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Chapter 1
Introduction
It is a well-accepted fact that doings and decisions of virtually every acting sub-
ject – whether it is an individual, an organization, or even an entire country –
do inevitably influence and connect to the actions of other subjects. Depending
on the context, these mutual interdependencies induce network-like relationships
which may take various forms. In daily life, for example, friendships and interper-
sonal relations between people span cohesive networks in which they communicate
and exchange information. Especially in recent times, these structures take concrete
shapes since more and more people are organizing themselves in social networks like
Facebook. But similar considerations also apply on institutional levels. Companies,
for instance, form reciprocal agreements which induce a high degree of collaboration
between them. This not only impacts competition but it also influences the prod-
uct variety obtainable in the market. Moreover, many countries enter bilateral or
even multilateral contracts which affect trade flows on a global level. Consequently,
for many years now, investigating economic networks has become a key element of
economic science and the number of publications dealing with this subject is contin-
uously increasing. In particular, the studies presented in this thesis also contribute
to this field of research.
Since network structures are characteristic for many settings and applications, the
corresponding analysis is divided into several (overlapping) branches. Among them
one could mention not only stability and efficiency of network structures but also
communication issues or public good provision, to name but a few. In addition to
this, many laboratory experiments and econometric studies have been conducted
in this context. As these examples already indicate, economic networks have been
approached in literature in manifold and highly heterogeneous ways. Thus, it is im-
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possible to embed all of them in a general framework. Instead, the objective of this
thesis is to highlight cooperative as well as strategic games in network economics in
order to explore this aspect in more detail and to complement it by analyzing issues
which have not been covered so far.
Roughly speaking, the vast majority of research questions in network theory that
utilize game theoretic tools is addressed in three specific branches. The first one con-
centrates on allocation rules for network games, i.e., on the issue of cooperatively
allocating welfare among the members of a (given) network. The main objective of
the second one is, on the other hand, to study strategic network formation in order
to predict which networks are likely to occur. Last but not least, the third branch
uses game theoretic concepts for analyzing locational competition on networks. As
a consequence of this division, the main part of this thesis consists of three self-
contained chapters (i.e., each can be read independently of the others), and each
of them focuses on one of the aforementioned topics. Chapter 2 looks at allocation
rules for network games whereas Chapter 3 concentrates on non-cooperative network
formation and Chapter 4 on locational competition on networks. The main goal is
to model the economic problems addressed in these branches more realistically in
order to enlarge the field of possible applications. This is done by allowing for more
flexibility in the formal substructure of the standard approaches. In order to give a
more precise idea about the proceeding, each of the branches will be outlined briefly
in the remainder of this introduction by surveying the most important contributions
and highlighting the main research questions. However, each chapter also contains
a comprehensive introduction that leads more into the details of the corresponding
topic and discusses interdisciplinary literature as well.
1.1 Allocation Rules for Network Games
The origins of this branch date back to cooperative game theory. Traditionally,
cooperative games with transferable utility (TU games) focus on situations where
a group of individuals generates some welfare by cooperation. The goal is to find
appropriate ways for allocating the welfare among the members of the group. This
is, of course, far away from being a trivial issue. Nevertheless, there are many stud-
ies addressing this issue and providing a variety of possible solutions (also known as
allocation rules if the solution is single-valued) which are usually based on certain
stability or fairness requirements (see, e.g., Peleg and Sudholter, 2003).
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One of the most known allocation rules is the famous Shapley Value (Shapley, 1953)
which is remarkable for at least two reasons: On the one hand, it is surprisingly in-
tuitive and, on the other, it can be characterized by a combination of convincing
axioms (see, e.g., Roth, 1988). In fact, the Shapley Value is the unique solution
concept which is efficient (i.e., the entire welfare is allocated to the individuals),
symmetric (i.e., all individuals are treated equally), additive (i.e., if there are no
externalities between two TU games, the corresponding allocations are mutually
independent, too), and satisfies the dummy axiom (i.e., individuals who do not con-
tribute receive a payoff of zero).1 Ever since this solution concept was introduced,
it has inspired many researchers who have varied and extended Shapley’s idea in
several ways. Among them is also Myerson (1977) who was the first author who
explicitly took network relations between the individuals into account. He assumed
that the lines of cooperation are restricted by these relations and he adjusted the
Shapley Value accordingly. In fact, he has shown that there is a unique allocation
rule (by now known as the Myerson Value) which, on the one hand, allocates the
welfare generated by each component of the network only among the corresponding
members and, on the other, guarantees equal bargaining power in terms of that if a
link between two individuals is deleted, both are affected equally (he called this fea-
ture “fairness”). In Myerson (1980), he generalized this approach to more complex
network structures, namely to mathematical hypergraphs which he interpreted as
conference structures, and he also extended his solution by translating the axiom-
atization from his previous work to the more general setting. A further prominent
allocation rule which is based on the setup of Myerson (1977) is the well-known
Position Value (Borm et al., 1992). The main idea of Borm et al. (1992) was to
construct a two-stage allocation procedure where first each link obtains a share of
the welfare which then, subsequently, is split equally between the two corresponding
partners. Thereby the authors assumed that the payoff of each link is determined
according to a modification of the Shapley Value. For trees (i.e., for networks with-
out cycles) Borm et al. (1992) also provided an axiomatic characterization of the
Position Value but they were not able to find one for arbitrary networks. Moreover,
in the same year, van den Nouweland et al. (1992) extended this allocation rule to
conference structures, too.
Although the aforementioned papers included networks into the setting of TU games
in a reasonable way, they are still subject to at least one major limitation: The au-
1In his seminal contribution Shapley actually used slightly different axioms. But the characteriza-
tion mentioned here is more prominent (cf. Winter, 2002).
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thors incorporated network relations between the individuals just for restricting the
possible lines of cooperation, but the induced welfare did not depend on the network
directly. This assumption is maintained by many works built on Myerson’s model
(e.g., Albizuri et al., 2005; Hamiache, 1999; Herings et al., 2008). For an overview
see Slikker and van den Nouweland (2001). However, Jackson and Wolinsky (1996)
were the first to recognize that in several environments the limitation appears to be
implausible. In their seminal contribution, they therefore followed a different ap-
proach and considered a model in which the welfare of cooperation directly depends
on the network structure. Even though this step is straightforward and relatively
small from a technical point of view, it allowed for many interesting economic im-
plications and gave fresh momentum to the analysis of economic networks. In fact,
Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) not only extended the Myerson Value and its charac-
terization to the generalized setting but they also showed that using this allocation
rule induces a certain type of stability. Especially the latter point inspired many
papers dealing with network formation (cf. Section 1.2).
Later, Jackson (2005) challenged some fundamental aspects of the Myerson Value.
His main criticism was that it is appropriate only in situations where the network
describing the relations between the individuals is fixed, as this allocation rule does
not take into account that, for example, certain links might be added. Following this
idea, Jackson (2005) introduced alternative solutions and provided characterizations
by means of axioms which explicitly allowed for some flexibility in the underlying
network. In the same year, Slikker (2005a,b) also extended the Position Value to
the setting of Jackson and Wolinsky (1996). Since in this model the networks play
a more central role, the main motivation that first each link receives a share of the
welfare became even more explicit. In fact, due to the higher degree of flexibility,
van den Nouweland and Slikker (2012) were able to provide an characterization of
the Position Value which parallels the one of the Shapley Value. More specifically,
the Position Value is the unique allocation rule which is efficient (i.e., the entire
welfare generated by a given network is allocated among the individuals), additive
(i.e., if there are no externalities between two network games, the corresponding
allocations do not affect each other as well), link anonymous (i.e., if the welfare only
depends on the number of links, the same goes for the payoff of the individuals), and
satisfies the superfluous link property (i.e., if a link does not affect the generated
welfare, it does not influence the individuals’ payoffs either).
Two further prominent solution concepts not mentioned so far are the egalitarian
allocation rule and the component-wise egalitarian allocation rule (both were in-
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troduced in Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) but the authors named them differently).
The motivation of the first one is straightforward: The welfare is split equally among
all individuals. Under the component-wise egalitarian allocation rule, on the other
hand, the focus is on the components. That is, the welfare generated by each of them
is equally distributed only among the corresponding members (given that there are
no externalities between the components). Jackson and van den Nouweland (2005)
showed that the latter allocation rule allows for interesting stability implications.
The second chapter of this thesis is built on or is related to all the aforemen-
tioned publications and reconnects network theory to its foundations in coopera-
tive game theory. In fact, the main motivation is two-fold: First, the model of
Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) is extended even further in order to capture a class of
applications which is neither covered by network theory nor by cooperative game
theory. More specifically, almost all of the models dealing with economic networks
are limited by the implicit assumption that cooperation takes place only within pairs
of individuals. In real life, however, this appears to be unrealistic in many settings.
Indeed, cooperation usually takes place not only within pairs but also within larger
groups such as departments of an organization, for example, and generically these
groups may overlap. Therefore, Chapter 2 focuses on the more general framework
of overlapping group structures which extends not only network games but also TU
games.
The second goal is to provide a framework which allows analyzing two-stage allo-
cation procedures like the Position Value in a structured way. In the context of
overlapping group structures this can be done particularly tractably by exploiting
the existence of a unique dual game where individuals and links interchange roles.
Proceeding this way allows not only modeling two stages explicitly but also formu-
lating convincing properties for solution concepts which characterize them. Thereby
it will be shown, for example, that the Position Value and iteratively applying the
Myerson Value can be characterized by similar axiomatizations.
1.2 Strategic Network Formation
In most of the publications surveyed in the previous section, the authors designed
allocation rules for situations where some welfare already had been generated by
a given network. However, the authors usually did not discuss under which cir-
cumstances which structures will emerge. Since this is of fundamental interest,
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especially in recent years more and more attention has been devoted to the issue of
network formation and it has been examined from numerous angles. An intuitive
and straightforward approach is to focus on structures which are stable with respect
to certain deviations. In order to give a brief overview, the following passages sum-
marize the most groundbreaking and prominent contributions to this approach.
The first work which explicitly modeled network formation has been provided by
Aumann and Myerson (1988) who considered a model of sequential link formation.
Given a finite set of individuals and starting with the empty network (i.e., there are
no links at all), the individuals were allowed to progressively add links according to a
given (random) order. Thereby the authors assumed that it is not possible to delete
links after they had been formed and the final payoff was determined by the My-
erson Value (cf. Section 1.1). For solving this game, Aumann and Myerson (1988)
focused on a refinement of Nash equilibria (Nash, 1951), namely on subgame perfect
equilibria (Selten, 1965). In this specific setting, this basically means that no pair of
players wants to add a link even if the sequence does not start at the empty but at
a different network. In particular, subgame perfectness implies that when deciding
whether to form a link or not, the individuals also take into account which network
might emerge in the end. Although the authors introduced the setup formally, they
did not analyze it extensively but rather discussed particular examples in which
their approach induced more plausible results than coalition formation in coopera-
tive game theory. However, since the existence of an ordering which specifies which
links may be added to the network cannot be guaranteed generically, there are not
many economic problems to which the model has been applied. Some years later,
Myerson (1991) took an alternative and more convincing approach. He introduced
a link formation process in which the individuals simultaneously announce to whom
they want to be connected and if two individuals agree to being connected, a link
between them is formed. The final payoff of the individuals is thereby supposed to
directly depend on the structure of the resulting network. Although Myerson (1991)
only briefly mentioned this link formation process and did not develop it in detail,
some attention has been devoted to it in literature. Indeed, the process inspired
several authors who adopted and varied it in multiple ways (e.g., Arcaute et al.,
2013; Bala and Goyal, 2000; Dutta and Mutuswami, 1997; Gilles et al., 2012).
Since Myerson’s setup obviously induces a non-cooperative game (by now known as
consent game), it is natural to focus on Nash equilibria for finding stable structures.
However, although the basic idea of the approach is quite plausible and appeal-
ing, using this stability concept has a significant drawback in a network framework.
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Applying Nash equilibria is appropriate only in settings where the focus is on devi-
ations of single players. But in Myerson’s game, the consent of both corresponding
individuals is needed to establish a new link. A straightforward implication of this
coordination problem is that every network is always stable when nobody wants
to sever one of her connections (like in the empty network, for example). Thus,
in a sense, there are too many stable outcomes. The first stability concept which
overcame this inappropriateness and was broadly accepted in literature stems from
Jackson and Wolinsky (1996). In fact, their work not only gave fresh momentum to
the analysis of allocation rules (cf. Section 1.1) but it also was the initial point
of a new stream of literature addressing network formation. The main idea of
Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) was to focus on single links, i.e., they considered a
network to be “pairwise stable” if no single link is changed anymore. Thereby, they
assumed that deleting a connection can be done unilaterally, while establishing a
new one needs the consent of both corresponding individuals. Phrased differently, a
network is pairwise stable if, on the one hand, nobody benefits from severing one of
her links and, on the other, if someone would like to add a link, the corresponding
partner would suffer from this. In this context, Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) found
among other things that often there might be a tension between efficiency and sta-
bility, i.e., in many settings it might be the case that none of the networks which is
desirable from a social planner’s point of view is stable and vice versa.
Although the existence of pairwise stable networks is an issue generically (see, e.g.,
Hellman, 2013; Jackson and Watts, 2001), motivated by the simple but convincing
idea of the stability concept, many researchers applied the basic setup to a vari-
ety of applications. Goyal and Joshi (2003, 2006), for example, used the model for
analyzing the collaboration of firms and free-trade agreements between countries.
But in contrast to Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) they have shown that in these
more specific settings stability and efficiency are generically not mutually exclusive.
Further contributions, to name but a few, stem from Calvo´-Armengol (2004) and
Bramoulle´ and Kranton (2007) who study, respectively, job contact networks and
risk sharing in networks.
However, even though the concept of pairwise stability is appealing in many ways,
in some settings it might be ineligible and, thus, it has been varied and refined in
several ways. The four most prominent modifications are pairwise stability with side
payments, pairwise Nash stability, strong stability, and farsighted stability.
As mentioned above, Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) implicitly assume that a link can
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be severed unilaterally, while establishing a new one needs just the consents of both
corresponding partners. In particular, since other individuals cannot influence these
decisions, cutting off a connection or establishing a new one might cause externalities
within the network. Taking this into account, Bloch and Jackson (2007) considered
a model variation in which side payments between the individuals are possible. In
fact, including compensations into the model allows to some extent to internalize
the externalities and to decrease the tension between efficiency and stability.
Another major criticism of pairwise stability is that this concept just focuses on al-
terations of single links. But in some situations, individuals might have an incentive
to change several connections at the same time. This aspect has been captured at
least partially by Calvo´-Armengol and I˙lkılıc¸ (2009) who combined the approaches
of Myerson (1991) and Jackson and Wolinsky (1996). In their paper, the authors
considered a network to be “pairwise Nash stable” if and only if it is pairwise sta-
ble from the perspective of Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) and Nash stable from the
perspective of Myerson (1991). This concept is appropriate in situations where the
individuals are able to unilaterally delete several of their connections at the same
time and where, if two individuals benefit from forming a link, there occurs no co-
ordination problem as in Myerson (1991). Hence, it is straightforward to show that
pairwise stability and pairwise Nash stability coincide if and only if in every pairwise
stable network, no player benefits from severing any set of her connections.
Some years earlier already, Jackson and van den Nouweland (2005) chose an even
more general approach and examined the “strong stability” of networks. The main
idea is that the members of a network might be able to coordinate themselves within
subgroups in order to conduct multiple changes at the same time. Consequently,
Jackson and van den Nouweland (2005) considered a network to be strongly stable if
there exists no subgroup of individuals where all of them could improve by changing
the network in such a way that they do not need the consent of individuals who are
not contained in the subgroup. In this context, the authors analyzed requirements
under which stable and socially optimal outcomes coincide, that is, they discussed
conditions guaranteeing that there is no tension between stability and efficiency.
Page et al. (2005) challenged a further shortcoming of pairwise stability. In fact,
the concept requires that the individuals are not forward-looking, meaning that
they only care about the immediate loss (or benefit) of changing a single link. Im-
plicitly, they are supposed to not take into account that this might cause further
changes of the network which finally might generate a higher (or lower) benefit. By
adopting the concepts of Chwe (1994) to network theory, Page et al. (2005) tried
13
to overcome this shortcoming and discussed the “farsighted stability” of networks.
The idea is, basically speaking, that the individuals are able to predict which struc-
ture might occur at the end of an arbitrarily long sequence of changes. Although
Page et al. (2005) did not define farsighted stability explicitly, according to their
main motivation a network is farsightedly stable if each deviation might lead to a
sequence of changes which finally makes the deviating individual(s) worse off. Note
that this is obviously closely related to strong stability. The main difference is that
here, the individuals behave less cooperatively. They do not coordinate directly
but they conduct non-cooperatively those changes which lead to further deviations
that finally provide them with a higher benefit. For further publications addressing
farsighted stability, see Page and Wooders (2009) or Herings et al. (2009), to name
but a few.
Another stream of literature which should not be neglected in this introduction
deals with dynamic network formation. The first publication addressing this issue
is from Bala and Goyal (2000). For specifically chosen payoff functions, the authors
studied the best response dynamic in the framework of Myerson’s consent game.
More precisely, they analyzed a repeated version of the game where the individuals
are supposed to play a best response against the strategies chosen in the previous
period. In addition to this, Bala and Goyal (2000) assumed that there is a certain
probability that the individuals stick to their previous strategy in order to escape
perpetual miscoordinations. Since these dynamics induce a Markov chain, the au-
thors focused on the question to which networks the process converges to. To this
end, they conducted several simulations and for small numbers of players, the out-
comes mostly coincided with the strict Nash equilibria of the one-shot game.
One year later, Watts (2001) followed a slightly different approach by considering
a random process in which in each period only one single link is picked randomly
with uniform probability. If the link is already contained in the network, then either
of the involved individuals is allowed to delete it. If the link is not contained in
the network, then the two corresponding individuals may decide to establish the
connection (both need to agree) and, at the same time, each of them may sever any
of her other connections. Thereby, the individuals are assumed to care only about
the immediate benefit, i.e., they are supposed to not be forward-looking. The main
insight of the paper was that the process converges to a socially optimal outcome
only under quite specific conditions.
In Jackson and Watts (2002), the authors modeled dynamic network formation in a
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similar way as Watts (2001) did. They also considered a random process in which in
each round exactly one link is picked randomly. However, there are two main differ-
ences to Watts (2001). First, inspired by pairwise stability the authors assume that
only the selected connection may be altered but the other links remain the same.
Second, after the involved individuals have decided whether to alter the connection
or not, with some small probability there might occur a mutation which reverses the
decision. That is, if the link is now contained in the network it is deleted and vice
versa. Given this Markov chain, Jackson and Watts (2002) considered a network
to be stochastically stable if it is in the support of the process as the probability
of the mutation converges to zero. In fact, they also provide a characterization of
these networks (by using “minimal resistance trees”) but this characterization is
relatively unintuitive and the economic interpretation is not obvious. Taking up
this subject, Tercieux and Vannetelbosch (2006) further elaborated on the setting
of Jackson and Watts (2002). In doing so, they characterized stochastically stable
networks by refining pairwise stability.
Another publication contributing to this stream of literature is Feri (2007). The
author analyzed stochastic stability in the framework of Bala and Goyal (2000) by
using a slightly varied payoff scheme but analyzing a random process which is sim-
ilar to the one from Jackson and Watts (2002). Thereby, he found that the set of
strict Nash networks from Bala and Goyal (2000) and the set of stochastically stable
networks almost coincide.
Similar to the aforementioned literature, the third chapter of this thesis also con-
centrates on network formation. It is a joint work with Ana Mauleon and Vincent
Vannetelbosch, whom I met when I was visiting the Center for Operations Research
and Econometrics (CORE) in Louvain-la-Neuve for six months. During my stay we
jointly worked out our research question in many fruitful and interesting discussions
and developed our model accordingly. Indeed, it complements the aforementioned
literature in at least two ways. First, it considers a more general notion of networks.
Our main objective is to analyze the formation of group structures where individuals
are allowed to engage in several groups at the same time. Formally this means that
each link in a network may contain not only two partners but an arbitrary number
of individuals. Second, the more distinguishing feature is the formal introduction
of constitutions. Each group or link is supposed to have a constitution governing
which members may join or leave it. Given these constitutional rules, a network is
considered to be stable if none of the groups is altered any more. This, in particu-
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lar, implies that the stability of a network depends on explicitly formalized rules of
network formation, and the analysis conducted in Chapter 3 is therefore two-fold:
It not only focuses on the issue of whether stable networks actually exist but also
on how the constitutions need to be designed in order to guarantee stability if the
individuals follow a “trial-and-error strategy”.
After having constructed the formal substructure, I undertook the analysis of the
model in order to derive the results presented in Chapter 3. The trial-and-error
behavior, for example, is formalized by means of a random process which is similar
to the one of Jackson and Watts (2002). Based on these preliminaries, we further
elaborated on the central theme in order to emphasize the main insights of our
model. For instance, we show that enhancing the blocking power of the individuals
does not necessarily lead to more stability and that a stable network is obtained for
sure if and only if there is a certain degree of consent about which feasible deviations
(according to the constitutions) are beneficial and which are not. Furthermore, by
embedding many-to-many matchings into our setting, we apply the model to job
markets with labor unions. To some extent the unions may provide job guarantees
and, thus, have influence on the stability of the job market.
1.3 Locational Competition on Networks
The large field of locational competition dates back to the pioneering work of
Hotelling (1929). He illustrated the competition between two firms operating in
a heterogeneous market by means of a simple but intriguingly intuitive two-stage
model. At the first stage, both competitors simultaneously choose a position in
the market which Hotelling (1929) modeled as a linear interval. The consumers are
supposed to be uniformly distributed along the interval and their utility is linearly
decreasing in the distance to the firm they buy from. At the second stage, each
competitor chooses a price for her good where the marginal costs are assumed to be
constant. Taking the prices and the locations into account, the consumers buy the
product which gives a higher benefit to them. Hotelling (1929) thereby assumed that
the total demand is totally inelastic. Given this setup, he found what has by now
become famous as the principle of minimal differentiation: In the unique subgame
perfect Nash equilibrium (cf. Section 1.2) both firms cluster in the middle of the
market and choose identical prices. By translating this result to daily life, Hotelling
(1929) tried to explain the increasing amount of standardization:
16
“Buyers are confronted everywhere with an excessive sameness. [...]
there is an incentive to make the new product very much like the old,
applying some slight change which will seem an improvement to as many
buyers as possible without ever going far in this direction. [...] So general
is this tendency that it appears in the most diverse fields of competitive
activity, even quite apart from what is called economic life. In politics
it is strikingly exemplified.” (Hotelling, 1929, p. 54)
Due to its clear and convincing message, the model received a great deal of attention.
However, by showing that there actually exists no subgame perfect Nash equilibrium
in the model, d’Aspremont et al. (1979) proved about 50 years later that Hotelling
(1929) was wrong. Furthermore, the authors also reinforced the main message of
several other studies which had shown that Hotelling’s setup is extremely sensitive
with respect to the underlying assumptions (e.g., Downs, 1957; Eaton and Lipsey,
1975; Lerner and Singer, 1937). Even if the fundamentals of the model are relaxed
or varied only slightly, it might change the final outcome considerably. These in-
sights lead to a broad discussion about to which extent minimal differentiation is
caused by spatial competition since other publications like de Palma et al. (1985,
1990) or Rhee (1996), to name but a few, demonstrated that Hotelling’s main result
can be restored under certain conditions. Indeed, up to now there is no final answer
to this question and the discussion is not over yet (e.g., Hehenkamp and Wambach,
2010; Irmen and Thisse, 1998; Kro´l, 2012; Meagher and Zauner, 2004).
The first three works which used networks for modeling the underlying market were
Hakimi (1964), Slater (1977) and Wendell and McKelvey (1981).2 Actually, the
main motivation of Hakimi (1964) was to study the problem of finding the best po-
sition of a single facility in a network (with respect to certain requirements) but he
did not study a competitive environment. However, he briefly mentioned that this
would be a reasonable extension. Following this idea, Slater (1977) deepened these
considerations. Since he developed his model independently from Hotelling (1929)
and as he was only interested in the location choices of the two competitors, he ab-
stracted from the second stage, i.e., he did not take price competition into account.
Moreover, he assumed that the two firms enter the market sequentially in order to
guarantee the existence of an equilibrium outcome. Nevertheless, although Slater’s
motivation was different to Hotelling’s, for the special class of tree networks he also
2In the context of spatial competition, networks are often denoted as graphs. This convention is
maintained in Chapter 4 as well.
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found that the firms minimally differentiate at the median (which he called centroid)
of the tree. For arbitrary networks he was only able to solve the model partially.
Independently of the two aforementioned works but motivated by Hotelling (1929)
and voting theory (e.g., Downs, 1957), Wendell and McKelvey (1981) tried to solve
the problem of finding a “Condorcet-winner” in a network. This issue can be shown
to be equivalent to finding a Nash equilibrium if there are two competitors. Since
the authors focused on voting theory, similarly to Slater (1977) they did not consider
a second stage with price competition. Indeed, they also found that given a tree
network, the median is the only Condorcet-winner.
Based on these works, the analysis of locational competition on networks continued
in several directions. Hakimi (1983) extended the model of Slater (1977) by con-
structing a more general setup in which both competitors were allowed to place more
than only one facility, i.e., they were allowed to occupy more than only one position
(but the number of positions was exogenously fixed). Analogously to Slater (1977),
he also focused on the location choices of the competitors and assumed that they
enter the market sequentially. This, in particular, implies that there always exists
equilibrium outcomes. However, Hakimi (1983) proved that, except for special cases,
finding these equilibria is very complex since the optimization problem of the leader
as well as of the follower generically is NP-hard and cannot be solved in polynomial
time. That is, although there exists an optimal solution for sure, finding it takes
much effort. These insights gave birth to a stream of literature which tries to find
efficient algorithms for solving the aforementioned issues or variations of them (e.g.,
Hansen and Labbe´, 1988; Kress and Pesch, 2012; Spoerhase and Wirth, 2009). But
the vast majority of these contributions did not address the issue of minimal differ-
entiation.
While the studies mentioned in the previous passage focused on situations where
the competitors enter the market sequentially, a further stream of literature consid-
ered, in contrast to this, the case of simultaneous entry like Wendell and McKelvey
(1981) did. A work which is particularly in spirit with Hotelling (1929) stems from
Eiselt (1992). He considered a two-stage competition where the competitors first
occupy a position in a tree and then, at the second stage, choose their prices. This
is, on the one hand, obviously the most straightforward extension of Hotelling’s
model to a network setup. But, on the other hand, a consequence of proceed-
ing that way is that generically there exists no equilibrium. In order to avoid the
non-existence problem, Eiselt (1992) also analyzed a setup without price compe-
tition, i.e, he analyzed the case where prices of both competitors are fixed. This
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had already been discussed by Eiselt and Laporte (1991). As a by-product they
thereby confirmed the results of Slater (1977) and Wendell and McKelvey (1981):
Given that prices are identical, both competitors will minimally differentiate at the
median. Later, Eiselt and Laporte (1993) also analyzed the locational competition
between three players on a tree and derived similar results. However, if the analy-
sis is not restricted to trees, abstracting from price competition is not sufficient for
guaranteeing the existence of equilibria as has been shown by Knoblauch (1991) and
Du¨rr and Thang (2007). Moreover, even if equilibria exist, finding them is NP-hard.
Therefore, most authors who focused only on the first stage, i.e, only on locational
competition, needed to impose further requirements in order to generate significant
results. For example, de Palma et al. (1989) studied a framework in which the indi-
viduals’ utility not only depends on the distance to the closest competitor but also
randomly on other characteristics not captured by the underlying network. Further-
more, Eiselt and Bhadury (1998) elaborated on the existence of Nash equilibria if
the competitors have fixed but unequal prices and Gur et al. (2012) concentrated
on particular subclasses of networks like cacti, to name but a few.
In addition to the aforementioned publications, there are several other works which
do not abandon the second stage completely but vary it by considering other forms of
price competition or Cournot competition. For example, Lederer and Thisse (1990)
and Dorta-Gonza´lez et al. (2005) assumed “delivery pricing” instead of “mill pric-
ing”. This means, roughly speaking, that at the second stage, the firms do not charge
a single price which is the same for every buyer but instead they determine specific
prices for each of the nodes of the network. In fact, given some further relatively
mild assumptions, this not only guarantees the existence of equilibrium outcomes
but it also assures that these outcomes are socially optimal. In contrast to having
price competition at the second stage, some further works studied Cournot compe-
tition instead (e.g., Labbe´ and Hakimi, 1991; Sarkar et al., 1997). More specifically,
the firms are again supposed to choose their positions first but then, subsequently,
the basic assumption is that they compete in quantities but not in prices. Most of
the corresponding studies focus on providing sufficient conditions for assuring the
existence of equilibria since those do not necessarily exist in this model variation.
Although the fourth chapter of this thesis (which is a joint work with Berno Bu¨chel
where both of us contributed equally) is about locational competition on networks,
the main question that is addressed is not restricted to networks and should also be
interesting in a more general context. Indeed, our main motivation is to challenge a
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fundamental aspect of Hotelling’s approach. Although the literature on locational
competition (not only with respect to networks) is rich and highly diversified, it has
been virtually always assumed that individuals who prefer the same position fully
agree upon the ranking of the other alternatives, i.e., they have identical preferences
or utility functions. This is, of course, hard to justify since it might well be that in
real life there are consumers with the same favorite brand but who disagree about
the ordering of two other brands. Therefore, in our study we scrutinize whether
given outcomes of locational competition rely on the questionable homogeneity re-
quirement or not. If it can be shown, that this assumption is not driving the results,
then the model is put on a solid foundation (at least with respect to this crucial
aspect).
To fix ideas: Given an underlying network, we consider an equilibrium outcome to
be “robust” if it does not depend on the aforementioned homogeneity requirement.
A key result of our analysis is the characterization of robust equilibria by four con-
ditions which are based on partitioning the underlying space into hinterlands and
competitive zones. Applying this result allows us first of all to judge which of the
standard results are robust. In fact, we find that several outcomes do not depend
on the homogeneity requirement, but some do. Furthermore, by discussing whether
the classical observations of minimal differentiation is a robust phenomenon, we find
strong support for an old conjecture that in equilibrium firms form local clusters.
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Chapter 2
Two-Stage Rules
2.1 Introduction
Ever since the beginnings of economic theory, finding appropriate as well as convinc-
ing ways for distributing welfare has been one of the fundamental problems. In the
context of cooperation between individuals, there are two branches, namely the The-
ory of Cooperative Games and, more recently, the Theory of Economic Networks,
that especially focus on this question and propose several solutions, which are called
values or allocation rules. This study relates to both approaches. More specifically,
the main purpose is to formalize and examine two-stage allocation procedures. To
gain an idea of this issue, consider situations where individuals cooperate in several
groups or coalitions which may overlap, like in departments of organizations, for
example. The main motivation of two-stage allocation procedures is that the gener-
ated welfare is not distributed to the individuals directly but first to the groups and
then, in a second step, within each group. In fact, for modeling this is it necessary
to extend the aforementioned approaches, Network Theory and Cooperative Game
Theory, to a more general model.
To understand the difference between Network Theory and Cooperative Game The-
ory it is necessary to analyze the view of cooperation in both branches. Coopera-
tive games with transferable utility (TU games) provide a theoretical framework for
modeling environments where the individuals are partitioned in coalition structures,
i.e., some individuals act together in groups to achieve a common goal but stan-
dardly it is assumed that nobody is a member of different groups at once (see, e.g.,
Aumann and Dre`ze, 1974). In Network Theory, on the other hand, coalitions are re-
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placed by networks which represent bilateral relationships between individuals (see,
e.g., Jackson, 2008). Indeed, one of the most characteristic features of networks is
that they exhibit some overlapping structure. However, in these models, cooperation
generically takes place only within pairs of individuals, which is a limitation as well.
Consider, for example, the models from Radner (1993), Bolton and Dewatriopont
(1994), or Arenas et al. (2010). Here, the authors use networks for representing the
structure of organizations. Within each network, the information is shared along the
links: that is, the information is exchanged among pairs of individuals. In general,
however, employees also work together within larger groups, such as projects, de-
partments, or divisions, and in many environments these groups may overlap, which
neither could be depicted by using bilateral networks nor by using TU games.
A convenient tool for modeling overlapping coalition structures are mathematical
hypergraphs which can be interpreted as a kind of overlapping coalition struc-
ture. Up to now, there is no general notion for these structures. Depending on
the context they are called “conference structures” (e.g., Myerson, 1980), “affilia-
tion networks” (e.g., Wasserman and Faust, 1994), “overlapping coalitions” (e.g.,
Chalkiadakis et al., 2010), “clubs” (e.g., Fershtman and Persitz, 2012) or simply
“hypergraphs” (e.g., Jorzik, 2012; van den Nouweland et al., 1992). To stress both,
the origins from Network Theory as well as from Cooperative Game Theory, in this
paper they will be called coalitional networks.
Formalizing two-stage allocation procedures is in line with several other works from
literature (e.g., Aumann and Dre`ze, 1974; Borm et al., 1992; Hart and Kurz, 1983;
Owen, 1977). More specifically, in their publications the authors introduce and
discuss particular examples, like the Aumann-Dre`ze Value, Owen’s Value or the
Position Value. Another contribution stems from Winter (1989) who analyzes co-
operative games with exogenously-given hierarchical structures. In this context,
he extends the Aumann-Dre`ze Value and Owen’s Value to arbitrary numbers of
stages. However, these publications do not provide a general framework for dis-
cussing two-stage allocation procedures in a structured way. In the context of
coalitional networks, this can be done tractably by exploiting the existence of a
unique dual network which can be interpreted as some kind of dual game where
individuals and coalitions (or links, respectively) interchange roles. This allows not
only modeling two stages explicitly but also formulating convincing properties for
solution concepts which characterize them. Indeed, it is possible to integrate the
aforementioned examples into the extended setting presented here. As it shall be
proven in this study, these solution concepts can be characterized by using similar
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axiomatizations. In particular, the second part of the paper is strongly motivated
by van den Brink (2007). In his work the author shows that the Shapley Value
(Shapley, 1953) and Equal Division Solutions can be described by means of similar
axioms. This leitmotiv will be found twice in the present study: Not only by show-
ing that the aforementioned two-stage allocation procedures satisfy similar axioms,
but also by extending the characterizations from van den Brink (2007) to coalitional
networks.
Some further publications should be mentioned in the context of this study. One
of the first authors theorizing overlapping coalition structures was Myerson (1980).
His study is motivated by TU games and the focus is on conference structures
which are modeled by means of hypergraphs. However, Myerson’s approach dif-
fers from the present work in at least one important aspect. He uses overlapping
coalition structures only for restricting the possible lines of cooperation between the
individuals, but the generated value or welfare, respectively, does not depend on
the underlying communication structure directly. This assumption is maintained
in most of the works built on Myerson’s publication (e.g., Albizuri et al., 2005;
van den Nouweland et al., 1992). In recent years, computer scientists also tended to
pay more and more attention to Cooperative Game Theory. They use TU games to
model the behavior of autonomous agents, and in this context they also investigate
overlapping coalition structures. However, most of the corresponding publications
(e.g., Chalkiadakis et al., 2010) focus on extensions of the core which, will not be
discussed here.
Although several notions and concepts used in this work are adopted from Network
Theory (e.g., from Jackson, 2005; Jackson and Wolinsky, 1996), overlapping coali-
tion structures have only been attempted by few scholars in this field. Among them
are Fershtman and Persitz (2012) who extend the Connections Model to the general-
ized framework and Jorzik (2012) who examines allocation rules for hypergraphs. A
further interesting work stems from Caulier et al. (2012) who study network forma-
tion for situations where the set of individuals is already partitioned into coalitions.
In this context, the authors examine the stability and efficiency of networks.
Moreover, from a technical point of view the model introduced here also relates to
many-to-many matchings (see, e.g., Sotomayor, 2004). In fact, there exists a canon-
ical bijection between many-to-many matchings and coalitional networks. However,
virtually all publications from this field do not address two-stage allocation rules
but have different objectives.
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The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows: In the next section, the model will
be introduced formally. This includes the definition of coalitional networks as well
as the extension of value functions and characteristic functions to the framework
analyzed here. The objective of Section 2.3 is to formalize allocation rules and to
characterize two-stage allocation procedures in general. Section 2.4 is devoted to
particular examples, like the Position Value, for instance. Finally, Section 2.5 briefly
summarizes and presents an agenda for further research.
2.2 The Model
Let N = {i1, . . . , in} be a finite set of players or individuals who are able to generate
some value or profit by cooperation. The cooperation takes place within groups
which may overlap. For this, let a finite set M = {c1, . . . , cm} of connections or
coalitions be given. The elements of M are interpreted as projects or departments
of an organization, for example, and the players are members of these projects.
Definition 2.1. Let h ∶M Ð→ 2N be an arbitrary mapping, where 2N is the power
set of N . The tuple (N,M,h) is a coalitional network.
If a coalitional network represents the structure of an organization, for instance,
then the mapping h assigns to each project of the organization c ∈M the employees
h(c) ⊆ N that are working on it. In particular, from a mathematical point of view,
the coalitional network (N,M,h) is simply a hypergraph (see, e.g., Berge, 1989) and
the set of all coalitional networks is denoted by H. Note that ∣H∣ = 2nm. For ease
of handling, coalitional networks are also simply called networks in the following.
But it should be mentioned that in literature bilateral networks (i.e., each connection
contains exactly two players) are usually termed this way. Moreover, since N andM
are not altered most of the time, a coalitional network (N,M,h) will be frequently
identified with h only if no confusions can result.
Example 2.1. As an example let N = {i1, i2, i3} and M = {c1, . . . , c4}, i.e., there
are three players and four connections. Suppose all players are contained in c1, the
players i2 and i3 are moreover contained in c2 and c3, while c4 only contains i1.
A coalitional network (N,M,h) describing this situation formally would be given by
h(c) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
{i1, i2, i3}, if c = c1
{i2, i3}, if c ∈ {c2, c3}
{i1}, if c = c4.
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c2
c3
c1
c4
b
i1
b
i2
b
i3
⎛⎜⎜⎝
c1 c2 c3 c4
i1 1 0 0 1
i2 1 1 1 0
i3 1 1 1 0
⎞⎟⎟⎠
Figure 2.1: The coalitional network in Example 2.1
The main difference to Myerson’s Communication Structures (Myerson, 1980) is
that here for c ∈M also ∣h(c)∣ = 1 is allowed: that is, it is possible that a connection
contains only one player. If c ∈M represents a project or the like and the players are
employees, then it is of course possible that an employee is working on the project
alone. Therefore, these structures are not excluded a priori.1 A further important
special case is ∣h(c)∣ = 0, i.e., it is also possible that a connection is empty or, in
other words, no worker is assigned to the project. The coalitional network h∅ with
h∅(c) = ∅ for all c ∈M is called empty network.
One of the most basic and important insights in Hypergraph Theory is the existence
of a unique dual hypergraph or dual network, respectively (see, e.g., Berge, 1989).
Definition 2.2. Let (N,M,h) ∈ H be a coalitional network. The corresponding
dual network (M,N,h∗) is given by h∗(i) = {m ∈M ∣ i ∈ h(m)}.
i1
i2
i3
b
c4
b
c2
b
c3
b
c1
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
i1 i2 i3
c1 1 1 1
c2 0 1 1
c3 0 1 1
c4 1 0 0
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
Figure 2.2: The dual network in Example 2.1
For given h ∈ H, the dual network assigns to each player the set of connections she is
contained in. As the name implies, it is a coalitional network, too, and similar to h it
1The main arguments for assuming that each link has to contain at least two players are often
based on communication issues, like that at least two players are needed to confer, for example.
However, in this case it is still possible to adjust the incentives for forming connections of size
one accordingly. For instance, by assuming that these connections or departments, respectively,
generate no or even negative profit (see Section 2.3 for a formal introduction of players’ payoffs).
For an extensive discussion of this issue see Aumann and Dre`ze (1974).
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will be simply denoted by h∗ in the following. LetH∗ denote the set of dual networks.
Note that for all i ∈ N and c ∈ M , c ∈ h∗(i) if and only if i ∈ h(c). This implies
(h∗)∗ = h and, thus, the dual network is uniquely determined. Phrased differently,
the dual network is simply an alternative way of representing the network structure.
However, the salient point is that from an economic perspective the players and
connections interchange roles. In the dual network, the players link the connections
and vice versa.
The following notions and definitions are variations or straightforward extensions
from Network Theory (cf. Jackson, 2008). A network h ∈ H is a subnetwork of
h′ ∈ H (denoted by h ⊆ h′) if each connection in h is contained in the corresponding
connection of h′, i.e., h(c) ⊆ h′(c) for all c ∈ M . An important special case of
subnetworks is the restriction to a certain set of individuals. Given S ⊆ N , the
subnetwork h∣S is obtained from h by deleting in all connections all players who are
not contained in S. Formally: h∣S(c) = h(c) ∩ S for all c ∈M ∣h,S. Given h ∈ H, the
size ηh of the coalitional network is the aggregated cardinality of all connections: i.e.,
ηh ∶= ∑c∈M ∣h(c)∣. Two players i, j ∈ N are called neighbors or adjacent if there exists
c ∈M with i, j ∈ h(c). Furthermore, the degree degi(h) of the player is the number
of connections she is contained in: i.e., degi(h) = ∣{c ∈M ∣ i ∈ h(c)}∣. Note that the
aggregated degree equals exactly the size of the network, that is, ∑i∈N degi(h) = ηh.
If i ∈ N has a degree of zero, she is said to be isolated and a player who is not
isolated is active. The set of active players is N(h) = {i ∈ N ∣ degi(h) ≥ 1}.
For two players i, j ∈ N an i-j-walk in the coalitional network h ∈ H is a sequence
of players (i0, . . . , ik) with i = i0, j = ik and il is adjacent to il+1 for all 0 ≤ l < k. A
nonempty set of players S ⊆ N is said to be connected if for any pair i, j ∈ S there
exists a walk between them. Furthermore, S is called association if it is maximally
connected: i.e., it is connected and for all i, j with i ∈ S and j ∉ S there is no
i-j-walk in h. A nonempty network h¯ ∈ H is called component of h ∈ H if there
exists an association A ⊆ N with h¯ = h∣A. In the following, let A(h) be the set of
all associations and C(h) the set of all components. Note that an association may
consist of only one player who may have a degree of zero.
Definition 2.3. A value function is a mapping v ∶H Ð→ R assigning a real number
to each network h ∈ H, where v(h) is interpreted as the worth of the network.
Thereby it is assumed that each value function is normalized, i.e., v(h∅) = 0.
The worth of a network is the total value of cooperation. If h ∈ H represents the
structure of some organization or the like, v(h) might be the organization’s profit or
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budget. Let V denote the set of value functions. For each v ∈ V the corresponding
dual value function v∗ ∶ HN,2M Ð→ R is obtained by assigning to each dual network
h∗ the worth of its “primal” one: v∗(h∗) ∶= v ((h∗)∗) = v(h). This induces, in
particular, a bijection between V and the set of the dual value functions V∗. For
avoiding notational inconveniences, in the following V and V∗ will be identified with
each other. That is, no distinction will be made between the both sets and both of
them will just be denoted by V . Phrased differently, v ∈ V implies the value function
is the primal one if v is applied to a network h ∈H and it implies v is the dual value
function if v is applied to the dual network h∗ ∈H. However, because both networks
receive the same worth no confusions should arise.
A specific example are basic value functions (e.g., Jackson, 2005). Given h ∈H∖{h∅},
the corresponding basic value function 1h ∈ V is defined by
1h(h′) = ⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩
1, if h ⊆ h′
0, if h ⊈ h′.
The interpretation is that a coalitional network h′ ∈H generates a positive worth if
and only if it contains the specific structure h.
Let CA ⊆ V denote the special class of component-additive value functions. A
value function v ∈ CA is component-additive if ∑h¯∈C(h) v (h¯) = v(h) for all coalitional
networks h ∈ H. Here, the total productivity of a coalitional network is simply
the aggregated worth of all its components (cf. Jackson and Wolinsky, 1996). The
productivity of a component is therefore not exogenously influenced by the other
components.
Remark 2.1. Traditionally, a TU game is a pair (N,γ) consisting of the set of
players N and a characteristic function γ assigning a value to each coalition S ⊆
N , i.e., γ ∶ 2N Ð→ R (see, e.g., Roth, 1988). On the other hand, a (bilateral)
network game is a pair (N,w) where w assigns a value to each bilateral network,
i.e., w ∶ 2G Ð→ R with G = {S ⊆ N ∣ ∣S∣ = 2} (see, e.g., Jackson, 2008). The main
idea for combining both approaches within the extended framework considered here
is to exploit the fact that both domains, coalitions and bilateral networks, can be
embedded into the set of coalitional networks. For instance, if ∣M ∣ = 1, i.e., if there
is only one connection, this connection can be interpreted as a coalition and value
functions can be identified with characteristic functions. Thus, the model is indeed
an extension of TU games. Moreover, a network game (N,w) can also be represented
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in a canonical way: let M = G and for each g ∈ 2G define
hg({i, j}) = ⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩
{i, j}, if {i, j} ∈ g
∅, if {i, j} ∉ g.
That is, i and j are adjacent in hg if and only if they are linked in g. Note that
the value or worth, respectively, of each bilateral network only depends on whether
certain players are linked but not on in which way they are connected. Therefore,
if vw ∈ V satisfies not only vw(hg) = w(g) for all g ∈ 2G but also vw(hg ○ π) = vw(hg)
for each permutation π ∶M Ð→M , this value function de facto represents w.2
Remark 2.2. Basic value functions are a straightforward extension of unanimity
games (cf. Shapley, 1953). It is well-known from literature that these games form a
basis of the space of characteristic functions. Analogously it can be shown that the
set of basic value functions forms a basis of V . More precisely, each v ∈ V can be
written as
v = ∑
h∈H∖{h∅}
∆h(v)1h, where the ∆h(v) = ∑¯
h⊆h
(−1)ηh−ηh¯v(h¯)
are the Harsanyi coefficients (cf. Harsanyi, 1959). This representation of value func-
tions will be helpful in the proofs.
Remark 2.3. Note that CA = {v ∈ V ∣ v is component-additive} is a subspace of
V and 1h ∈ CA if and only if ∣C(h)∣ = 1 (cf. van den Nouweland and Slikker, 2012).
Moreover, since the operator ∗ ∶ V Ð→ V with v z→ v∗ is not only bijective but also
linear and ∣C(h)∣ = 1 is equivalent to ∣C(h∗)∣ = 1, v ∈ CA is component-additive if and
only if v∗ ∈ CA has this feature, too.
2.3 Allocation Rules
Given the productivity of cooperation, the next step is to allocate the worth among
the players. Therefore, the pair (N,M) is an allocation problem (note that V =
V(N,M) is uniquely determined by N and M). Most of the solutions analyzed in
Cooperative Game Theory or Network Theory distribute the worth in a player-based
way, i.e., the payoff is associated to players directly.
2As usual, ○ denotes the composition of the mappings hg and pi.
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Definition 2.4. A player-based allocation rule X assigns to each allocation problem
(N,M) a tuple of mappings (Xi)i∈N with Xi ∶ V Ð→ V and ∑i∈N Xi(v) = v for all
v ∈ V .3
A player-based allocation rule X (or (Xi)i∈N , respectively) decomposes each value
function v ∈ V into individual payoff functions vXi ∶= Xi(v) ∈ V . Phrased differently,
given the total productivity v(h) of a network h, each player receives her share
of the payoff vXi (h) = (Xi(v)) (h). The central assumption in Definition 2.4 is
that allocation rules are balanced, i.e., ∑i∈N vXi (h) = v(h) for all h ∈ H and v ∈ V .
Thus, the value of cooperation is always distributed completely among the players.4
The sets of all player-based allocation rules will be denoted by X . Note that each
allocation rule Z ∈ X assigns payoff functions (vZc )c∈M to the dual problem (M,N),
too. This is due to the fact that in the dual network the connections are considered
as players and vice versa.
Example 2.2. A possible way to allocate the worth of a network is to distribute it
equally among all active players:
vEDi (h) = (EDi(v)) (h) ∶=
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩
v(h)
∣N(h)∣ , if i ∈ N(h)
0, if i ∉ N(h),
where h ∈ HM,2N and v ∈ V. For instance, in Example 2.1 this yields vEDi (h) = v(h)4
for all i ∈ N . Analogously, in the corresponding dual network h∗ each connection
c ∈ M receives vEDc (h∗) = v(h∗)3 = v(h)3 . The allocation rule ED ∈ X will be called
Equal Division Solution in the following.
Distributing the worth in two stages cannot be modeled explicitly by means of player-
based allocation rules since, as mentioned before, in this case it is first distributed
3In their seminal contribution, Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) introduce (player-based) allocation
rules in a slightly different way. They define an allocation rule A to be a mapping A ∶ H×V Ð→ Rn
with ∑i∈N Ai(h, v) = v(h) for all h ∈ H and v ∈ V. The interpretation is, of course, the same.
Given a network h ∈ H and a value function v ∈ V, Ai(h, v) is agent i’s share of the network’s
value v(h). Using the formulation introduced here is just for technical reasons and will be helpful
in the following.
4In contrast to efficiency from Cooperative Game Theory (an allocation rule is said to be ef-
ficient if it always distributes the value that could be reached by the grand coalition N (see,
e.g., van den Brink, 2007)), it is not implicitly assumed that the grand coalition or the com-
plete network, respectively, generically generates the highest value. Therefore, the assumption of
balancedness is less restrictive and more natural.
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among the connections and subsequently within each connection. Thus, it is not
associated to the players directly but, if the connections represent projects, for
example, each player receives her share of each project’s budget. Capturing this
aspect requires a refined concept of allocation rules.
Definition 2.5. A position is a pair ic ∶= (i, c) ∈ N ×M . A position-based allocation
rule Y assigns a family of functions Y = (Yic)ic∈N×M to each allocation problem(N,M) with Yic ∶ V Ð→ V and ∑c∈M,i∈N Yic(v) = v for all v ∈ V . Moreover, given the
dual problem (M,N), each Y is assumed to satisfy (Yci(v∗))∗ = Yic(v) for all v ∈ V .
The interpretation is basically the same as the interpretation of player-based alloca-
tion rules. But in addition there is a further symmetry axiom imposed: it requires
that each position in the dual problem receives the same payoff as in the primal
one. The set of position-based allocation rules is Y . The salient point is that ev-
ery position-based allocation rule Y ∈ Y induces two player-based allocation rules
XY ∈ X and ZY ∈ X in a straightforward way. Given v ∈ V , each player/connection
receives the aggregated payoff of all her/its positions:
1. (XYi )i∈N is given by vYi ∶=XYi (v) = ∑c∈M Yic(v) and
2. (ZYc )c∈M by vYc ∶= ZYc (v) = ∑i∈N Yic (v).
2.3.1 A Specific Two-stage Procedure
Position-based allocation rules allow for more flexibility in tracking how the worth
of a network is distributed among the players. In particular, they allow modeling
two-stage allocation procedures explicitly. To fix ideas, let a pair of player-based
allocation rules (X,Z) ∈ X × X be given and for each allocation problem (N,M)
define Y ∈ Y via Yic ∶=Xi ○Zc for all ic ∈ N ×M . The interpretation is as follows:
1. The allocation rule Z specifies the payoff at the first stage. Given a network
h ∈H, the connections play a dual game in h∗ and they are paid according to
Z. That is, connection c ∈M receives vZc (h∗) = (Zc (v)) (h∗).
2. Then, in a second step, for each c ∈M the value vZc (h∗) is distributed among
the players according toX ∈ X . More specifically, player i’s share of connection
c is vYic(h) = (Xi(vZc ))(h) = (Xi (Zc(v))) (h) = ((Xi ○Zc) (v)) (h).
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Consequently, a position-based allocation rule Y ∈ YM,2N is said to be induced by
two player-based allocation rules if there exists a pair (X,Z) ∈ X × X with Yic ∶=
Xi ○ Zc for each allocation problem (N,M) and all ic ∈ N ×M . Let Y2ply ∶= {Y ∈Y ∣Y is induced by two player-based allocation rules}. As will be shown later, this is
just a special case of a broader class of two-stage allocation procedures. Nevertheless,
it possesses striking and remarkable characteristics which are worth studying in more
detail.
Lemma 2.1. Let an allocation problem (N,M) be given. If a position-based al-
location rule Y ∈ Y2ply is induced by two player-based allocation rules X ∈ X and
Z ∈ X , then Zc = ZYc for all c ∈M .
Proof. This is a straightforward implication of the balancedness assumption. In
particular, in the second step the players distribute exactly the first-stage value
among each other:
vYc = ∑
i∈N
Yic(v) = ∑
i∈N
(Xi (Zc(v))) = Zc(v) = vZc for all i ∈ N and v ∈ V .
Thus, if Y ∈ Y2ply is induced by two player-based allocation rules, the first-stage
allocation Z and the connections’ values determined by ZY do not differ. Generically,
this is not necessarily true for X and XY . Redistributing the value at the first stage
might have a significant impact on the payoff of the players. However, there is an
important class of allocation rules where both ways of allocating the worth coincide.
Definition 2.6. A player-based allocation rule X ∈ X is additive (ADD) if X(v +
v′) = X(v) + X(v′) for all (N,M) and v, v′ ∈ V . Additivity for position-based
allocation rules is defined analogously.
Additive allocation rules exhibit a non-externalities property. The payoff generated
by a value function v ∈ V is not influenced by other value functions.
Proposition 2.1. Let an allocation problem (N,M) be given and suppose Y ∈ Y2ply
is induced by two player-based allocation rules X ∈ X and Z ∈ X . If X is additive,
Xi =XYi for all i ∈ N .
Proof. If X is additive, then
vYi = ∑
c∈M
Yic(v) = ∑
c∈M
(Xi (Zc(v))) =Xi ○ (∑
c∈M
Zc(v)) =Xi(v) = vXi
for all i ∈ N and v ∈ V .
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Proposition 2.1 shows that the final outcome obtained by integrating an additive
allocation rule X ∈ X into a two-stage allocation procedure as introduced above
does not differ from applying X in a player-based way. Moreover, this is completely
independent of the first-stage allocation rule Z ∈ X . It does not matter in which way
the value is redistributed at the first stage, the final outcome is always the same.
In particular, these considerations allow some interesting implications: Suppose a
coalitional network represents a complexly structured firm or organization and it is
more convenient to pay the players for each project separately instead of calculating
the payoff of all players as a function of the organization’s revenue. If an additive
allocation rule is chosen, the players’ payoff is not changed. This motivates the
following definition:
Definition 2.7. A player-based allocation rule X ∈ X is invariant under redistribu-
tion if for all allocation problems (N,M) and v ∈ V ,
Xi(v) = ∑
c∈M
Xi (Zc(v)) for all Z ∈ X . (2.1)
As it has been shown in Proposition 2.1, additive allocation rules satisfy this crite-
rion. It turns out that these are indeed the only ones. The proof of the following
result can be found in the appendix.
Proposition 2.2. A player-based allocation rule X ∈ X is invariant under redistri-
bution if and only if it is additive.
Although Proposition 2.2 might be slightly surprising at first sight, again it is just
a direct implication of the balancedness assumption. This together with additiv-
ity immediately implies Equation (2.1). However, even if Proposition 2.2 is not
very complicated from a mathematical point of view, in the context of coalitional
networks it gives rise to an alternative interpretation of additivity. It allows for
arbitrary redistributions of the worth without changing the final outcome of the
players. In fact, many allocation rules discussed in the literature are additive, such
as the Shapley Value, the Equal Division Solution or the Position Value, to name
but a few.
Before completing this subsection there remains a further question which requires
special attention. So far the discussion concentrated on properties of allocation rules
in Y2ply without explicitly characterizing this particular class. In other words: Which
position-based allocation rules are actually induced by two player-based allocation
rules? In order to approach this question, let Y ∈ Y and suppose there exist X ∈ X
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and Z ∈ X with Yic =Xi ○Zc for all allocation problems (N,M). This, in particular,
implies that each position’s value only depends on the corresponding connection’s
value generated at the first-stage but not on the connection itself. That is, if the
first-stage outcomes vXc and v¯
X
c¯ of two connections c, c¯ ∈M for two allocation rules
v, v¯ ∈ V coincide, the payoff player i receives for both positions has to be the same as
well, i.e, Xi (vXc ) =Xi (v¯Xc¯ ). By applying Lemma 2.1 this independence property can
be restated as follows: If the values of two connections coincide, each player receives
the same payoff from both of them. In fact, this property is not only necessary but
also sufficient.
Proposition 2.3. A position-based allocation rule Y ∈ Y is induced by two player-
based allocation rules if and only if it satisfies the following independence property:
Given an allocation problem (N,M), if vYc = v¯Yc¯ for c, c¯ ∈ M and v, v¯ ∈ V , then
vYic = v¯Yic¯ for all i ∈ N .
The proof can be found in the appendix. A consequence of this independence prop-
erty is that players might receive payoff from connections they are not a member of.
Consider for example the Equal Division Solution ED ∈ X which is additive and let
an allocation problem (N,M) and a network h ∈H be given. If Z ∈ X is a first-stage
allocation rule, generically it is possible that ((EDi ○Zc) (v)) (h) ≠ 0 even if i ∉ h(c).
This is due to the fact that vZc depends on the whole network and not only on c. Of
course, in certain situations it is quite reasonable that players receive payoff from
connections they are not a member of, like in the case of externalities, for example.
However, in many environments it seems to be more convincing that the value of
a connection is distributed only among the corresponding members. This aspect is
not captured so far and it requires a higher degree of flexibility. That is, instead of
applying the same second-stage allocation rule X ∈ X for all c ∈M it is necessary to
use for each connection a specifically designed Xc ∈ X .
2.3.2 Reduced Allocation Problems
Consider a similar situation as before. Again, the connections first receive a certain
payoff, but now the players are supposed to face reduced problems of allocating the
value within each connection. The main idea is that the corresponding members take
the rest of the network as given and compare the prospects if only their connection
changes. To define this formally, assume that there is given a coalitional network
h ∈ H, a value function v ∈ V , and a first-stage allocation rule Z ∈ X . For each set
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of players S ⊆ N the network h∣c,S ∈ H is obtained from h by deleting all players in
h(c) that are not contained in S while the other links remain the same, i.e.,
h∣c,S(c′) =
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩
h(c′), if c′ ≠ c
h(c) ∩ S, if c′ = c
for all c, c′ ∈ M . Furthermore, let h∣∗c,S denote the corresponding dual network.
This substructure allows designing a reduced allocation problem (N,{c}) within
connection c ∈M . Each subset of players S ⊆ N can be interpreted as a coalitional
network with only one connection (cf. Remark 2.1), and the corresponding value
function wc,h
vZ
∈ V{c},2N of the reduced problem is given by wc,hvZ (S) ∶= vZc (h∣∗c,S).
The players only take into account in which way the first-stage payoff changes if
deviations within c occur while the other connections remain the same. In order
to guarantee that wc,h
vZ
∈ V{c},2N is well-defined, that is, to guarantee that wc,hvZ is
normalized, in the following it will always be required that Z ∈ X satisfies the active
players axiom.
Definition 2.8. A player-based allocation rule X ∈ X satisfies the inactive players
axiom (IPLY) if for each allocation problem (N,M), i ∉ N(h) implies vXi (h) = 0 for
all h ∈H and v ∈ V .
If a player-based allocation rule satisfies this axiom, players who are not active get
zero payoff. In the dual game considered here, this means that empty connections
receive a worth of zero.
Now suppose Xre ∈ X is an allocation rule applied to the reduced problem (N,{c}).
This induces finally a second-stage allocation rule Xc ∈ X via (Xci (vZc ))(h) ∶=(Xrei (wc,hvZ ))(h(c)) for all i ∈ N .5 Note that although the main motivation was
to construct a position-based allocation rule which gives zero payoff to positions
not contained in the network, up to here it is not required that this condition is
indeed satisfied. However, assuming additionally for all connections c ∈M that the
allocation rule applied to (N,{c}) satisfies the inactive players axiom is sufficient to
achieve the desired effect.
Of course, the main idea of considering reduced problems of allocating the value
is similar to Subsection 2.3.1, but the main difference is that now the allocation
rules in the second step do not necessarily have to be the same for all connections.
Therefore, the corresponding two-stage procedure has the following form:
5For further allocation problems (N ′,M ′) ≠ (N,M) it would be possible to proceed analogously.
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1. Given a value function v ∈ V , the value of c ∈M is determined according to a
first-stage allocation rule Z ∈ X .
2. Then vZc is allocated according to X
c ∈ X for each c ∈M , i.e., player i receives
Xci (vZc ).
In the following, a position-based allocation rule Y ∈ Y is said to be implemented
in two stages if for each allocation problem (N,M) there exist Xc ∈ X for each
c ∈ M and Z ∈ X such that Yic = Xci ○ Zc for all i ∈ N and c ∈ M . Let Y2stg ⊆ Y
be the set of position-based allocation rules satisfying this criterion, i.e., Y2stg =
{Y ∈ Y ∣ Y is implemented in two stages} . Note that Y2ply ⊆ Y2stg.
Lemma 2.2. Let an allocation problem (N,M) be given and assume a position-
based allocation rule Y ∈ Y2stg is implemented in two stages, where Z ∈ X is the
first-stage allocation rule. Then Zc = ZYc for all c ∈M .
Proof. The reasoning is completely analog to Lemma 2.1.
In particular, it does not matter whether for each connection a specifically designed
allocation rule is used or whether it is always the same one. The aggregated value
is the same in any case due to the balancedness assumption. Moreover, although
Y2stg is a broader class of allocation rules than Y2ply, it is possible to characterize it
by a similar independence property.
Proposition 2.4. A position-based allocation rule Y ∈ Y is implemented in two
stages if and only if it satisfies the following independence property: Given an
allocation problem (N,M), if vYc = v¯Yc for c ∈ M and v, v¯ ∈ V , then vYic = v¯Yic for all
i ∈ N .
The proof proceeds analogously to the one of Proposition 2.3 and the interpretation
is similar as well. The difference is that here, the payoff of each position has to be
independent only of how the connection’s value is generated but not of the connection
itself. This is, of course, due to the fact that the second-stage allocation rule now
may depend on c.
The main relevance of the previous proposition is that it characterizes all two-stage
allocation procedures in a natural way. Therefore, implicitly it also provides a tool
for checking whether position-based allocation rules belong to this class or not. The
remainder of this paper is devoted to the study of particular examples, like the
Position Value, for instance. It also includes a general discussion of properties of
allocation rules.
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2.4 Some Particular Allocation Rules
Before analyzing some specific two-stage allocation procedures, first the focus lies on
player-based allocation rules. The economic implications of this intermediate step
are actually just straight-forward extensions from Network Theory and Cooperative
Game Theory. Nevertheless, they strongly support the intuition of the two-stage
allocation procedures analyzed later in Subsection 2.4.2 and provide a technical
substructure for them.
2.4.1 Player-based Allocation Rules
One specific player-based allocation rule, the Equal Division Solution, has already
been introduced in Example 2.2. Another well-known example from literature is
the Myerson Value which has been established by Myerson (1977) and extended
to bilateral networks by Jackson and Wolinsky (1996). The main motivation of
this allocation rule is to pay each player her expected marginal contribution to a
(bilateral) network. Clearly, this idea can be adopted completely analogously to
the setting considered here. Formally this means that given an allocation problem
(N,M), for each h ∈ H and v ∈ V the Myerson Value (for coalitional networks)
MV X is defined by
vMVi (h) = ∑
S⊆N∖{i}
∣S∣!(n − (∣S∣ + 1))!
n!
⋅ (v(h∣S+i) − v(h∣S)) for all i ∈ N.6
At first sight the Equal Division Solution and the Myerson Value seem to be quite
different and a priory it is not clear which one is appropriate for which situation.
To gain a better understanding, it is necessary to analyze which properties both
allocation rules have and in which way they differ.
Definition 2.9. Let an arbitrary allocation problem (N,M) be given. A player-
based allocation rule X ∈ X satisfies . . .
(CBAL) . . . component-balancedness if ∑i∈A vXi (h) = v(h∣A) for each network h ∈H,
every component-additive value function v ∈ CA, and all associations A ∈ A(h).
(SYM) . . . symmetry of active players if for i, j ∈ N(h), v(h∣S+i) = v(h∣S+j) for all
S ⊆ N(h) ∖ {i, j} always implies vXi (h) = vXj (h).
6The Myerson Value is, roughly speaking, an extension of the Shapley Value (Shapley, 1953). In
fact, if Φ denotes the Shapley Value, vMVi (h) = Φi (w
h
v ) where w
h
v (S) ∶= v(h∣S) for all S ⊆ N .
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(NULI) . . . the nullifying player property if v(h∣S+i) = 0 for all S ⊆ N(h) ∖ {i}
implies vXi (h) = 0.
(NULL) . . . the null player property if v(h∣S+i)−v(h∣S) = 0 for all S ⊆ N(h) implies
vHi (h) = 0.
The previous notions are standard in the literature of Cooperative Game Theory
and Network Theory and therefore the interpretations do not change. Given a
component-additive value function, an allocation rule is component-balanced if it
distributes the value of each component only among its members. Symmetry of
active players requires that two players receive the same payoff whenever their con-
tributions to the network are equal. An allocation rule satisfies the nullifying player
property if a player receives no payoff whenever her presence in a network induces
a value of zero. Deegan and Packel (1978) call these individuals zero players. In
contrast to this, the null player property, also known as the dummy axiom, focuses
on the marginal contribution of a player to the network. The usual interpretation is
that a player has no bargaining power if her marginal contribution to the network
is always zero and, thus, she should receive no payoff. Note that this implies the
inactive players axiom.
In the context of Cooperative Game Theory, van den Brink (2007) proved that the
Shapley Value and the Equal Division Solution satisfy similar axioms. In fact, it is
possible to extend this insight to the more general setting considered here.
Proposition 2.5. X ∈ X satisfies (ADD), (SYM), (IPLY), and (NULI) if and only
if Y = ED.
For the proof (and also for the proofs of the following results) refer to the appendix.
In principle it proceeds in a standard fashion. More precisely, given an allocation
problem (N,M), due to additivity it is sufficient to focus on basic value functions
which form a basis of V (recall Remark 2.2).
Proposition 2.6. X ∈ X satisfies (ADD), (SYM), and (NULL) if and only if Y =
MV .
Since the Myerson Value is an extension of the Shapley Value (Shapley, 1953), it
can be characterized by similar axioms. Analogously to the characterization of the
Equal Division Solution, the proof of Proposition 2.6 also exploits additivity and
concentrates on basic value functions.
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The previous results show that if an allocation rule is supposed to satisfy additiv-
ity, symmetry of active players, and the inactive players axiom, the final outcome
strongly depends on the decision whether more importance is attached to nullifying
or to null players. In one case the Myerson Value and in the other the Equal Division
Solution is obtained.
In fact, in Cooperative Game Theory the null player property is often used to char-
acterize solutions. Besides the Myerson and the Shapley Value, also Owen’s Value
(Owen, 1977), for example, satisfies this axiom. It allows some noteworthy implica-
tions which should not be neglected here:
Lemma 2.3. If X ∈ X satisfies (ADD) and (NULL), it also satisfies (CBAL).
Proposition 2.6 and Lemma 2.3 immediately imply the following result.
Proposition 2.7. The Myerson Value is component-balanced.
The intuition of Lemma 2.3 is straightforward. If a value function is component-
additive, the value of a component does not depend on the others. Therefore, the
marginal contribution of a player to other components is always zero. The result then
follows from the null player property and because the individual payoff functions can
be decomposed appropriately by additivity.7
2.4.2 Position-based Allocation Rules
All the properties introduced in the previous subsection focus on the players directly
but not on the positions. The marginal contribution, for instance, is determined only
for subnetworks where player i ∈ N completely drops out of the network. In this
case, she totally stops cooperating. In economic life, however, if the connections
represent projects or the like, it might happen that a player only leaves some of her
projects but not all of them. Translated to the model this would mean that she
stops cooperating only partially. To fix ideas, consider the position-based variations
of the properties introduced in the previous sections:
Definition 2.10. Let an arbitrary allocation problem (N,M) be given. A position-
based allocation rule Y ∈ Y satisfies . . .
7For bilateral networks Jackson and Wolinsky (1996), who refer to Myerson (1977), have already
established Proposition 2.7. Although they have shown it in a different context, and thus in a
different way, some elements of the proof of Lemma 2.3 are adopted from these works.
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(CBAL’) . . . component-balancedness if ∑i∈A∑c∶h(c)⊆A vYic(h) = v(h∣A) for all h ∈ H,
every component-additive value function v ∈ CA, and all associations A ∈ A(h).
(IPOS) . . . the inactive positions axiom if i ∉ h(c) implies vYic(h) = 0 for all v ∈ V .
(cwSYM) . . . symmetry of active players connection-wise if for each c ∈ M and
i, j ∈ h(c) from vYc (h∣∗c,S∪{i}) = vYc (h∣∗c,S∪{j}) for all S ⊆ h(c) ∖ {i, j} always
vYic(h) = vYjc(h) follows.
(cwNULI) . . . connection-wise the nullifying player property if for each c ∈M from
vYc (h∣∗c,S) = 0 for all S ⊆ N(h) ∖ {i} always vYic(h) = 0 follows.
(cwNULL) . . . connection-wise the null player property if for each c ∈ M from
vYc (h∣∗c,S∪{i}) = vYc (h∣∗c,S) for all S ⊆ h(c) ∖ {i} always vYic(h) = 0 follows.
Component-balancedness and the inactive positions axiom are analogously defined
as the axioms for player-based allocation rules and therefore the interpretations are
the same as well. However, here the focus lies on the positions but not on the
players. For example, (cwNULL) concentrates on the marginal contributions of the
players to single connections. Given this axiom, player i ∈ N receives nothing from
c ∈M if her marginal contribution to the connection is zero. Similar considerations
also apply if the position-based allocation rule satisfies connection-wise the nullifying
player property or symmetry of active players.
One of the most prominent two-stage allocation rules in Network Theory is the often-
studied Position Value (e.g., Borm et al., 1992). The main idea is to determine the
connections’ values according to the Myerson Value and then, in the second step, the
members of each connection apply the Equal Division Solution in order to share the
corresponding value equally. Of course, this motivation can be extended to the more
general setting considered here. Given an allocation problem (N,M), the Position
Value (for coalitional networks) PV ∈ Y is given explicitly by
vPVic (h) = (PVic(v)) (h) ∶=
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩
1
∣h(c)∣ ⋅ v
MV
c (h∗) , if i ∈ h(c)
0, if i ∉ h(c)
for all i ∈ N and c ∈M . Note that each player i receives
vPVi (h) = ∑
c∶i∈h(c)
1∣h(c)∣ ⋅ vMVc (h∗)
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and the value of each connection is indeed given by the Myerson Value: vPVc = vMVc
for all c ∈ M . Taking into account the characterizations established in Proposi-
tions 2.5 and 2.6, these considerations imply that the Position Value needs to sat-
isfy (ADD), (SYM), together with (NULL) at the first stage and (ADD), (IPOS),
(cwSYM), and (cwNULI) with respect to each connection. In fact:
Proposition 2.8. Suppose Y ∈ Y satisfies (ADD), (IPOS), (cwSYM), (cwNULI),
and assume ZY ∈ X satisfies (NULL) and (SYM). Then Y ∈ Y2stg and, furthermore,
Y = PV .8
Again, the proof can be found in the appendix. Showing Y ∈ Y2stg is based on
exploiting (cwNULI) and (ADD). By applying the latter axiom and Proposition 2.4,
it is sufficient to show that whenever a connection receives a value of zero in all
networks, the positions within this connection receive a payoff of zero, too. This is
given, obviously, by (cwNULI). Moreover, since the first-stage allocation rule is the
Myerson Value, component-balancedness also carries over to the Position Value.
Lemma 2.4. If Y ∈ Y is component-balanced both induced player-based allocation
rules XY ∈ X and ZY ∈ X have this property, too.
Proof. Let (N,M) be an allocation problem and v ∈ CA be component-additive.
Furthermore, let h ∈H and A ∈ A(h). Then:
∑
i∈A
vYi (h) = ∑
i∈A
∑
c∈M
vYic(h)´udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¸udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¶
=0, if i∉h(c)
= ∑
i∈A, c∶h(c)⊆A
vYic(h) = v (h∣A) .
Analogously for ZYc = ∑i∈N Yci.
Lemma 2.5. Let Y ∈ Y satisfy (IPOS). Then ZY ∈ X is component-balanced if and
only if XY ∈ X is component-balanced.
Proof. For the proof just note that if Y satisfies the inactive positions axiom, the
proof of Lemma 2.4 works in both directions.
8Borm et al. (1992) introduce a characterization of the Position Value for a certain class of Myer-
son’s communication situations (cf. Myerson, 1977). Interestingly, they also interpret their “arc
game” as a “dual game”: “[The value] of an arc is measured by means of the Shapley Value of
a kind of ’dual’ game [. . . ]” (Borm et al., 1992, p. 306). Later, van den Nouweland and Slikker
(2012) extended this characterization to bilateral networks. However, it is not possible to extend
it further to coalitional networks in a straightforward way, because they use the “superfluous link
property”, which is not as restrictive here as in the bilateral setting.
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Proposition 2.9. Let Y ∈ Y satisfy (IPOS) and (ADD). If, furthermore, ZY ∈ X
satisfies (NULL), then XY ∈ X is component-balanced.
Proof. This is a direct implication of Lemmas 2.3 and 2.5.
Of course, Proposition 2.9 is also satisfied if XY and ZY interchange roles.
Proposition 2.10. The Position Value is component-balanced.
For bilateral networks, van den Nouweland and Slikker (2012) already established
Proposition 2.10. However, to show it, the authors used “component decomposabil-
ity” which is not needed here. In the context of coalitional networks, the result is a
direct implication of the characterization of the Position Value.
Although the Position Value possesses interesting and desirable features, in some
situations it might be inadequate. For example, using the Myerson Value first
and the Equal Division Solution in the second step violates consistency. Follow-
ing Hart and Kurz (1983), a two-stage allocation rule is consistent if the way of
distributing the value within each connection is the same as the one used for deter-
mining the values in the dual game. Of course, there are several ways to construct
consistent allocation rules, but in light of the preceding discussion, a canonical can-
didate is the iterated application of the Myerson Value. Therefore, consider again
a two-stage procedure where the first-stage allocation rule is MV ∈ X . Given an
allocation problem (N,M), for each h ∈ H and v ∈ V , the value function of the
reduced game within c ∈M is then given by wc,h
vMV
(S) = vMVc (h∣∗c,S) for all S ⊆ N . In
contrast to the Position Value, suppose now that the second-stage allocation rules
are chosen in a consistent way: that is, the solutions of the reduced games are also
determined according to the Myerson Value MV ∈ X for all c ∈ M . This iterated
application of the Myerson Value will be denoted by IM ∈ Y and it is given by
vIMic (h) ∶= (MVi(wc,hvMV ))(h(c)).
As already discussed in Section 2.3, the characterizations of the Equal Division So-
lution and the Myerson Value differ by only one axiom. Consequently, the same is
also true for the Position Value and the iterated application of the Myerson Value.
In fact, instead of the nullifying player property, IM satisfies connection-wise the
null player property.
Proposition 2.11. Let Y ∈ YM,2N satisfy (ADD), (cwSYM), (cwNULL), and assume
ZY ∈ X satisfies (SYM). Then Y ∈ Y2stg, ZY satisfies (NULL), and, furthermore,
Y = IM .
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Moreover, since in the first step the worth is distributed according to the Myerson
Value, Lemma 2.5 can be applied again.
Proposition 2.12. IM is component-balanced.
Applying the Myerson Value iteratively is in spirit with a prominent solution concept
from Cooperative Game Theory, namely with Owen’s Value (Owen, 1977). In his
seminal contribution, the author focused on cooperative games with a given coalition
structure, that is, the players are partitioned exogenously into coalitions which may
not overlap. Given this setting, Owen applied the Shapley Value iteratively, first
among the coalitions and then within each coalition. Loosely speaking, this approach
does not take the actual form of cooperation h ∈ H into account but instead it
focuses only on the induced associations A(h). To fix ideas, let (N,M) be an
allocation problem and let Ψ denote Owen’s Value. Moreover, for given v ∈ V , let
whv (S) ∶= v(h∣S) be the worth of h ∈H restricted to S ⊆ N . Then Owen’s Value can be
extended analogously to the Myerson Value via vOVi (h) = Ψ (A(h), whv ). Note that Ψ
depends on the coalition structure A(h) but not on the network h directly. Consider
the special case where the network h ∈ H actually forms a coalition structure: that
is, assume ⋃c∈M h(c) = N and h(c) ∩ h(c′) ≠ ∅ only if c = c′ for all c, c′ ∈ M .
Phrased differently, each player is a member of exactly one connection. Here, the
only difference between iteratively applying the Myerson Value IM and Owen’s
Value OV is that the latter one focuses less on single positions. More specifically,
it is possible to show that OV satisfies the null player property only in a player-
based way but not connection-wise. However, if the total productivity is determined
by means of a component-additive value function, each player’s contribution to the
whole network is exactly what she contributes to her connection and therefore both
axioms are equivalent.
Proposition 2.13. Assume h ∈ H forms a coalition structure and v ∈ CA is a
component-additive value function. Then vIMi (h) = vOVi (h) for all i ∈ N .9
The main idea of the proof is to translate the axiomatization given in Owen (1977)
to the setting considered here and to show that both allocation rules have the same
properties. The previous result immediately implies that the Position Value and
Owen’s Value differ by just one axiom under certain circumstances (i.e., if h ∈ H
forms a coalition structure and v ∈ V is component-additive). Moreover, given these
9The author is grateful to Andre´ Casajus for pointing out a mistake in a previous version of this
result.
requirements, it is straightforward to show that component-balancedness is equiv-
alent to what Aumann and Dre`ze (1974) call “relative efficiency”: The aggregated
payoff of players within each connection equals exactly the connection’s value. For
this special case it is also possible to extend the Aumann-Dre`ze Value and it coin-
cides with iteratively applying the Myerson Value and with Owen’s Value.
2.5 Conclusion
The structures of many economical and social organizations are too complex to ana-
lyze them by means of Cooperative Game Theory or Bilateral Network Theory. The
model introduced here uses mathematical hypergraphs (which are called coalitional
networks in this study) to extend both approaches to a more general and richer
framework. This enlarges not only the field of possible applications but it also al-
lows to model them more realistically. In particular, the extended setting allows to
formalize and analyze two-stage allocation procedures in a convenient way. Although
these procedures already have been attempted in literature by some studies (e.g.,
Albizuri et al., 2005; Aumann and Dre`ze, 1974; Borm et al., 1992; Hart and Kurz,
1983; Owen, 1977) there has been no general framework for analyzing them in a
structured way. This study not only provides such a framework but it also extends
some particular examples of two-stage allocation rules well-known from Cooperative
Game Theory and Network Theory to coalitional networks. Moreover, characteriza-
tions of these allocation rules are discussed. Interestingly, under certain requirements
the Position Value and Owen’s Value satisfy almost the same axioms.
The analysis of coalitional networks could be extended in several ways. One of the
most interesting ones would be to investigate dynamic models of network formation.
In the study presented here, the coalitional network was always given exogenously.
Therefore, it seems to be crucial to know under which circumstances which struc-
tures will arise. To this end, suitable stability concepts and deviation rules would
need to be introduced. It would furthermore be reasonable to allow N and M to
be infinite and to work with finite carriers in order to have no exogenously given
limitation in the number of networks. Another natural extension is to apply the
extended model to applications not covered so far. Coalitional networks are richer
than coalition structures or bilateral networks, and they allow to study settings
where the players cooperate in quite complex structures. Examples of this are large
organizations or social clubs, to name but a few.
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2.6 Appendix: Proofs
Some of the proofs are based on only slightly varied but similar technical arguments.
For example, the characterizations of the allocation rules discussed in this paper are
all based on basic value functions and they all proceed in a similar way. In order to
not repeat the same arguments again and again, the following two lemmas will be
helpful.
Lemma 2.6. Let an allocation problem (N,M) be given. Assume the allocation
rule X ∈ X satisfies (ADD), (IPLY), and (SYM). Furthermore, let α ∈ R be a
constant and 1h ∈ V a basic value function with h ∈H ∖ {h∅}. Then:
(Xi (α1h)) (h′) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
0, if i ∉ N(h′)
0, if i ∈ N(h′) and h ⊈ h′
α
∣N(h′)∣ , if i ∈ N(h′) and h = h′
Proof. Let X ∈ X satisfy (ADD), (IPLY), and (SYM). Furthermore, let α ∈ R,
1h ∈ V for h ∈ H ∖ {h∅}, and h′ ∈ H. First note that the inactive players axiom
implies (Xi (α1h)) (h′) = 0 for all i ∉ N(h′).
Case 1: h ⊈ h′.
This implies 1h(h′) = 0. Furthermore, α1h(h′∣S+i) = α1h(h′∣S+j) = 0 for all
i, j ∈ N(h′) and S ⊆ N(h′) ∖ {i, j}. Thus, by symmetry (Xi (α1h)) (h′) =(Xj (α1H)) (h′) for all i, j ∈ N(h′) and, because X is balanced by definition,
this implies that all players receive a payoff of 0.
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Case 2: h = h′.
This case proceeds analogously to the previous one. Again α1h(h′∣S+i) =
α1h(h′∣S+j) = 0 for all i, j ∈ N(h′) and S ⊆ N(h′) ∖ {i, j}. From this fol-
lows (Xi (α1h)) (h′) = (Xj (α1h)) (h′) for all i, j ∈ N(h′) by symmetry and,
thus, (Xi(α1h))(h′) = α∣N(h′)∣ by balancedness.
Note that Lemma 2.6 makes no statement about h ⊊ h′. For this case, further
requirements are needed.
Lemma 2.7. Assume that the position-based allocation rule Y ∈ Y is additive. If
it additionally satisfies (cwNULI) or (cwNULL), then Y ∈ Y2stg.
Proof. Let (N,M) be an arbitrary allocation problem. If Y ∈ Y is additive, for
applying Proposition 2.3 it is sufficient to show that vYc = 0 for c ∈ M and v ∈ V
always implies vYic = 0 for all i ∈ N . Phrased differently, if the connection’s worth is
zero in all networks the corresponding positions receive this worth as well. Therefore,
suppose there is given a value function v ∈ V with vYc (h∗) = 0 for all h∗ ∈ H∗. By
applying either (cwNULI) or (cwNULL) this immediately implies vYic(h) = 0 for all
i ∈ N . Thus, Y ∈ Y2stg.
Proof of Proposition 2.2
This proposition is a direct implication of balancedness. Given an allocation problem
(N,M) and a player-based allocation rule Z ∈ X , each value function v ∈ V can be
decomposed via v = ∑c∈M vZc . Thus, an equivalent formulation of invariance under
redistribution for X ∈ X is
Xi (∑
c∈M
vZc ) = ∑
c∈M
Xi (vZc )
for all i ∈ N , h ∈ HM,2M and each sequence of payoff functions {vZc }c∈M , and this is
obviously equivalent to additivity.
Proof of Proposition 2.3
Let an allocation problem (N,M) be given. First assume Yic = Xi ○ Zc for two
player-based allocation rules X ∈ X and Z ∈ X . If vYc = v¯Yc¯ for c, c¯ ∈M and v, v¯ ∈ V ,
Lemma 2.1 implies
vYic =Xi (vZc ) =Xi (vYc ) =Xi (v¯Yc¯ ) =Xi (v¯Zc¯ ) = v¯Yic¯ for all i ∈ N.
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For the other direction let Y ∈ Y be given. According to Lemma 2.1 it is feasible
to choose Zc ∶= ZYc for all c ∈M . Exploiting the condition given in the proposition
yields that
Xi(v′) ∶=
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩
Yic(v), if there exist c ∈M and v ∈ V with v′ = Zc(v)
XYi (v′), otherwise
is well-defined for all v′ ∈ V . Of course, it would also be possible to choose any other
X ′ ∈ X in the second case. Then balancedness is indeed satisfied because
∑
i∈N
Xi(v′) =
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩
∑i∈N Yic(v), if there exist c ∈M and v ∈ V with v′ = Zc(v)
∑i∈N XYi (v′), otherwise
= ⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩
ZYc (v) = Zc(v) = v′, if there exist c ∈M and v ∈ V with v′ = Zc(v)
∑i∈N,c∈M Yic(v′) = v′, otherwise.
Furthermore, by construction also Yic =Xi ○Zc for all i ∈ N and c ∈M .
Proof of Proposition 2.4
The proof proceeds analogously to the one of Proposition 2.3.
Proof of Proposition 2.5
Let an allocation problem (N,M) be given. It is easy to verify that ED satisfies
all the axioms. For the other direction let α ∈ R and h ∈ H. Furthermore, assume
X ∈ X satisfies all the axioms. Let h′ ∈H be a further network. Applying Lemma 2.6
yields for h ⊈ h′ and h = h′ that (Xi (α1h)) (h′) is uniquely determined. Therefore,
suppose for the rest of the proof h ⊊ h′. Obviously, α1h = α∑h¯∶h⊆h¯ 1h¯, where 1h¯ is
called Standard Value Function (cf. van den Brink, 2007) and it is given by
1h¯(h′) =
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩
1, if h¯ = h′
0, if h¯ ≠ h′.
If h¯ ≠ h′, player i ∈ N(h′) is a nullifying player with respect to α1h¯ if and only if
i ∉ N(h¯). This implies (Xi(1h¯)) (h′) = 0 for all i ∉ N(h¯). Furthermore, because of
symmetry and balancedness the other players receive a payoff of zero, too. Thus,
additivity implies
(Xi(α1h)) (h′) = ∑
h¯∶h⊆h¯
(Xi (α1h¯)) (h′)´udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¸udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¶
=0, if h¯≠h′
= (Xi (α1h′)) (h′) .
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Analogously to case 2 in Lemma 2.6 it is possible to show that
(Xi (α1h′)) (h′) = (Xi(α1h′))(h′)
and, therefore, the payoff is uniquely determined.
Proof of Proposition 2.6
Let an allocation problem (N,M) be given. The proof proceeds in a similar way as
the one of Proposition 2.5. First note that the Myerson Value satisfies the axioms.
The easiest way for verifying this is by exploiting the properties of the Shapley Value
Φ (see, e.g., Roth, 1988) because vMVi (h) = Φi(wvh), where wvh(S) = v(h∣S) for all
S ⊆ N . The rest of the proof proceeds in standard fashion. Because of additivity it
is sufficient to concentrate on basic value functions for showing uniqueness. To this
end let α ∈ R and h ∈ H ∖ {h∅}. Furthermore, assume X ∈ X satisfies the axioms
given in the proposition. Because the null player property implies the inactive
players axiom, Lemma 2.6 can be applied. That is, for h ⊈ h¯ and h = h¯ the payoff is
uniquely determined. For h ⊊ h¯ each player i ∉ N(h) is a null player and therefore
receives a payoff of 0. Because all players in N(h) are symmetric in h¯ and Y is
balanced, (Xi (α1h)) (h¯) = α∣N(h)∣ for all i ∈ N(h). Thus, in this case the payoff is
uniquely determined as well.
Proof of Lemma 2.3
Let an allocation problem (N,M) be given and suppose X ∈ X satisfies additivity
and the null player property. Furthermore, let h ∈ H be a network and Ai ∈ A(h)
the association containing player i ∈ N . For each component-additive value function
v ∈ CA define the auxiliary function vAi ∶ H Ð→ R by vAi(h¯) = v(h¯∣Ai) for all h¯ ∈ H.
Then:
v(h∣S+i) − vAi(h∣S+i) = ∑
A∈A(h)
v (h∣((S+i)∩A)) − v (h∣((S+i)∩Ai))
= ∑
A∈A(h)
v (h∣((S)∩A)) − v (h∣((S)∩Ai)) = v(h∣S) − vAi(h∣S)
Therefore, player i is a null player with respect to v−vAi in the network h. The null
player property implies 0 = (Xi (vAi − v)) (h) and, thus, by additivity (Xi(v))(h) =(Xi(vAi))(h) for all v ∈ CA. Obviously, each player j ∉ Ai is a null player with
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respect to vAi . Hence,
∑
j∈Ai
(Xj(v)) (h) = ∑
j∈Ai
(Xj (vAi)) (h)
= ∑
j∈N
(Xj (vAi)) (h) = vAi(h) = v(h∣Ai).
Proof of Proposition 2.8
Let an arbitrary allocation problem (N,M) be given and assume Y ∈ Y satisfies all
of the axioms given in the proposition. In particular, Lemma 2.7 yields Y ∈ Y2stg.
In the following let Xc ∈ X for c ∈M and Z ∈ X be the player-based allocation rules
with Yic = Xci ○Xc for all i ∈ N and c ∈ M . Proposition 2.2 implies Zc = ZYc for all
c ∈M . Moreover, since ZY satisfies additivity, symmetry of active players, and the
null player property by assumption, Proposition 2.6 implies that Z has to be the
Myerson Value.
The remainder of the proof proceeds in a similar way as the characterization of the
Equal Division Solution. In fact, as the axioms already indicate, it will be shown
that within each connection the players distribute their value equally. Because of
additivity it is sufficient to concentrate on basic value functions. To this end let
α ∈ R and h ∈H. Note that the inactive positions axiom implies (Yic (α1h)) (h′) = 0
for all h′ ∈H with i ∉ h′(c).
Case 1: h ⊈ h′.
Lemma 2.6 yields
(ZYc (α1h))(h′∗) = (MVc(α1h))(h′∗) = 0
for all c ∈M . As all players i, j ∈ h′(c) are symmetric within c, all positions in
this connection receive the same payoff, i.e., (Yic (α1h)) (h′) = (Yjc (α1H)) (h′)
for all i, j ∈ h′(c). Consequently, (ZYc (α1h))(h′∗) = 0 implies that this payoff
has to be zero for all players.
Case 2: h = h′.
Here, Lemma 2.6 can be applied again:
(ZYc (α1h))(h′∗) = (MVc(α1h))(h′∗) =
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩
α
∣M(h∗)∣ , if c ∈M (h∗)
0, if c ∉M (h∗)
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Similar to case 1, for all c ∈M all players within the connection are symmetric
and by (cwSYM) all positions in c get the same. Thus,
(Yic (α1h)) (h′) = α∣h(c)∣ ∣M (h∗)∣ for all i ∈ h(c).
As already mentioned before, if i ∉ h(c) the corresponding position receives a
payoff of zero.
Case 3: h ⊊ h′.
Again, the connections’ values are given by
(ZYc (α1h))(h′∗) = (MVc(α1h))(h′∗) =
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩
α
∣M(h∗)∣ , if c ∈M (h∗)
0, if c ∉M (h∗) .
For c ∈ M(h′∗) ∖M (h∗) all players i, j ∈ h′(c) are symmetric within c and,
similar to case 1, applying (cwSYM) yields
(Yic(1h)) (h′) = (Yjc(1h)) (h′) = 0.
Therefore, suppose c ∈M (h∗). Furthermore, let again α1h = α∑h¯∶h⊆h′ 1h¯ where
the 1h′ are standard value functions (cf. the proof of Proposition 2.5). If there
exists no T ⊆ M with h¯ = h′∣T , then player i ∈ h′(c) is a nullifying player in
c with respect to α1h¯ if and only if i ∉ h¯(c). Thus, (Yic(α1h¯)) (h′) = 0 for all
i ∉ h′(c). Because each connection c′ ∈M is a null player in h′ with respect to
1h¯, the aggregated value (ZYc (α1h¯)) (h′) = ∑i∈N (Yic(α1h¯)) (h′) of c also has
to be equal to zero and by (cwSYM) this implies (Yic(α1h¯)) (h′) = 0 for all
i ∈ N . Thus, (Yic(α1h¯)) (h′) ≠ 0 only if there exists T ⊆M with h¯ = h′∣T . Now
the value of position i ∈ h′(c) can be decomposed in the following way:
(Yic(α1h)) (h′) = ∑
h¯∶h⊆h¯
(Yic (α1h¯)) (h′)´udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¸udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¶
=0, if ∄ T⊆M ∶ h¯=h′∣T
= ∑
T ∶M(h∗)⊆T⊆M(h′∗)
(Yic (α1h′∣T )) (h′) (2.2)
Note that c ∈ M (h∗) implies c ∈ T for all M (h∗) ⊆ T ⊆ M(h′∗) and, thus,
h′∣T (c) = h′(c). Therefore, all players in h′(c) are symmetric in c with respect
to 1h′∣T and (cwSYM) yields
(Yic (1h′∣T )) (h′) = (Z
Y
c (α1h′∣T ))(h′∗)∣h′(c)∣
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for all i ∈ h′(c). Now Equation (2.2) can be exploited again:
(Yic(α1h)) (h′) = ∑
T ∶M(h∗)⊆T⊆M(h′∗)
(Yic (α1h′∣T )) (h′)
= 1∣h′(c)∣ ∑
T ∶M(h∗)⊆T⊆M(h′∗)
(ZYc (α1h′∣T ))(h′∗)
= 1∣h′(c)∣ ∑
h¯∶h⊆h¯
(ZYc (α1h′∣T ))(h′∗)
= 1∣h′(c)∣(ZYc (α1h))(h′∗) = α∣h′(c)∣∣M (h∗) ∣
From this it follows that within each connection the value is allocated equally
among all corresponding members.
Proof of Proposition 2.11
Let an arbitrary allocation problem (N,M) be given. Proposition 2.6 implies that
iteratively applying the Myerson Value satisfies the axioms. For the other direction
let Y ∈ Y . Moroever, assume Y satisfies all the axioms. By applying Lemma 2.7
this implies Y ∈ Y2stg. First note that because of additivity it is again sufficient to
concentrate on α1h, where α ∈ R and h ∈H.10 Furthermore, let h′ ∈H.
Case 1: h ⊈ h′.
Here, every player is a null player in each connection. Thus, (Yic(α1h)) (h′) = 0
for all i ∈ N and c ∈M .
Case 2: h ⊆ h′.
In this case, ic is a null position if and only if i ∉ h(c). From this follows
(ZYc (α1h))(h′∗) = ∑
i∈N
(Yic(α1h)) (h′) = 0 for all c ∈M with ∣h′(c)∣ = 0
and, thus, symmetry of ZY implies (ZYc (α1h))(h′∗) = α∣M(h′)∣ for all c ∈M(h′).
Finally, exploiting (cwSYM) yields (Yic (α1h)) (h′) = α∣h(c)∣∣M(h∗)∣ for all i ∈ N
and c ∈M with i ∈ h(c).
10Although Owen (1977) requires the null player property, the remainder of the proof in principle
proceeds completely analogously to the characterization of his value. Of course, (NULL) has to
be replaced by (cwNULL) but the line of argumentation is the same.
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Therefore, Y equals iteratively applying the Myerson Value. In particular, according
to Proposition 2.6 this implies that the first-stage allocation rule satisfies (NULL).
Proof of Proposition 2.13
The main idea of the proof is to show that if a network forms a coalition structure
and moreover a component-additive value function is given, IM and OV satisfy
the same axioms. To this end, it is necessary to introduce some preliminaries from
Cooperative Game Theory. As already mentioned in Remark 2.1, a TU game is a
pair (N,γ) with γ ∶ 2N Ð→ R and γ(∅) = 0. If the set of players is decomposed into
a set of coalitions B = {B1, . . . ,Bk}, i.e., ⋃kl=1Bl = N and Bl ≠ ∅ for all 1 ≤ l ≤ k,
this set B is called partition. Moreover, a (single-valued) solution Γ assigns a payoff
vector Γ(γ,B) ∈ Rn to each pair consisting of a TU game (N,γ) and a partition
B. Analogously to allocation rules it is possible to characterize solutions by means
of several axioms: Let two arbitrary TU games (N,γ) and (N,γ′) together with a
partition B be given. A solution Γ. . .
Efficiency . . . is efficient if ∑i∈N Γi(γ,B) = γ(N).
Additivity . . . is additive if Γ(γ + γ′,B) = Γ(γ,B) + Γ(γ′,B).
Null player property . . . satisfies the null player property if every null player i ∈ N
(i.e., γ(S ∪ {i})− γ(S) = 0 for all S ⊆ N ∖ {i}) always receives a payoff of zero:
Γi(v,B) = 0.
Symmetry within coalitions . . . satisfies symmetry within coalitions if two sym-
metric players i, j ∈ N (i.e., γ(S∪{i}) = γ(S∪{j}) for all S ⊆ N ∖{i, j}) always
receive the same payoff: Γi(v,B) = Γj(v,B).
Symmetry across coalitions . . . satisfies symmetry across coalitions if the aggre-
gated payoff of two symmetric coalitions Bl,Bl′ ∈ B (i.e., v(B′∪Bl) = v(B′∪Bl′)
for all B′ ⊆ B ∖ {Bl,Bl′}) is always the same: ∑i∈Bl Γi(v,B) = ∑i∈Bl Γi(v,B).
Owen (1977) has shown the following result:11
Theorem. Owen’s value Ψ is the unique solution satisfying efficiency, additivity, the
null player property, symmetry within coalitions, and symmetry across coalitions.
11Actually, Owen (1977) used slightly different but equivalent axioms in his work. The more
common variation of his axiomatization stated here can be found, for example, in Winter (2002).
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Now, let an allocation problem (N,M) and a component-additive allocation rule
v ∈ CA be given. Moreover, suppose the network h ∈ H forms a coalition structure.
Then, each player-based allocation rule X ∈ X can be interpreted as a position-based
allocation rule via
vXic (h) ∶=
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩
vXi (h), for i ∈ h(c)
0, for i ∉ h(c).
According to Corollary 2.4 from Hart and Kurz (1983), (ZOVc )c∈M equals the Myer-
son Value:
vOVc (h∗) = ∑
i∈N
vOVic (h) = ∑
i∈h(c)
vOVi (h) = ∑
i∈h(c)
Ψi (A(h), whv) HK= Φc (wh∗v ) = vMVc (h∗) ,
where, again, Φ denotes the Shapley Value and wh
∗
v (T ) ∶= v(h∣∗T ) for all T ⊆M (cf.
Footnote 6). In particular, this implies (ZOVc )c∈M satisfies symmetry. By applying
the characterization of Ψ it is straightforward to show that OV also satisfies addi-
tivity and the null player property (with respect to coalitional networks). Because
h is a coalition structure and v is component-additive, player i’s contribution to the
whole network is exactly what she contributes to her connection c ∈M :
v(h∣S∪{i}) − v(h∣S) = v(h∣h(c)∩(S∪{i})) − v(h∣h(c)∩S)
= vMVc (h∣∗S∪{i}) − vMVc (h∣∗S)
= vMVc (h∣∗c,S∪{i}) − vMVc (h∣∗c,S)
for all S ⊆ N . Thus, OV satisfies the null player property not only in a player-based
way but also connection-wise. Nevertheless, it should be mentioned that this is
true only under the requirements given here. By further exploiting the construction
of the Myerson Value and component additivity, it is possible to show that sym-
metry within coalitions corresponds to connection-wise symmetry (note that from
Lemma 2.7 it follows that OV ∈ Y2stg): Let i, j ∈ N such that there exists c ∈ M
with i, j ∈ h(c). Then:
v(h∣S∪{i}) = v(h∣S∪{j}) for all S ⊆ N ∖ {i, j}
⇔ ∑
c′∈M
v(h∣h(c′)∩(S∪{i})) = ∑
c′∈M
v(h∣h(c′)∩(S∪{j})) for all S ⊆ N ∖ {i, j}
⇔ v(h∣c,S′∪{i}) = v(h∣c,S′∪{j}) for all S′ ⊆ h(c) ∖ {i, j}
⇔ v(h∣∗c,S′∪{i}) = v(h∣∗c,S′∪{j}) for all S′ ⊆ h(c) ∖ {i, j}
⇔ vMVc (h∣∗c,S′∪{i}) = vMVc (h∣∗c,S′∪{j}) for all S′ ⊆ h(c) ∖ {i, j}
Therefore, OV and IM satisfy the same axioms.
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Chapter 3
Constitutions and Social Networks
3.1 Introduction
There are various situations in economic or daily life where individuals organize
themselves in groups, whether for cooperation, coordination, or otherwise. The goal
of this paper is to formalize and examine environments where individuals are al-
lowed to engage in several groups at the same time. These group structures are
interpreted as social networks in this study. Depending on the context, formation
of these networks occurs for manifold reasons and considering all of them seems to
be a virtually impossible venture. In order to be as general as possible, we abstract
from activities carried out within each group. That is, we suppose the individuals’
preferences to depend on the structure of the network directly. Given these prefer-
ences, there might be incentives for joining or leaving certain groups. The salient
point is, however, that individuals are generically not necessarily free to deviate.
Some members of a group might have certain property rights which allow them
to block new members or even give them the power to force existing members to
stay. We capture this aspect by means of introducing the notion of constitutions.
More precisely, each group is supposed to have specific rules governing, on the one
hand, which deviations are feasible and, on the other, who may decide about the
deviations. Therefore, the formation of social networks not only depends on the
preferences of the individuals but also on the property rights granted by the consti-
tutions.
The framework outlined above captivates with a wide spectrum of possible applica-
tions. A particular one that we are going to discuss in detail is job markets with
labor unions. But one could also mention research collaborations, immigration, or
62
social clubs, for instance. These examples already indicate that the rules or con-
stitutions governing which members may join or leave a group may vary greatly.
For instance, in some groups it might be possible to dismiss members but in others
there might be a protection against this. Or, in some groups entry might be free
but in others it might require the consent of other members. Therefore, the consti-
tutional design may have a significant impact on the formation of social networks.
Consequently, two questions which we are going to address are: (i) what changes if
more blocking power is given to the individuals and, more general, (ii) under which
circumstances is it possible to find constitutions which guarantee a certain degree
of stability?
Since the formation of social groups is of fundamental interest, it has been examined
from numerous angles before. For instance, Ellickson et al. (1999, 2001) as well as
Allouch and Wooders (2008) analyze this issue in the framework of general equi-
librium theory, Acemoglu et al. (2012) provide a dynamic model for studying the
stability of societies, and Page and Wooders (2010) formalize club formation as a
non-cooperative game, to name but a few. In fact, providing a complete overview
over all publications dealing with group formation in a broader sense would exceed
the scope of nearly every paper due to the great complexity and diversification of
the field. Therefore, the following survey restricts on most closely related branches
and outlines which publications particularly influenced our work.
Analyzing group formation but abstracting from activities carried out within each
group obviously relates to hedonic coalition formation (e.g., Banerjee et al., 2001;
Bogomolnaia and Jackson, 2002). Moreover, studies dealing with economic net-
works (e.g., Jackson, 2008) or matching markets (e.g., Roth and Sotomayor, 1990)
can also be embedded into our setting. Thus, we contribute indirectly to a stream
of literature where the authors combine coalition formation and matching problems
(e.g., Cesco, 2012; Pycia, 2012). However, the way we model social networks and
preferences is closer to models from matching theory where the individuals are not
only concerned about which groups they belong to but also about who the other
members of the groups are (e.g., Dutta and Masso´, 1997; Eichenique and Yenmez,
2007; Kominers, 2010).
One of the main contributions of this paper is formalizing constitutional rules
within a hedonic setting. This approach is in spirit with some other publica-
tions from literature, like Bala and Goyal (2000), Page and Wooders (2009), or
Jehiel and Scotchmer (2001), for example. These papers analyze which networks
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or coalition structures might be expected to emerge under several specific rules gov-
erning network or coalition formation, respectively. However, the aforementioned
works differ from ours in at least one important aspect: For analyzing which struc-
tures are likely to occur we focus on constitutionally stable networks, where a social
network is considered to be constitutionally stable if none of the groups is modified
any more. The salient point is that, in our framework, the stability of a network
depends on explicitly modeled constitutions. In the above-mentioned papers, on the
contrary, the constitutional rules are varied only implicitly by discussing different
stability concepts. For this reason, our approach not only achieves greater generality
but it also allows separating more clearly which influence constitutional rules have
on group formation.
The analysis conducted in this paper is two-fold: We not only focus on the question
whether constitutionally stable networks actually exist but we also discuss whether
they might be reached given that the players apply a “trial-and-error strategy”.
To this end, we follow Roth and Vande Vate (1990). In the context of marriage
problems (or two-sided one-to-one matchings, respectively), the authors introduced
a Markov process which always results in a stable matching with probability one,
even if the individuals act myopically. Later, this work has been extended and var-
ied in several ways (e.g., Chung, 2000; Diamantoudi et al., 2004; Klaus et al., 2010;
Kojima and U¨nver, 2008). In our study, we use basically the same approach but
we adopt the terminology of Jackson and Watts (2001, 2002) who examined a sim-
ilar random process but focused on stochastic stability of economic networks. By
analyzing “improving paths” we formulate requirements on constitutions and pref-
erences guaranteeing that for every social network there always exists an improving
path leading to a stable network. It turns out, in fact, that this is equivalent to re-
quiring the existence of a specific version of a common ranking (cf. Banerjee et al.,
2001; Farrell and Scotchmer, 1988). We also find that giving more blocking power to
the individuals does not necessarily lead to more stability. Indeed, higher blocking
power might destroy the existence of the common ranking.
Although the main purpose of this paper is to discuss formation of social networks
in general, the last part is devoted to a particular application, namely to job mar-
kets with labor unions. Applying the general results obtained in the sections before
allows to judge for different levels of the unions’ strength, whether the job market
is likely to become stable or not. In doing so, we also find a variation of Roth’s
“polarization of interests” (cf. Roth, 1984) between employers and employees.
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The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows: The next section introduces the
model. This also includes formal definitions of social networks and of constitutions.
In Section 3.3, we discuss conditions for the existence of constitutionally stable net-
works and, in Section 3.4, we apply the corresponding results to our model of job
markets. Finally, Section 3.5 contains the conclusions.
3.2 The Model
In the following, let N = {i1, . . . , in} be a finite set of players and M = {c1, . . . , cm}
be a finite set of connections.
Definition 3.1. A social network h is a mapping h ∶ M Ð→ 2N assigning to each
c ∈M a subset of players (as usual, 2N is the power set of N).1
A social network h indicates which players are members of which connections. For
each i ∈ N let Mh(i) = {c ∈ M ∣ i ∈ h(c)} be the set of connections player i is
contained in. The set of all social networks is denoted by H and the cardinality of
H is ∣H∣ = 2mn. A particular special case is the empty social network h∅ ∈ H, with
h∅(c) = ∅ for all c ∈M . That is, no player is contained in any connection.
Example 3.1. Suppose there are three players and four connections, i.e., we have
N = {i1, i2, i3} and M = {c1, . . . , c4}. Consider the case where all players are con-
tained in c1, the players i2 and i3 are moreover contained in c2 and c3, while c4 only
contains i1. This is described formally by the following social network h:
h(c) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
{i1, i2, i3}, if c = c1
{i2, i3}, if c ∈ {c2, c3}
{i1}, if c = c4.
c2
c3
c1
c4
b
i1
b
i2
b
i3
Figure 3.1: The social network h
3.2.1 Constitutions
Each player i ∈ N is supposed to have rational preferences ⪰i over H and the tuple
⪰ = (⪰i)i∈N is called a preference profile. Depending on the preferences, there might
1 Note that the tuple (N,M,h) is simply a mathematical hypergraph. Therefore, from a technical
point of view our definition of social networks also relates to the notions of conference structures
(e.g., Myerson, 1980) and many-to-many matchings (e.g., Roth, 1984).
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be incentives to alter some connection in a given network. For modeling this formally
we use the symmetric difference ± defined by D′ ±D = (D′ ∖D) ∪ (D ∖D′) for all
D′,D ⊆ N . Correspondingly, given a connection c ∈ M and a subset of players
D ⊆ N , let h±(c,D) be the social network that is obtained from h ∈H if c is altered
by the players in D. More specifically, players in D ∩ h(c) leave the connection and
players in D ∖ h(c) join it:2
(h ± (c,D))(c′) ∶=
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
h(c) ±D if c = c′
h(c′) if c ≠ c′ (3.1)
If D ∩ h(c) = ∅, we just write h + (c,D) instead of h ± (c,D) to stress the fact that
no player leaves the connection. Conversely, if D ⊆ h(c), we just write h − (c,D)
instead of h ± (c,D) to indicate that no player joins the connection.
The central assumption in our framework is that certain deviations might be pre-
cluded, even if all deviating players would benefit from altering the network. For
capturing this facet, we introduce constitutions which govern the exit of already
existing members and/or the arrival of new members. That is, the constitutions
describe, on the one hand, which modifications of a connection are feasible and, on
the other, the coalitions whose support is needed for the modifications to take place.
Definition 3.2. The constitution Cc = (Cch)h∈H of connection c ∈M is a collection of
pairs Cch = (Dch, Sch) where (i) Dch ⊆ 2N ∖{∅} describes the feasible deviations and (ii)
for each D ∈ Dch, Sch(D) ⊆ 2h(c) specifies a non-empty set of supporting coalitions.
For all c ∈M and h ∈H, Cch consists of two components. The first one, Dch, specifies
which changes (with respect to the deviations formalized in (3.1)) of c are possible.
Of course, it might be the case that Dch = 2N ∖{∅} and that there are no restrictions
on feasible deviations. In many applications, however, certain modifications of a
connection are not possible due to capacity constraints or legal requirements, for
example, and this is captured by Dch. Moreover, for deviating from h(c), each
deviating set of players D ∈ Dch needs the support of at least one supporting coalition
S ∈ Sch(D).3 If there exists no such S, the modification by D is blocked. Note that
2We use ± instead of the usual symbol ∆ for denoting the symmetric difference in order to emphasize
that it might be possible that at the same time new members enter a connection while other
members leave it.
3Our notions of feasible deviations and supporting coalitions relate in a way to “move arcs” and
“preference arcs”, respectively, from Page et al. (2005).
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∅ ∈ Sch(D) is allowed, too. In this case, the players in D ∈ Dch do not need the consent
of any member of the connection for deviating. Moreover, if S ∈ Sch(D) ∖ {∅}, we
assume S′ ∈ Sch(D) for all S′ ⊇ S. That is, if S is a supporting coalition for a certain
deviation, all coalitions containing S also have the power to support this deviation.
In the following, let C ∶= (Cc)c∈M . The tuple (N,M,⪰,C) is called a society.
Example 3.2. Let N = {i1, . . . , in} and M = {c1, c2, c3}. As an example consider
the following three specific constitutions:
(i) If Dc1h = {D ⊆ N ∣ ∣h(c1) ±D∣ ≤ 9, D ≠ ∅} and Sc1h (D) = {S ⊆ h(c1) ∣2 ⋅ ∣S∣ >∣h(c1)∣} for all h ∈ H and D ∈ Dc1h , the players have to respect a quota of nine
and decisions are taken by means of the majority rule.
(ii) Suppose Dc2h = {D ⊆ N ∣ l ≥ 3 ∀ il ∈D, D ≠ ∅} and Sc2h (D) = {S ⊆ h(c2) ∣h(c2) ∩
D ⊆ S} for all h ∈ H and D ∈ Dc1h . This reflects the case where deviations
require certain qualifications. In this specific example, players need an index
of at least three. Moreover, none of the members has property rights for the
connection. If a deviation is feasible, the corresponding players have the power
to support themselves, i.e., they are free to enter or exit.
(iii) Let Dc3h = 2N ∖ {∅} and Sc3h (D) = {S ⊆ h(c3) ∣ il¯ ∈ S, where l¯ ≥ l∀ il ∈ h(c3)} for
all h ∈H and D ∈ Dc1h . Here, all deviations are feasible and the player with the
highest index acts as a kind of dictator and has perfect property rights. That
is, she may decide about both, whether players may join the connection as well
as whether they may leave it.
3.2.2 Stability
For analyzing which social networks might be expected to emerge we propose a
notion of stability which requires that no single connection is altered any more.
Definition 3.3. Given the society (N,M,⪰,C), a social network h is constitutionally
stable with respect to the constitutions C if for all c ∈M and D ∈ Dch we have that:
(i) h ⪰i h ± (c,D) for at least one i ∈ D ∖ h(c) or (ii) in each supporting coalition
S ∈ Sch(D) there is a player j ∈ S with h ⪰j h ± (c,D).
Expressed in words, a social network h ∈H is constitutionally stable if and only if for
any connection c ∈M and any feasible modificationD ∈ Dch, at least one of the players
joining c does not strictly benefit from deviating or at least one of the members of
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every supporting coalition S ∈ Sch(D) is not strictly better off. Therefore, implicitly
we assume that moving from h ∈H to h±(c,D) does not necessarily need the consent
of players leaving c. The main idea is that some members of the connection might
have the power to force other members to leave c even when the excluded players
suffer from this deviation. On the other hand, a player who is not in c ∈M cannot be
forced to join the connection. Only if she strictly benefits will she agree to becoming
a member of it.
Remark 3.1. An alternative approach one might think about would be that a devi-
ation already takes place if only one ot the supporting or deviating players is strictly
better off and the others do not suffer from the deviation. This would be a direct
extension of “pairwise stability” from Network Theory (see Jackson and Wolinsky,
1996). However, in our model this variation causes strange curiosities which are not
plausible in real life. For example, consider the following situation: Suppose there
are three players N = {i1, i2, i3} and only one connectionM = {c}. Let h(c) = {i1, i2},
h′(c) = {i1, i3}, {i2, i3} ∈ Dch ∩ Dch, and {i1} ∈ Sch({i2, i3}) ∩ Sch′({i2, i3}). Moreover,
suppose the preferences with respect to these two networks are as follows: h ∼i1 h′,
h ≻i2 h′, and h′ ≻i3 h. Then, given the network h, if player i2 is replaced by i3,
the last-mentioned is strictly better off while i2 suffers from this deviation. Never-
theless, since i1 is indifferent between h and h′, she would support deviating from
h to h′ because she has no incentive for blocking this modification of the connec-
tion. However, in the next step, the same pattern recurs again. The only differ-
ence is that now i2 and i3 interchange roles. Thus, i1 would grant i2 access to
the connection although she evicted this player in the step before. In particular,
this skipping back and forth between the two networks the whole time implies an
inconsistency in the behavior of i1 which is quite counterintuitive. For excluding
situations like these, we require that players only deviate or support a deviation if
they are strictly better off. Note that this is in line with several other related sta-
bility concepts from literature, like the core stability of Bogomolnaia and Jackson
(2002) and Banerjee et al. (2001), the pairwise stability of Sotomayor (1999), or the
strong stability of Dutta and Mutuswami (1997), to name but a few.
In the following, let ST (C) denote the set of constitutionally stable networks with
respect to the constitutions C. Moreover, for each h ∈H, let
Ach(C) ∶= {D ∈ Dch ∣∃S ∈ Sch(D) such that h ± (c,D) ≻i h ∀ i ∈ (D ∖ h(c)) ∪ S}
be the set of all feasible deviations causing instabilities in c ∈ M . Note that if
D ⊆ h(c), D ∈ Dch, and ∅ ∈ Sch(D), then D causes an instability by definition
68
although it might be that nobody benefits from this deviation. Therefore, in order
to exclude exogenous instabilities like these, we will assume ∅ ∉ Sch(D) if D ⊆ h(c).
3.3 General Results
Generically constitutionally stable social networks might fail to exist and this leads
to the question of how the design of constitutions affects the (non-)existence of
stable structures. For approaching this issue let us start with a straightforward
and plausible attempt: Suppose the constitutions grant the players a certain level
of blocking power. That is, the members of each connection might have certain
property rights allowing them to inhibit modifications of the connection which are
not conform to their own ideas.
Remark 3.2. Let two societies (N,M,⪰,C) and (N,M,⪰, C¯) be given and assume
C ⊆ C¯, i.e., Dch ⊆ D¯ch and Sch(D) ⊆ S¯ch(D) for all h ∈ H, c ∈ M , and D ∈ Dch. Then:
ST (C¯) ⊆ ST (C).
The remark follows directly from the definition of constitutional stability. If the
sets of feasible deviations and supporting coalitions shrink, the blocking power of
each individual player increases and the set of constitutionally stable networks might
become larger. However, although the reasoning is very intuitive it might be mis-
leading. In fact, whether more blocking power really implies more stability, strongly
depends on the perspective of stability: On the one hand, there might be more
stable networks but, on the other, reaching them might not be possible any more.
For formalizing these thoughts we follow Jackson and Watts (2001, 2002) and use
the notion of improving paths: “An improving path is a sequence of networks that
can emerge when individuals [join or leave a connection] based on the improvement
the resulting network offers relative to the current network” (Jackson and Watts,
2002, p. 51). That is, each of the networks differs from its predecessor only in
that exactly one connection is modified by a deviating coalition. This requires, of
course, that every player joining the connection must strictly prefer the resulting
network to the current one. Moreover, the deviation should not be blocked and,
hence, there should be a supporting coalition where every member strictly benefits
from the modification.4 More formally:
4In improving paths the players are implicitly assumed to care only about the immediate benefit
of deviating to the next network but they do not forecast how others might react to their actions.
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Definition 3.4. An improving path from h0 ∈H to hk ∈H is a sequence of networks(h0, h1, . . . , hk) such that for all 0 ≤ l < k there is exactly one cl ∈ M with hl+1 =
hl ± (cl,Dl) for some Dl ∈ Aclhl(C).
If there exists an improving path from h ∈ H to h′ ∈ H, we write h ↦ h′. Moreover,
let I(h) = {h′ ∈ H ∣ h ↦ h′} be the set of networks that can be reached by an
improving path starting at h. Notice that h is constitutionally stable if and only if
I(h) = ∅. A set of networks H ⊆ H is closed if there is no improving path leading
out of it, i.e., I(h) ⊆H for all h ∈H. Moreover, a set of networks H ⊆H with ∣H ∣ ≥ 2
is a cycle if for any pair h,h′ ∈ H, there exists an improving path from h to h′ and
vice versa.
Lemma 3.1. Let the society (N,M,⪰,C) be given. There exists no closed cycle if
and only if, for each network h ∈ H that is not constitutionally stable, there exists
an improving path leading from this network to a constitutionally stable one.
Proof. We will show the reverse statement of Lemma 3.1. If there exists a closed
cycle H, by definition there exists no improving path from any h ∈H to a constitu-
tionally stable network. This already proves the first direction. Now suppose there
exists a network h ∈H such that there is no constitutionally stable network in I(h).
Therefore, this set must contain at least one cycle H1. Suppose H1 is a maximal
cycle, i.e., it is not a proper subset of any other cycle. Now, either H1 is closed and
we are done, or it has an improving path going out of it, leading to a new maximal
cycle H2. Note that H1 ∩H2 = ∅. If H2 is not closed, one can iterate the previous
steps and because I(h) is finite, we will finally reach a closed cycle.
Lemma 3.1 is a modification of Lemma 1 from Jackson and Watts (2002).5 The
non-existence of closed cycles not only implies existence of stable networks but it
also guarantees stability in case the agents follow a “trial-and-error” strategy and
care only about immediate benefits. In order to make the latter point more specific
consider the following random process which has been introduced for marriage prob-
lems by Roth and Vande Vate (1990): Start with an arbitrary network h0 ∈H. Each
This approach relates to myopic learning (e.g., Kandori et al., 1993; Kandori and Rob, 1995;
Monderer and Shapley, 1996) and is appropriate in relatively complex settings where it is difficult
to anticipate all possible changes. In the context of coalition or network formation some authors
have relaxed this assumption by analyzing “farsighted stability” (see, e.g., Page and Wooders,
2009; Page et al., 2005). Conducting similar studies in our framework is left for future work.
5The authors have shown in slightly different terms that it is possible to find “pairwise-stable”
networks if there exist no closed cycles.
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round r ∈ N≥0 a pair (cr,Dr) ∈M × 2N is drawn randomly with positive probability.
If Dr ∈ Acrhr(C), the process moves to hr+1 ∶= hr ± (cr,Dr). Otherwise it remains at
hr+1 ∶= hr.
Proposition 3.1. Given a society (N,M,⪰,C), the random process described above
always (i.e., for all h0 ∈H) converges with probability one to a constitutionally stable
network if and only if there are no closed cycles.
In the context of one-to-one matching problems, the previous result has been es-
tablished by Roth and Vande Vate (1990). Although in our model the reasoning is
the same, for sake of completeness we add the proof to the appendix. The intuition
is straightforward. As every feasible deviation is drawn with positive probability,
also every improving path has a positive probability. Therefore, if for every start-
ing point there is an improving path leading to a constitutionally stable network,
the random process converges to one of these for sure whenever it is not stopped
after finitely many steps. This is particularly remarkable as in our model, network
formation is not guided by a social planner or the like. Given the random process
introduced above, non-existence of closed cycles is sufficient for guaranteeing that
a society induces a constitutionally stable network with probability one even if the
players act myopically and the deviations are not organized in a centralized way.
Proposition 3.2. Let N , M , and ⪰ be given. Let C ⊆ C¯. Then, non-existence of
closed cycles under C¯ does not imply that there are no closed cycles under C.
Proof. In order to prove the proposition, it is sufficient to construct a suitable
example. The one we consider here is a variation of an example introduced in
Bogomolnaia and Jackson (2002) and revived in Diamantoudi et al. (2004). There
are three players N = {i1.i2, i3} and one connection M = {c}. Thus, ∣H∣ = 8. The
networks are given by
h1(c) h2(c) h3(c) h4(c) h5(c) h6(c) h7(c) h∅
c {i1} {i2} {i3} {i1, i2} {i1, i3} {i2, i3} {i1, i2, i3} ∅
and the players’ preferences are
h4 ≻i1 h7 ≻i1 h5 ≻i1 h1 ≻i1 h2 ∼i1 h3 ∼i1 h6 ∼i1 h∅
h6 ≻i2 h7 ≻i2 h4 ≻i2 h2 ≻i2 h1 ∼i2 h3 ∼i2 h5 ∼i2 h∅
h5 ≻i3 h7 ≻i3 h6 ≻i3 h3 ≻i1 h1 ∼i3 h2 ∼i3 h4 ∼i3 h∅
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The setting is actually not completely the same as in Bogomolnaia and Jackson
(2002), because in their paper the authors study coalition formation (i.e., the set of
players is always decomposed into a partition) while we have just one connection
containing some of the players. However, “core stability” in their setting corresponds
to constitutional stability with respect to the following constitutions C = (D,S):
Dch = 2N ∖ {∅} and Sch(D) = {S ⊆ h(c) ∣ (h(c) ∖D) ⊆ S, S ≠ ∅} (3.2)
for all c ∈ M and h ≠ h∅. Given C, a priori all modifications of the connection
are feasible and a deviation D ≠ h(c) takes place if and only if all members of the
resulting network benefit from deviating, i.e, h± (c,D) ≻i h for all i ∈ h(c)±D. This
implies that players who are undesired can be dismissed if the other members agree
on this. For the (pathological) special case ofD = h(c), it is required that at least one
player has to approve the deviation in order to avoid exogenous instabilities. Now,
given the constitutions as defined in (3.2), Diamantoudi et al. (2004) already pointed
out that h7 is the unique constitutionally stable (or “core stable”, respectively)
network and H ∶= {h4, h5, h6} forms a closed cycle. In fact, once H is reached, there
is no improving path leading to h7 because the players act too myopically. However,
consider the following constitutions C¯ = (D¯, S¯): let
D¯ch = 2N ∖ {∅} and S¯ch(D) =
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩
{S ⊆ h(c) ∣ (h(c) ∖D) ⊆ S, S ≠ ∅} , if D ∩ h(c) ≠ ∅
{S ⊆ h(c) ∣S ≠ ∅} , if D ∩ h(c) = ∅
for all c ∈M and h ≠ h∅. Here, granting access to c just needs the support of only one
member of the connection. This obviously implies C ⊊ C¯ and, thus, the players have
less blocking power (but note that the sets of stable networks coincide). However,
in this case H, does not form a closed cycle any more because for all h ∈H there is
always one member of c who supports deviating from h to h7. Therefore, given C¯,
there exist no closed cycles.
Proposition 3.2 dissents Remark 3.2 in a way. In fact, concluding that more blocking
power leads to more stability is too simplistic. Even if the set of constitutionally
stable networks becomes larger, it could happen that all improving paths leading to
them are severed and closed cycles occur.
Consequently, instead of enhancing the blocking power of the players, it is necessary
to find alternative approaches for assuring that the society always induces a consti-
tutionally stable network. To this end, consider once again the example constructed
in the proof of Proposition 3.2. Examining it in detail yields that under C¯ we have
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h ↦ h7 for all networks h ≠ h7 but I(h7) = ∅. Therefore, for all h ∈ H there exists a
unique element in I(h) which is maximal with respect to “↦”. On the other hand,
this is not true under C because H = {h4, h5, h6} forms a closed cycle and, thus,
I(h) = H for all h ∈ H. Although these observations are limited to this specific
example, similar considerations also apply in general.
Definition 3.5. Given a society (N,M,⪰,C), a common ranking ⊵ is a complete
and transitive ordering over H such that D ∈ Ach(C) implies h ± (c,D) ⊵ h for all
h ∈H and c ∈M .
A common ranking ⊵ reflects a certain level of consensus between the players. The
main idea is that the set of networks can be decomposed into several equivalence
classes and once a higher class is reached, this will not be reversed afterwards.
Indeed, a deviation takes place only if the joining and supporting players agree that
the resulting network is not contained in a lower class than the current one. Note
that a priori this is not a restriction at all because it would be possible, for instance,
to choose ⊵ in such a way that all networks are equivalent (i.e., h ⊵ h′ as well as h′ ⊵ h
for all h,h′ ∈H). This immediately implies that a (not necessarily unique) common
ranking always exists. However, the more consensus about beneficial deviations
between the players, the stronger the restrictions that can be imposed by a common
ranking.
Proposition 3.3. Let a society (N,M,⪰,C) be given.
(i) There are no cycles if and only if there exists a common ranking ⊵ such that
for all H ⊆H there is a unique ⊵–maximal network hˆ ∈H.
(ii) There are no closed cycles if and only if there exists a common ranking ⊵ such
that for all closed H ⊆H there is a unique ⊵–maximal network hˆ ∈H.
For the proof refer to the appendix. The main advantage of Proposition 3.3 is that it
provides an alternative criterion for guaranteeing convergence to a constitutionally
stable network. Item (i) states that requiring the absence of cycles is equivalent
to requiring the existence of a special common ranking which identifies a unique
maximal element in every subset of networks.6 Moreover, according to (ii), having
6A common ranking meets this requirement if and only if it is strict. In this case, it is a variation
of “Generalized Ordinal Potentials” introduced by Monderer and Shapley (1996). In particular,
item (i) of Proposition 3.3 is closely related to Lemma 2.5 from their publication. Moreover, it
also relates to Theorem 1 in Jackson and Watts (2001).
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this feature only in particular subsets of H is still strong enough for excluding closed
cycles. Therefore, the society induces a constitutionally stable network for sure if and
only if the constitutions allow for a common ranking which is sufficiently restrictive.
That is, there must be a certain degree of consent about which feasible deviations
are beneficial and which are not.
3.3.1 Constitutional Rules and Players’ Preferences
The remainder of this section is devoted to requirements assuring the existence of
a common ranking which excludes closed cycles. In order to get more intuition for
this, let us consider a stylized example:
Example 3.3. Suppose there are three players N = {i1, i2, i3} and a unique con-
nection M = {c}. Analogously to the example in the proof of Proposition 3.2 let
h3(c) = {i3}, h5(c) = {i1, i3}, h6(c) = {i2, i3}, and h7(c) = {i1, i2, i3}. But here, the
corresponding feasible deviations are Dch3 = Dch5 = Dch6 = Dch7 = {{i1},{i2},{i3}},
while the supporting coalitions are given by Schl(D) = {S ⊆ hl(c) ∣ i3 ∈ S} for all
D ∈ Dchl where l ∈ {3,5,7} and Sch6(D) = {S ⊆ h6(c) ∣ i2 ∈ S} for all D ∈ Dch6. More-
over, the players’ preferences are supposed to be as follows:
h7 ≻i1 h5 ≻i1 h6 ∼i1 h3 ≻i1 . . .
h7 ≻i2 h6 ≻i2 h5 ∼i2 h3 ≻i2 . . .
h6 ≻i3 h3 ≻i3 h5 ≻i3 h7 ≻i3 . . .
It is not difficult to check that in this case the set H = {h6, h3, h5, h3} forms a closed
cycle because (h3, h6, h7, h5, h3) is an improving path (see Figure 3.2).
Inspecting this cycle in detail we can find a kind of irregularity in the constitutions:
In h3, h5, and h7, player i3 is the only one who may decide about deviations and
she even has the power to exclude the other players from the connection. But after
moving to h6, player i3 looses her strong property rights and i2 is able to grant
i1 access to the connection. Moreover, not only the constitutions exhibit a kind of
irregularity but the players also disagree about the optimal form of the connection.
First, as mentioned before, i3 can exclude i1 or i2 in h7 against their will. If either
this was not possible or the players agreed to being excluded and did not want to
join the connection again, the cycle would be splintered. Second, both players, i2
and i3, have the power to support a deviation of player i1. The salient point is that
both disagree about whether i1 should be a member of the connection or not. If there
would be a common agreement about this, one of the deviations would be blocked.
74
h3 h6
h5 h7
h3 + (c,{i2})
h5 − (c,{i1}) h6 + (c,{i1})h7 − (c,{i1})
h7 − (c,{i2})
Figure 3.2: The cycle H
As the example illustrates, in general there are three main factors which support
the occurrence of closed cycles:
(i) constitutions might change strongly even if the network itself does not,
(ii) players might be forced to leave a connection against their will, and
(iii) there might be disagreement between the players who may decide about the
deviations.
In fact, for guaranteeing the existence of a common ranking which satisfies the
criterion formalized in Proposition 3.3(ii), it is necessary to control for all of these
factors. This implies that we not only have to find reasonable restrictions on players’
preferences but also consistency conditions on the constitutions.
Definition 3.6. Given a closed set H ⊆H, the constitutions C = (D,S) satisfy . . .
• . . . regularity with respect to H if for all h ∈H and c ∈M we have:
(i) If h¯(c) = h(c) ∪ D¯ for some h¯ ∈ H and D¯ ⊆ N ∖ h(c), then Dch = Dch¯ and
for all D ∈ Dc
h¯
and S¯ ∈ Sc
h¯
(D) there exists S ∈ Sch(D) with S ⊆ S¯ ⊆ S ∪ D¯.
(ii) If D ∈ Dch and S ∈ Sch(D) with S ⊈D, then h(c) ∖ (S ∪D) ∉ Sch(D).
• . . . protection against eviction with respect to H if for all h ∈ H and c ∈ M
always D ∩ h(c) ⊆ S for all D ∈ Dch and S ∈ Sch(D).
• . . . decomposability with respect to H if for all h ∈H and c ∈M , we have that
D ∈ Dch implies D′ ∈ Dch and Sch(D) = Sch(D′) for all D′ ⊆D.
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The main motivation of regularity is to exclude the possibility of skipping back and
forth between two networks the whole time: Condition (i) states that the feasible
deviations and corresponding supporting coalitions of each c ∈ M may not vary
extremely whenever c changes. If further players are added to the connection, the
feasible deviations are supposed to remain the same and supporting coalitions change
only as long as they might be complemented by new members. Thus, together with
(ii) this implies that if a coalition S ∈ Sch(D) has the authority to support a deviation
D ∈ Dch, this cannot be reversed by another coalition which is neither associated to
S nor to D.
If the constitutions satisfy protection against eviction, no player can be forced to
leave a connection c ∈M if she does not want to do it. Modifying c always requires
the consent of all deviating players (not only the consent of players who join the
connection).
Decomposable constitutions exhibit a kind of independence property. If the deviation
of a group of players is feasible, deviations of any subgroup of players are feasible as
well and the corresponding supporting coalitions do not change.
Definition 3.7. A preference profile ⪰ . . .
• . . . satisfies self-concern if h ∼i h¯ for all i ∈ N and each pair of networks h, h¯ ∈H
with Mh(i) =Mh¯(i) and h(c) = h¯(c) for all c ∈Mh(i).
• . . . is lexicographic if each agent i ∈ N has a preference ordering ⪰¯i over 2M
such that Mh(i) ⪰¯i Mh¯(i) implies h ⪰i h¯ for all h, h¯ ∈H with Mh(i) ≠Mh¯(i).
• . . . is uniform if for all i ∈ N , c ∈ M , and h, h¯ ∈ H with i ∈ h(c) = h¯(c),
h − (c,{k}) ≻j h implies h¯ − (c,{k}) ≻i h¯ and h ≻j h − (c,{k}) implies h¯ ≻i
h¯ − (c,{k}) for j ∈ h(c), k ∈ h(c) ∖ {i, j}.
• . . . is equable if for all i ∈ N , c ∈ M , and h, h¯ ∈ H with i ∈ h(c) = h¯(c),
h ≻j h − (c,{j}) for some j ∈ h(c) implies h¯ ≻i h¯ − (c,{i}) and h − (c,{j}) ≻j h
for some j ∈ h(c) implies h¯ − (c,{i}) ≻i h¯.
• . . . is separable if for all i ∈ N , c ∈M , and h, h¯ ∈H with i ∈ h(c) ⊆ h¯(c) the two
following conditions are satisfied:
(i) h¯ − (c,D) ≻i h¯ if and only if h − (c,D) ≻i h for all ∅ ≠D ⊆ h(c) ∖ {i}.
(ii) h¯ + (c,D) ≻i h¯ if and only if h + (c,D) ≻i h for all ∅ ≠D ⊆ N ∖ h¯(c).
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Self-concern is a kind of independence property. Player i neither benefits nor suffers
if the network changes in such a way that i is not affected directly.
The definition of lexicographic preferences is adapted from Dutta and Masso´ (1997).
Under this requirement, each player i ∈ N is mainly concerned about the connections
themselves where she is a member of and less about who the other members are.
Only if Mh(i) =Mh¯(i), might she care about the other players in her connections.
If the preferences of the players are uniform and a player leaves a connection, either
all remaining members benefit from this deviation or none of them. Note that this
is supposed to be independent of the form the other connections have.
Under equability player i ∈ N wants to stay in a connection c ∈M only if the other
members also want to stay. Suppose, for example, the connections generate a payoff
which is distributed equally among the members: Then, if a player has an incentive
to leave c, the same goes for i.
Separability as introduced here is a variation of the same-named concept from
Banerjee et al. (2001). The idea is that player i’s support for a certain leaving
or joining group D is independent of the form the connection actually has.
3.3.2 Non-existence of (Closed) Cycles
Now, combining the restrictions introduced in the previous subsection allows formu-
lating conditions which guarantee non-existence of (closed) cycles and thus lead to
convergence to a constitutionally stable network.
Proposition 3.4. Let a society (N,M,⪰,C) be given where all constitutions satisfy
protection against eviction with respect to a closed set H ⊆ H. If the players’
preferences satisfy equability and self-concern, there exist no cycles in H.
All proofs of this subsection can be found in the appendix. The requirements of
Proposition 3.4 reflect the three factors which might cause instabilities. Equability
and self-concern, for example, impose restrictions on the players’ preferences. Both
conditions together guarantee that there is only little disagreement about the opti-
mal form of each connection c ∈M . Complementing this, protection against eviction
with respect to H has two consequences: On the one hand, as the definition directly
implies, players cannot be forced to leave a connection if they do not agree to this.
On the other hand, indirectly it also ensures that the constitutions do not change
too strongly whenever a connection is altered. More specifically, S ∈ Sch(D) implies
h(c) ∖ S ∉ Sch(D) for all h ∈ H, c ∈M , and D ∈ Dch. The interpretation is similar to
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regularity: If S has the power to support a deviation of D, this cannot be reversed
by other supporting coalitions.
Proposition 3.5. Let a society (N,M,⪰,C) be given where all constitutions satisfy
protection against eviction with respect to a closed set H ⊆ H. If the players’
preferences are lexicographic, there exist no cycles in H.
The intuition of the previous result is similar to Proposition 3.4. Obviously, the
only difference is that the preferences are not supposed to satisfy equability and
self-concern but lexicography instead. Therefore, even if there is some disagreement
about the optimal form of the connections, it is relegated to a secondary role.
Both previous propositions exclude the existence of not only closed cycles but even
of cycles in general. To some extent this is caused by protection against eviction.
Indeed, it is not possible to drop or to relax this assumption without reinforcing the
requirements on players’ preferences.
Proposition 3.6. Let a society (N,M,⪰,C) be given. Assume all constitutions are
decomposable and regular with respect to a closed setH ⊆H. Moreover, suppose the
players’ preferences are separable, uniform, equable, and they satisfy self-concern.
Then, there exist no closed cycles in H.
As the definition directly implies, regularity inhibits the constitutions from varying
too extremely and, similar to Proposition 3.4, equability and self-concern guarantee
a certain degree of consent about the optimal form of the network. In addition to
this, due to separability and uniformity, in most networks the players are not forced
to leave their connections if they do not agree to this. If, for example, some player’s
entry is supported by a certain coalition, the corresponding members will not change
their minds, even if the connection is altered strongly. Thus, the player will only
leave again if she has an incentive for deviating.
Note that similar to Proposition 3.4, it is required that the preferences satisfy equa-
bility and self-concern together. Consequently, and analogously to above, it is pos-
sible to replace both assumptions in Proposition 3.6 by lexicography. The intuition
is the same: The optimal form of the connections is relegated to a secondary role.
Proposition 3.7. Let the society (N,M,⪰,C) be given. Assume all constitutions
are decomposable and regular with respect to a closed set H ⊆H. Moreover, suppose
the preferences of the players are separable, uniform and lexicographic. Then, there
exist no closed cycles in H.7
7Although the proof proceeds similarly as the one of Proposition 3.6, the main idea is partially
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3.4 Many-to-many Matching Markets
One of the most intriguing features of our model is a versatile applicability since
overlapping group structures are characteristic for many environments. Consider, for
example, many-to-many matching markets. The main primitives of these markets
are two finite sets of players E and F , where the members of E are usually interpreted
as employees (or workers) and the members of F as firms (see, e.g., Roth, 1984).
A (two-sided) many-to-many matching µ ⊆ E × F is then simply a collection of
worker-firm pairs indicating which employees are working for which firms. Both
sides of the market, i.e., all players in E as well as all players in F , are supposed to
have preferences over all possible matchings. Thereby, the employees are classically
assumed to care only about which firms they work for but not about who their
co-workers might be. The owners, on the other hand, are only concerned about the
employees working for their firm:
“This involves an assumption that workers are indifferent to who their
co-workers might be, and firms are indifferent to whether their employees
moonlight at other jobs.” (Roth, 1984, p. 51)
The setting outlined above can be embedded into our model in a straightforward
way: Let M ∶= F , i.e., each connection c ∈ M is interpreted as firm. Since in our
model the connections do not act as players, we suppose that each firm c has ex-
actly one owner oc ∈ O. That is, in the following we assume that the set of players
N ∶= E ∪O can be decomposed into two (disjoint) subsets, the employees E and the
owners O. Given these preliminaries, each matching µ ⊆ E × F can be represented
by the social network hµ ∈ H which is defined via hµ(c) = {i ∈ E ∣ (i, c) ∈ µ} ∪ {oc}
for all c ∈ M = F . In order to be in line with classical literature on many-to-many
matchings, we assume that each owner has no incentive for leaving her firm or for
joining any other firm, i.e., we are only interested in the case O ∩ h(c) = {oc} for
h ∈ H and c ∈ M .8 Nevertheless, since a priori we do not exclude certain network
structures, for technical reasons we also have to define preferences over networks
where this requirement is not met. To fix ideas, Roth’s assumptions on the players’
preferences imply that each employee i ∈ E is indifferent to all networks where she
is working for the same set of firms, i.e., h ∼i h¯ for all h, h¯ ∈ H with Mh(i) =Mh¯(i).
based on Section 5 of Sotomayor (1999).
8Thus, we do not consider the possibility of changing the owner. But from a technical point of
view it would not be difficult to include this feature into the model.
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Moreover, given c ∈ M and O ∩ h(c) = {oc}, the assumptions also imply h ∼oc h¯
whenever h(c) = h¯(c). For the (pathological) case of O ∩ h(c) ≠ {oc}, we assume
h ± ((O ∩ h(c)) ± {oc}) ≻oc h. Therefore, the preferences of all employees are lexico-
graphic; and restricted to the set H ∶= {h ∈ H ∣ O ∩ h(c) = {oc} ∀ c ∈ M} the same
goes for the owners, too.
Since our model is richer than the classical matching approach (in particular, social
networks as defined here might be interpreted as one-sided many-to-many match-
ings), it consequently enables us to model job markets more realistically. Comple-
menting this, our formalization of constitutions supports plausibility even further
as it allows studying different levels of authority of the owners in a flexible way.
For instance, in many countries (especially in Europe) employees are organized in
labor unions which represent the interests of their members. These unions may
guarantee a quite strong protection against dismissal to the employees and in the
short run the consent of a worker is needed if the owner wants her to leave the firm.
Many-to-many matching theory, however, usually concentrates on job markets with-
out strong protection against dismissal, like the US job market, for example, and
neglects the impact of labor unions. Due to its versatility, our model provides an
appropriate framework for examining and comparing these settings in a convenient
way. Therefore, the remainder of the paper is devoted to the study of different levels
of authority of the owners.
3.4.1 Protection against Dismissal
In the following, we always assume that the employees are allowed to accept as many
jobs as they want to. Moreover, the firms have unlimited capacity to hire workers,
i.e., given O ∩ h(c) = {oc} for h ∈ H and all c ∈ M , every possible deviation of the
employees is feasible. Nevertheless, quotas could be included easily by allowing only
for deviations which respect a maximal firm size. For sake of completeness, we also
have to consider the case where an owner is not part of her firm or other owners
are contained in it. Then, we assume that the only feasible deviation is to add the
owner and to delete all the others:
Dch =
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩
2E, if O ∩ h(c) = {oc}
(O ∩ h(c)) ± {oc}, if O ∩ h(c) ≠ {oc} (3.3)
As mentioned before, in this subsection we suppose that the owner has no authority
to fire her employees if they do not agree with this. However, she is the only one
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who may decide about hiring new workers. On the other hand, each employee is
free to terminate her job if she has an incentive to do so. These considerations lead
to the following set of supporting coalitions:
Sch(D) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
{S ⊆ h(c) ∣D ∩ h(c) ⊆ S and oc ∈ S}, if O ∩ h(c) = {oc} and D ⊈ h(c)
{S ⊆ h(c) ∣D ⊆ S}, if O ∩ h(c) = {oc} and D ⊆ h(c)
{∅}, if O ∩ h(c) ≠ {oc}
Note that for the case of O ∩ h(c) ≠ {oc}, we assume that the empty set is the only
supporting coalition and, thus, these networks are not stable by construction.
Corollary 3.1. There are no cycles in “Protection against Dismissal”.
Proof. This follows immediately from Proposition 3.5 because the players’ prefer-
ences are lexicographic and we also have protection against dismissal with respect
to the closed set H.
At first sight, the previous result might be slightly surprising because in many
studies about two-sided many-to-many matchings the existence of stable structures
is an issue (e.g., Sotomayor, 2004). This is mainly due to the fact that this literature
normally examines environments where the owners are free to fire a worker if they
benefit from it. Indeed, protection against dismissal is the driving force of the
previous result. Let ST PD denote the set of stable networks in Protection against
Dismissal. Note that this set also contains the worker-optimal networks which are
defined as follows: Suppose M¯ i ⊆ M is a set of firms which is mostly preferred by
i ∈ E. Then, if hwo is given by hwo(c) = {i ∈ E ∣ c ∈ M¯ i} ∪ {oc} for all c ∈M, every
employee is assigned to a set of firms she preferably wants to work for and, thus,
she obviously has no incentive for deviating.
3.4.2 Hire and Fire
Let us now focus on job markets without strong protection against dismissal. Trans-
lated to the model considered here, this means that the owners have the right to
fire employees even if these do not agree to leaving. This aspect can be captured by
considering the following supporting coalitions:
Sch(D) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
{S ⊆ h(c) ∣ oc ∈ S}, if O ∩ h(c) = {oc},D ⊈ h(c)
{S ⊆ h(c) ∣D ⊆ S or oc ∈ S}, if O ∩ h(c) = {oc},D ⊆ h(c)
{∅}, if O ∩ h(c) ≠ {oc}
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Let ST HF be the set of stable networks in “Hire and Fire”. Note that Remark 3.2
implies ST HF ⊆ ST PD. However, it is well known that without further assumptions
existence of stable networks in Hire and Fire is not assured (as can be easily seen
by means of an example with two workers and two firms). Thus, in order to exclude
existence of closed cycles it is necessary to impose further restrictions on constitu-
tions or preferences. A straightforward approach would be to proceed similarly to
Proposition 3.7 since, as mentioned above, the preferences of the players are lexico-
graphic and, moreover, the constitutions in Hire and Fire are not only decomposable
but also regular with respect to H. However, due to the specific structure of the
setting considered here it is not necessary to impose such strong assumptions as in
Proposition 3.7. Since the owners are the only players who have the authority to
hire new employees and because they never leave their firm, uniformity is not needed
and it is sufficient to additionally assume that the owners’ preferences are separable.
Proposition 3.8. If the preferences of the owners are separable, there exist no
closed cycles in Hire and Fire.
Remark 3.3. This proposition is in line with several other well-known publications
from literature, like the papers from Roth and Vande Vate (1990), Chung (2000),
Diamantoudi et al. (2004), and especially Kojima and U¨nver (2008). Similar to our
result, Kojima and U¨nver (2008) have shown in the context of two-sided many-to-
many matchings that if employees and owners have, respectively, “substitutable”
(see Roth, 1984) and “responsive” (see Roth, 1985) preferences, there always exists
an improving path leading to a “pairwise stable” matching. In fact, the assumptions
we impose in Proposition 3.8 are less restrictive: Given preferences as defined at
the beginning of this section and if, in addition to this, only deviations of single
players are feasible, responsiveness of the owners’ preferences implies separability
which in turn implies substitutability (converse implications do not hold). Therefore,
Proposition 3.8 complements their findings.
Although we have ST HF ⊆ ST PD, the converse inclusion does not necessarily hold.
Therefore, there might exist networks which are stable in Protection against Dis-
missal but would be blocked if the owners’ level of authority is sufficiently high. In
particular, due to the characteristics of Hire and Fire, if h ∈ ST PD but h ∉ ST HF,
there is at least one owner who would like to fire some of her employees. This already
indicates that the interests of both sides of the market might be opposed in some
way. For deepening these considerations further we need to enhance separability:
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Definition 3.8. A preference profile ⪰ is strongly separable if for all i ∈ N , c ∈M ,
and h, h¯ ∈H with i ∈ h(c) ⊆ h¯(c), the two following conditions are satisfied:
(i) h¯ − (c,D) ≻i h¯ if and only if h − (c,D) ≻i h for all ∅ ≠D ⊆ h(c).
(ii) h¯ + (c,D) ≻i h¯ if and only if h + (c,D) ≻i h for all ∅ ≠D ⊆ N ∖ h¯(c).
As the name implies, strong separability is a stronger requirement than separability.
Again, player i’s support for a certain leaving or joining group is independent of the
form the connection actually has. But under strong separability this is also true if
i belongs to the deviating group, i.e., if i leaves the connection. Translated to Hire
and Fire, this basically means that i’s preference about whether to work for a firm
c ∈M or not is independent of the other firms she is working for.
Proposition 3.9. Assume the workers’ preferences are strongly separable and the
owners’ preferences are separable. Moreover, suppose the worker-optimal network
hwo is uniquely determined. Then, hwo ∈ ST HF if and only if ST PD = ST HF.
Proof. If ST PD = ST HF, then also hwo ∈ ST HF because hwo is always stable in
Protection against Dismissal and there remains nothing to show. For the other
direction, suppose the statement is not true, i.e., hwo ∈ ST HF but ST HF ⊊ ST PD.
Let h¯ ∈ ST PD ∖ ST HF. Then, there must be an owner oc who would block h¯ if
her property rights are strong enough, i.e., there exists an employee i ∈ h¯(c) such
that h¯ − (c,{i}) ≻oc h¯. Because oc’s preferences are separable and hwo is stable, this
implies i ∉ hwo(c). Otherwise, the owner would also have an incentive to dismiss
the employee in hwo. Thus, uniqueness of hwo yields that i strictly prefers hwo to
hwo + (c,{i}). In particular, because her preferences are supposed to be separable,
she would also have a strict incentive for leaving c at h¯, but this contradicts stability
of this network.
Proposition 3.9 is in line with Roth (1984). Under the requirement that the pref-
erences of owners and employees are “substitutable”, the author finds a “conflict of
interest between agents on opposite sides [of the market]” (Roth (1984), p. 47). A
similar conflict also arises here: Given (strong) separability of the players’ prefer-
ences, the stable outcome which would be blocked first by the owners is the worker-
optimal network. In fact, this phenomenon is completely independent of specific
working conditions such as wages or the working environment, for example, because
we abstracted from factors like these. Moreover, as will be shown in the following,
the conflict becomes even stronger if the owners’ level of authority is raised higher.
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3.4.3 Slavery
Roughly speaking, “Slavery” is the counterposition of Protection against Dismissal.
Here, the owners not only have the power to decide about new employees but also
about whether workers may leave their firm or not:
Sch(D) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
{S ⊆ h(c) ∣ oc ∈ S}, if O ∩ h(c) = {oc} and D ⊈ h(c)
{S ⊆ h(c) ∣ oc ∈ S}, if O ∩ h(c) = {oc} and D ⊆ h(c)
{∅}, if O ∩ h(c) ≠ {oc}
By applying Proposition 3.5 we get the following result:
Corollary 3.2. Every improving path in Slavery leads to a constitutionally stable
network.
Let ST SL be the corresponding set of stable networks.
Remark 3.4. It is easy to check that a network is stable in Hire and Fire if and only
if it is stable in Protection against Dismissal and Slavery, i.e., ST HF = ST PD∩ST SL.
But it might be the case that the intersection of the sets of stable networks is
empty. However, according to Corollary 3.1 and Corollary 3.2 there exist no cycles in
Protection against Dismissal and Slavery. Therefore, a simple algorithm for finding
stable networks in Hire and Fire (in case they exist) is to determine the sets of
maximal elements of all improving paths in the two other settings and to check
whether the intersection of these sets is non-empty.
Analogously to worker-optimal networks it is, of course, also possible to define firm-
optimal networks. Let Eˆc ⊆ E be a set of employees which is mostly preferred by
player oc and define hfo by hfo(c) = Eˆc∪{oc} for all c ∈M . Then, none of the owners
has an incentive for deviating and, thus, the network is stable in Slavery.
Proposition 3.10. Assume the workers’ preferences are strongly separable and the
owners’ preferences are separable. Moreover, suppose the firm-optimal network hfo
is uniquely determined. Then, hfo ∈ ST HF if and only if ST SL = ST HF.
Proof. Because Slavery is symmetric to Protection against Dismissal, the proof
proceeds analogously to the one of Proposition 3.9, just by reversing the role of
owners and employees.
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Proposition 3.10 has two implications: First, it shows that the owners can enforce
the network which is most beneficial for them if they have a high level of authority.
Second, this network would be the first network which is rejected by the employees.
In fact, this result extends and reinforces the interpretation of Proposition 3.9 in
a straightforward way: Each side of the market would be worse off if the other
side obtains more property rights. If, for example, labor unions narrow the owners’
level of authority, the employees would benefit from this and vice versa. Recall
once more that this insight does not directly depend on wages or the like, which
we do not consider explicitly in our model. In particular, this implies that Roth’s
“polarization of interests” seems to achieve great generality.
3.5 Conclusion
Even though there is an immense and rich body of literature on the stability of
networks (or group structures, respectively), in most of these studies, the stability
concepts the authors use are relatively rigid since they do not consider explicitly
the rules governing network formation. Indeed, the most distinctive feature of our
framework is the formal introduction of constitutions which enable modeling these
rules in a very flexible way. Using this approach we find that enhancing the blocking
power of the players does not necessarily lead to more stability. Moreover, we show
that the society induces a constitutionally stable network for sure if and only if there
is a certain degree of consent between the players about which feasible deviations
(according to the constitutions) are beneficial and which are not. In this context,
we also discuss conditions under which this criterion is satisfied. By applying our
model to job markets with labor unions we find a variation of Roth’s “polarization
of interests”: The workers generically suffer if the degree of authority of the owners
is raised and vice versa. In addition to this, we also show that the markets always
become stable if the property rights of one side of the market become sufficiently
strong.
Although the model we analyze in this paper expands well-established branches
like Network Theory or Matching Theory, for example, it is still subject to certain
limitations which narrow the field of possible applications. For instance, assuming
myopic behavior is reasonable for a start, but it is well-justified only in complex
settings where it is extremely difficult to anticipate all possible alterations. There-
fore, it might be worth analyzing which results could be obtained if the players act
85
farsightedly. Another natural extension is to examine situations where it is possi-
ble to add new players or connections to the society. To incorporate this kind of
dynamics, it would be necessary to relax the assumption of fixed sets of players
and connections. Furthermore, under certain requirements common rankings relate
to ordinal potentials. Since there are numerous publications on potential functions
(e.g., Hart and Mas-Colell, 1989; Monderer and Shapley, 1996; Page and Wooders,
2010; Qin, 1996; Slikker, 2001), it seems interesting to study whether the corre-
sponding results also extend to the model introduced here.
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3.6 Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 3.1
Basically speaking, the proposition is an immediate implication of standard results
in Probability Theory. For a formal introduction see Grimmett and Stirzaker (2001),
for example. For each pair (c,D) ∈ M × 2N let pc,D > 0 denote the probability of
choosing (c,D). Then, given a network h ∈ H, the probability phh′ ∈ [0,1] of moving
from h to another network h′ ≠ h is
phh′ =
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩
pc,D, if h′ = h ± (c,D) for some (c,D) ∈M × 2N and D ∈ Ach(C)
0, if either h′ ≠ h ± (c,D) for all (c,D) ∈M × 2N or D ∉ Ach(C).
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Moreover, we define phh ∈ [0,1] via phh = 1 − ∑h′∶h′≠h phh′ . Let X = (Xr)r∈N≥0 be
the (homogeneous) Markov Chain describing the random process introduced in Sec-
tion 3.3, i.e, the probability of moving from hr ∈ H to hr+1 ∈ H in round r ≥ 0 is
given by
P (Xr+1 = h′∣X0 = h0,X1 = h1, . . . ,Xr = hr) = P (Xr+1 = h′∣Xr = hr) = phrhr+1
for all h0, . . . , hr−1 ∈ H. Therefore, P(Xr+1 = h¯∣Xr = h¯) = 1 for all r ≥ 0 if and
only if h¯ is constitutionally stable. In particular, this implies that each constitu-
tionally stable network is persistent, where a network h ∈ H is said to be persis-
tent if P (Xr = h for some r ≥ 1∣X0 = h) = 1 (cf. Grimmett and Stirzaker, 2001). If
h is not persistent it is called transient. For each pair of networks h,h′ ∈ H, let
phh′(s) = P(Xr+s = h′∣Xr = h) be the probability of reaching h′ from h in s steps.
According to the Chapman-Kolmogorov equation, this probability does not depend
on r and so is well-defined indeed.
The definitions introduced in the preceding paragraph provide a basis for proving the
proposition formally. For the first direction let a closed cycle H be given. Thus, we
have phh′ = 0 for all h ∈ H and h′ ∉ H. Let (h0, h1, . . . , hk) be an arbitrary sequence
of networks with h0 ∈ H and hk ∈ ST (C). Note that we do not require that the
sequence is an improving path. Nevertheless, there has to be at least one 0 ≤ r < k
with hr ∈ H and hr+1 ∉ H and, thus, P(X1 = h1, . . . ,Xk = hk, . . . ,Xk = hk∣X0 = h0) =
P(X1 = h1∣X0 = h0) ⋅ . . . ⋅P(Xr+1 = hr+1∣Xr = hr) ⋅ . . . ⋅P(Xk = hk∣Xk−1 = hk−1) = 0. Since
the sequence was chosen arbitrarily, this implies ph0hk(s) = 0 for all s ≥ 0. But from
this it immediately follows that the probability of converging to a constitutionally
stable network is equal to zero if the Markov Chain starts in H.
Now suppose there are no closed cycles and let h′ ∉ ST (C) be a non-stable network.
According to Lemma 3.1 there exists an improving path (h0, h1, . . . , hk) with h0 = h′
leading to a constitutionally stable network hk. Then:
P(Xr = h′∣X0 = h′) ≤ 1−P(X1 = h1, . . . ,Xk = hk, . . . ,Xr = hk,Xr+1 = hk∣X0 = h′)
= 1−P(X1 = h1∣X0 = h′) ⋅ . . . ⋅ P(Xk = hk∣Xk−1 = hk−1)
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for all r ≥ 1. Therefore, a network h′ is transient if and only if h′ is not constitu-
tionally stable and this allows applying a well-known result in Probability Theory:
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Proposition (Cf. Grimmett and Stirzaker, 2001, p. 222). If h′ is transient then
phh′(s)→ 0 as s→∞ for all h ∈H.
Thus, for every starting network h, the probability of converging to a transient
network is equal to zero. Or, stated equivalently: the probability that the Markov
Chain introduced above converges to a constitutionally stable network (or persistent
network, respectively) is always one.
Proof of Proposition 3.3(i)
In order to show that the existence of ⊵ implies the non-existence of cycles, we will
consider the counter-position of this statement. Therefore, assume there is a cycle
H ⊆H. Since there exists a path from each network to every other network in H, if
⊵ is a common ranking, we must have h¯ ⊵ h˘ as well as h˘ ⊵ h¯ for all h¯, h˘ ∈ H. Thus,
there is no unique ⊵-maximal element in H.
For the other direction suppose there exist no cycles. The following algorithm pro-
ceeds in a similar way as the one in the proof of Theorem 1 in Jackson and Watts
(2001). We start with the binary relation ⊵1 where h ⊳1 h¯ if and only if there exists
an improving path from h¯ to h. Since there is no cycle, ⊵1 is strict. Moreover, for all
h ∈H, c ∈M , and D ∈ Dch, deviating from h to h±(c,D) always implies h±(c,D) ⊳1 h
by construction. However, ⊵1 is not necessarily complete. Let h˜, h˘ ∈ H with neither
h˜ ⊳1 h˘ nor h˘ ⊳1 h˜. We construct ⊵¯1 by adding h˜ ⊳¯ h˘ to ⊵1, i.e., h ⊵¯1 h¯ if and only
if h ⊵1 h¯ or h = h˜ and h¯ = h˘. Moreover, let ⊵2 be the transitive closure of ⊵¯1. We
will show that ⊵2 still represents the preference profile of the players, i.e., deviating
from h to h ± (c,D) always implies h ± (c,D) ⊳2 h for all c ∈ M and D ∈ Ach(C).
Suppose this is not true, that is, suppose there exist h′ ∈ H, c ∈ M , D ∈ Dch′ , and
S ∈ Sch′(D) with h′ ± (c,D) ≻i h′ for all i ∈ (D∖h′(c))∪S but h′ ⊵2 h′ ± (c,D). Thus,
there exists a sequence of networks (h0, h1, . . . , hk) with h0 = h′, hk = h′ ± (c,D) and
h0 ⊵¯1 h1 ⊵¯1 . . . ⊵¯1 hk. Assume the sequence is of minimal length. This implies that
hl = hl′ only if l = l′ for all l, l′ ∈ {0,1, . . . , k}. Suppose there exists an l ∈ {1, . . . , k}
with {hl−1, hl} = {h˘, h˜}. Because hl′ ≠ h˘, h˜ for all l′ ∉ {l − 1, l} this yields
hl ⊵1 hl+1 ⊵1 . . . ⊵1 hk = h′ ± (c,D) ⊵1 h′ = h0 ⊵1 . . . ⊵1 hl−1
and, thus, there exists an improving path from h˜ to h˘ or vice versa. This contradicts
the assumption that the two networks are not comparable under ⊵1. Therefore, there
exists no l ∈ {1, . . . , k} with {hl−1, hl} = {h˘, h˜}. From this follows h0 ⊵1 h1 ⊵1 . . . ⪰¯1 hk
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which contradicts the assumption that there is no cycle. Thus, ⊵2 still represents
the preferences of the players and by construction it is also transitive and strict. If it
is not complete, the previous steps can be iterated. As the set of networks is finite,
the iteration will stop after finitely many steps and we obtain a common ranking
⊵ which is strict. In particular, strictness implies that for each H ⊆ H there is a
unique ⊵-maximal network hˆ ∈H.
Proof of Proposition 3.3(ii)
The first direction proceeds analogously to the first direction of Part (i). Let a
common ranking ⊵ and a set of networks H ⊆H be given. If H forms a closed cycle,
we have I(h) = I(h′) = H and h ⊵ h′ as well as h′ ⊵ h for all h,h′ ∈ H. But this
would contradict that there is a unique ⊵-maximal network in H and, thus, there
cannot exist a closed cycle.
For the other direction suppose there exist no closed cycles. The first step of the
construction of the common ranking proceeds in the same way as the one of Part (i).
That is, we start with ⊵1 where h ⊵1 h¯ if and only if there exists an improving path
from h¯ to h. But note that here this binary relation is not necessarily strict. Since by
assumption there are no closed cycles, there exists at least one constitutionally stable
network h′ ∈ H. If this network is uniquely determined, according to Lemma 3.1 it
is contained in every closed subset H ⊆ H and ⊵1 can then obviously be extended
to a complete ranking where h′ is the unique maximal element. Therefore, in the
following, suppose there exists a further constitutionally stable network h′′ ∈ H. In
particular, this implies that neither h′ ⊵1 h′′ nor h′′ ⊵1 h′. Let h˜, h˘ ∈H be an arbitrary
pair of networks not comparable under ⊵1. Analogously to above, ⊵¯1 is constructed
by adding h˜ ⊳¯1 h˘ to ⊵1, i.e., h ⊵¯1 h¯ if and only if h ⊵1 h¯ or h = h˜ and h¯ = h˘. Again, let⊵2 be the transitive closure of ⊵¯1. Note that by construction h′ ⊵2 h′′ would imply
h′ ⋭2 h′′ and vice versa. If ⊵2 is not complete, because of finiteness of H we can
iterate the previous steps until a complete ranking ⊵ is reached. We will show that
h′ and h′′ are still not equivalent under ⊵. This, in fact, has the following implication:
If hˇ is ⊵–maximal in a closed subset H ⊆ H, it has to be constitutionally stable by
construction and w.l.o.g. we may assume hˇ = h′. Then, for any other stable network
h′′ ∈H, we must have h′ ⊳ h′′ and, thus, h′ is the unique ⊵–maximal element in H.
In order to show that h′ and h′′ are still not equivalent under ⊵, let ⊵k be the binary
relation constructed in the k-th step of the algorithm described in the previous
passage. For k = 1,2 we already know that h′ ⊵k h′′ would imply h′ ⋭k h′′ and vice
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versa. We will show inductively that this is also satisfied for all other k. Therefore,
let k ≥ 3 and suppose that h′ and h′′ are not equivalent under ⊵k−1. Moreover,
assume this is not satisfied under ⊵k, i.e, we have h′ ⊵k h′′ as well as h′′ ⊵k h′. This
assumption will lead to a contradiction. Let h˜(k−1), h˘(k−1) ∈ H be the corresponding
pair of networks not comparable under ⊵k−1 which is added in the next step. We
will distinguish three cases:
Case 1: h′ ⊳k−1 h′′.
Because we assume that h′ and h′′ are not equivalent under ⊵k−1, this implies
that there exists a sequence of networks (h1, . . . , hl) with h1 = h′′, hl = h′,
and h1 ⊵¯k−1 . . . ⊵¯k−1 hl. Moreover, from this also follows that there exists
1 ≤ l′ ≤ l − 1 with {hl′ , hl′+1} = {h˜(k−1), h˘(k−1)}. But then
hl′+1 ⊵k−1 . . . ⊵k−1 h′ ⊳k−1 h′′ ⊵k−1 . . . ⊳k−1 hl′ ,
which contradicts that h˜(k−1) and h˘(k−1) are not comparable under ⊳k−1.
Case 2: h′′ ⊳k−1 h′.
This case proceeds analogously to the previous one by just reversing the roles
of h′ and h′′.
Case 3: h′ and h′′ are not comparable under ⊵k−1.
If h′ and h′′ are equivalent under ⊵k but not under ⊵k−1, there have to be two
sequences of networks (h1, . . . , hl) and (h¯1, . . . , h¯l¯) with h1 = h¯l¯ = h′, hl = h¯1 =
h′′, and
h1 ⊵¯k−1 . . . ⊵¯k−1 hl = h¯1 ⊵¯k−1 . . . ⊵¯k−1 h¯l¯.
Moreover, there exist 1 ≤ l′ ≤ l−1 and 1 ≤ l¯′ ≤ l¯−1 with {hl′ , hl′+1} = {h¯l¯′ , h¯l¯′+1} ={h˜(k−1), h˘(k−1)}. In particular, this yields
hl′ ⊵¯k−1 hl′+1 ⊵k−1 . . . ⊵k−1 h′′ ⊵k−1 . . . ⊵k−1 h¯l¯′ ⊵¯k−1 h¯l¯′+1
which could only be satisfied if h˜(k−1) and h˘(k−1) are comparable under ⊵k−1.
Proof of Proposition 3.4
Let (h0, . . . , hk) with h0, . . . , hk ∈ H be an improving path. Moreover, suppose
h0 = hk, that is, suppose {h0, . . . , hk} forms a cycle. By construction of improving
paths there exists c0 ∈M and D0 ∈ Dc0h0 with h1 = h0 ± (c0,D0).
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Case 1: D0 ⊈ h0(c0), i.e., there exists i0 ∈D0 ∖ h0(c0).
Note that this implies h1 ≻i0 h0. Moreover, since all players are self-concerned,
we get
h1 ≻i0 h0 ∼i0 h0 ± (c0,D0 ∖ {i0}) = h1 − (c0,{i0}).
In other words, after joining the connection, player i0 has no incentive to leave
it unilaterally. By equability this is also true for all other i ∈ h1(c0). Let
D ∈ Dc0h1 with D ∩ h1(c0) ≠ ∅ and let i ∈D ∩ h1(c0). Then:
h1 ≻i h1 − (c0,{i}) ∼i (h1 − (c0,{i})) ± (c0,D ∖ {i0}) = h1 ± (c0,D)
Since the constitutions satisfy protection against eviction by assumption, no
player can be forced to leave a connection against her will. Thus, all players in
h1(c0)∩D would block deviating from h1 to h1±(c0,D). It will be shown next
that the same is also true in h2. To this end, let c1 ∈ M and D1 ∈ Dc1h1 with
h2 = h1 ± (c1,D1). If c1 = c0, the previous discussion implies D1 ∩ h1(c0) = ∅
and, by similar arguments as before, it can be shown that h2 ≻i h2±(c0,D) for
all i ∈ h2(c0) and D ∈ Dc0h2 with i ∈D. However, if c1 ≠ c0, then h2(c0) = h1(c0).
Thus, by equability h2 ≻i h2 ± (c0,D) for all i ∈ h2(c0) and D ∈ Dc0h2 with i ∈D.
Iterating these arguments implies
hl ≻i hl − (c0,D) for all 1 ≤ l ≤ k, i ∈ hl(c0), and D ∈ Dc0hl with i ∈D.
In particular, if h0 = hk, then h0 = hk ≻i0 hk − (c0,D0) = h1 and, thus, i0 would
have blocked deviating to the network h1.
Case 2: D0 ⊆ h0(c0), i.e., h1 = h0 − (c0,D0).
Thus, h1(c0) ⊊ h0(c0) and, moreover, h0 − (c0,D0) ≻i h0 for all i ∈ D0 by
protection against eviction. Let i0 ∈ D0. Since h0 = hk, there must be 1 ≤ k′ ≤
k − 1 and D ∈ Dc0hk′ with hk′+1 = hk′ ± (c0,D) and i0 ∈D. Note that this implies
hk′+1 ≻i0 hk′ . Similar to Case 1, exploiting that all players are self-concerned
yields
hk′+1 ≻i0 hk′ ∼i0 hk′ ± (c0,D ∖ {i0}) = hk′ − (c0,{i0}).
Therefore, from equability follows hk′+1 ≻i hk′+1 − (c0,{i}) for all i ∈ hk′+1(c0).
Now, by advancing analog arguments as in Case 1 it is possible to show that
this also implies
hl ≻i hl − (c0,D) for all k′ + 1 ≤ l ≤ k, i ∈ hl(c0), and D ∈ Dc0hl with i ∈D.
In particular, this is true for h0 = hk, too. But this contradicts h0 − (c0,D0) =
h1 ≻i0 h0.
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Proof of Proposition 3.5
Let (h0, h1, . . . , hk) be an improving path in H. We will show by induction that
there is always at least one player i ∈ N with Mhk(i) ≠Mh0(i) and hk ≻i h0. Thus,
hk ≠ h0.
k = 1: According to the definition of an improving path and because all constitutions
satisfy protection against eviction, at least one of the deviating players strictly
benefits from moving to h1. Thus, there remains nothing to show.
k > 1: Suppose the statement is true for k − 1. Note that Mhk−1(i) ≠ Mh0(i) and
hk−1 ≻i h0 implies Mhk−1(i) ≻¯i Mh0(i). Let ck−1 ∈ M be the connection and
Dk−1 ∈ D
ck−1
hk−1
be the subset of players with hk = hk−1±(ck−1,Dk−1). First consider
the case i ∈ Dk−1. By assumption every player j ∈ Dk−1 strictly benefits from
the deviation. Because preferences are lexicographic, this implies not only
hk ≻i h0 but also Mhk(i) ≠ Mh0(i). Next suppose i ∉ Dk−1. Then, of course,
Mhk(i) =Mhk−1(i) ≠Mh0(i). But it might be possible that i suffers from this
deviation, i.e., hk−1 ≻i hk. Nevertheless, since Mhk(i) =Mhk−1(i) ≻¯i Mh0(i), the
player still strictly prefers hk to h0.
Some of the following proofs use similar technical arguments and the following lemma
will serve as a convenient and useful tool. Recall that for each h ∈H,
Ach(C) = {D ∈ Dch ∣ ∃S ∈ Sch(D) such that h ± (c,D) ≻i h ∀i ∈ (D ∖ h(c)) ∪ S}
is the set of all feasible deviations causing an instability in c ∈ M . We say that a
network h ∈ H is exit-proof if D ∈ Ach(C) implies D ⊈ h(c) for all c ∈ M . That is,
given an exit-proof network, no group of players D ⊆ h(c) wants or is forced to leave
a connection.
Lemma 3.2. Let (N,M,⪰,C) be a society. Moreover, let h ∈ H be an arbitrary
network. Then there exists an exit-proof network h¯ ∈ I(h).
Proof. Let c ∈M such that there exists D ∈ Ach with D ⊆ h(c). If such a connection
does not exist, the network is exit-proof already and there remains nothing to show.
Consider h′ ∶= h − (c,D). If h′(c) is not exit-proof, further subsets of players can
be deleted from c until the connection is either empty or no coalition is supporting
these deviations any more. This proceeding can be repeated for all connections and
because N and M are finite, after finitely many steps an exit-proof network h¯ will
be reached.
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Note that by applying the previous result, Lemma 3.1 could be restated as follows:
There exists no closed cycle if and only if, for each exit-proof network h¯ ∈ H that
is not constitutionally stable, there exists an improving path leading from h¯ to a
constitutionally stable network.
Proof of Proposition 3.6
The main idea of the proof is to construct for every network in H an improving path
leading from this network to a stable network. By closedness, this stable network is
in H, too. Hence, there cannot be a closed cycle in H.
For constructing these paths, let us define, for each network h ∈H, the set
M¯h = {c ∈M ∣∃ j ∈ h(c) ∶ h ≻j h − (c,{j})}.
That is, a connection c ∈ M is contained in M¯h if and only if at least one of its
members does not want to leave c. In particular, if this is the case, due to equability
none of the members wants to leave the connection.
Let h1 ∈ H be an arbitrary network. By applying Lemma 3.2 we may assume that
h1 is exit-proof. In the following, we will establish that if h1 is not constitutionally
stable (if this would be the case, there would remain nothing to be shown), there
exists an improving path from h1 to another exit-proof network h2 such that either
M¯h1 ⊊ M¯h2 , or M¯h1 = M¯h2 and h1 ⊊ h2. Then, if h2 is not constitutionally stable, it
is possible to iterate the previous step again and again. In particular, each time the
step is iterated, either there are more connections which the corresponding members
do not want to leave or the network strictly grows. Since both, the set of connections
and the set of players, are supposed to be finite, this procedure will end after finitely
many steps.
Case 1: There exists c ∈M ∖ M¯h1 with Ach1 ≠ ∅.
Note that because h1 is exit-proof, D ∈ Ach1 if and only ifD ⊈ h1(c), i.e., there is
at least one player i1 ∈D∖h1(c) who joins the connection. Let h′1 ∶= h1±(c,D).
Since all players are self-concerned, this implies
h′1 ≻i1 h1 ∼i1 h1 ± (c,D ∖ {i1}) = h′1 − (c,{i1}).
In other words, after joining the connection, player i1 has no incentive to leave
it unilaterally. By equability this is also true for all i ∈ h′1(c) and, thus, c ∈ M¯h′1 .
Now let c′ ∈ M¯h1 . Note that c ≠ c′ and h1(c′) = h′1(c′). Therefore, equability
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implies that c′ ∈ M¯h′
1
, too. Moreover, assume there exists D′ ∈ Ac′
h′
1
with D′ ⊆
h′1(c′). That is, assume that c′ is not exit-proof any more. Let S′ ∈ Sc′h′
1
(D′) be
the corresponding supporting coalition. From regularity it follows that there
is a player j ∈ S′ with h1 ⪰j h1 − (c′,D′) but h′1 − (c′,D′) ⪰j h′1. If j ∉ D′, this
would contradict separability because h1(c′) = h′1(c′). If j ∈ D′, this would
violate equability and self-concern. Therefore, the assumption cannot be true
or, in other words, transforming c does not affect exit-proofness of c′. Similar
considerations also apply if c′ ∈ M ∖ M¯h1 with c′ ≠ c. However, it might be
possible that c itself is not exit-proof any more. In this case, we can delete
(analogously to Lemma 3.2) all groups of players from the connection under
the conditions that (i) no player joins c and (ii) all deviations comply with the
constitutions, i.e., they are feasible and supported by a supporting coalition.
Let h2 be the network which is finally reached by means of this procedure. In
particular, by advancing the same arguments as before it can be shown that
the other connections are still exit-proof and, moreover, M¯h1 = M¯h2∖{c} ⊈ M¯h2 .
Case 2: Ach1 = ∅ for all c ∈M ∖ M¯h1 .
Since h1 is not constitutionally stable, there exists c1 ∈ M¯h1 with Ac1h1 ≠ ∅.
Let D ∈ Ac1h1 be of minimal size, i.e., D˜ ∉ Ac1h1 for all D˜ ⊊ D. Moreover, let
S ∈ Sc1h1(D) be the corresponding coalition which supports the deviation of D.
We will show first that D∩h1(c1) = ∅, that is, there are only players in D who
join the connection c. Assume this is not true, i.e., there exists i ∈D ∩ h1(c1).
Then, h1 ≻i h1 − (c1,{i}) ∼i h1 ± (c1,D) by self-concern and definition of M¯h1 .
From this, it follows that i would not support the deviation of D and, thus,
S∩D = ∅. Since all constitutions are supposed to be decomposable and regular,
we also have {i} ∈ Dc1h1 and S ∈ Sc1h1({i}). By construction of h1 the network is
exit-proof and, therefore, there exists a player j ∈ S with h1 ⪰j h1−(c1,{i}). In
particular, due to uniformity this is true for all members of S. But exploiting
separability then yields h1±(c1,D∖{i}) ⪰j h1±(c1,D) ≻j h1 for all j ∈ S which
contradicts minimality of D.
Define h2 ∶= h1 + (c1,D). As all i ∈ D agreed to joining c1 we must have
h2 ≻i h1 ∼i h2 − (c1,{i}) by self-concern. Therefore, from equability it follows
that no player in h2(c1) wants to leave the connection unilaterally. Moreover,
if D¯ ∈ Dc1h2 with D¯ ∩ h2(c1) ≠ ∅, then
h2 ≻i h2 − (c1,{i}) ∼i h2 ± (c1, D¯) (3.4)
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for all i ∈ D¯ ∩ h2(c1), again by self-concern. In other words, all players who
would have to leave the connection would suffer from this deviation.
In the remainder of the proof we will show that h2 is indeed exit-proof. Let
c′ ∈M be an arbitrary connection and D′ ∈ Dc′h2 with D′ ⊆ h2(c′). Recall that
Dc
′
h2
= Dc′h1 by regularity and, thus, D′ ∈ Dc′h1 , too.
First consider the case c1 ≠ c′. Since the agents’ preferences are separable,
h2 ⪰j h2 − (c′,D′) if and only if h1 ⪰j h1 − (c′,D′) for all j ∈ h2(c′) ∖ D′.
Therefore, if j ∈ h2(c′) ∖D′ does not support the deviation of D′ in h1, the
same goes for h2, too. However, this is also true for all j ∈D′ due to equability
and self-concern. From this it follows that a coalition supports a deviation in
h2 if and only if it does the same in h1 (cf. Case 1). In particular, this implies
that the connection c′ is also exit-proof in h2.
Next consider c′ = c1. Here we have to distinguish two cases, S = ∅ and S ≠ ∅.
First consider S = ∅, that is, when deviating from h1 to h2, the agents in D
do not need the consent of other members for entering c. Assume there exists
D′ ∈ Ac1h2 with D′ ⊆ h2(c1). Let S′ ∈ Sc1h2(D′) be a coalition which supports
the deviation of D′, i.e., there is no j ∈ S′ with h2 ⪰j h2 − (c1,D′). From
Equation (3.4) we get D′ ∩ S′ = ∅. Moreover, regularity implies that there
exists ∅ ≠ S′′ ∈ Sc1h1(D′) with S′′ ⊆ S′. Note that h2 − (c1,D′) = (h1 + (c1,D))−(c1,D′) = h1± (c1,D±D′). In particular, D′ ⊆ h1(c1) if and only if D∩D′ ≠ ∅.
However, this is not possible because this would contradict separability of
the players’ preferences. Therefore, D ∩ D′ ≠ ∅. But this is not possible,
too: by decomposability and regularity also D ∩ D′ ∈ Dc1h2 ⊆ Dc1h1 and S′ ∈
S
c1
h2
(D ∩ D′). Since ∅ ∈ Sc1h1(D ∩ D′), decomposability and regularity again
imply D ∩ D′ ⊆ S′ which contradicts Equation (3.4). Next consider S ≠ ∅.
We will show that ∣D∣ = 1. Let i ∈ D. If there would be no player j ∈ S with
h1 + (c,{i}) ≻j h1, decomposability together with separability would imply
h1 + (c,D ∖ {i}) ⪰j h1 + (c,D) = h2 ≻j h1 for all j ∈ S. In other words, S would
also support a deviation of D ∖ {i}. Moreover, from uniformity it follows that
h1 + (c,D ∖ {i}) ⪰j h1 + (c,D) = h2 ≻j h1 for all j ∈ h1(c) ∪ (D ∖ {i}). Thus,
the players in D ∖ {i} would agree to joining c without player i which would
contradict minimality of D. Therefore, given that each i ∈ D is supported by
at least one player in S, from uniformity it follows that this is also true for all
other members of h1(c1). That is, h1 + (c1,{i}) ≻j h1 for all j ∈ h1(c1). Thus,
h1 + (c1,{i}) ≻j h1 ≻j h1 − (c1,{j}) ∼j (h1 + (c1,{i})) − (c1,{j}) as c1 ∈ M¯h1 .
By equability this also holds for player i or, phrased differently, i has an
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incentive for joining c1 unilaterally. In fact, this implies D = {i} by minimality
of D. Moreover, due to uniformity all players in h1(c1) strictly benefit from
deviating from h1 to h2. Now let D′, S′, and S′′ be given as in the case S = ∅.
Then, as before we have D′∩D ≠ ∅ and, thus, i ∈D′. By decomposability also
(h1(c1)∩(D±D′)) = h1(c1)∩D′ ∈ Dc1h1 and S′′ ∈ Sc1h1(h1(c1)∩D′). Since we have
D¯ ∈ Ac1h1 only if D¯ ⊈ h1(c1), there exists j ∈ S′′ with h1 ⪰j h1 − (c1, h1(c1)∩D′).
But this implies
h1 − (c1, h1(c1) ∩D′) = h2 − (c1,D′jh2 ≻j h1 ⪰j h1 − (c1, h1(c1) ∩D′)
which obviously is a contradiction. Thus, the assumption D′ ∈ Ac1h1 with D′ ⊆
h2(c1) must be false and c1 is also exit-proof in h2.
Proof of Proposition 3.7
The proof proceeds in a similar way as the one of Proposition 3.6. As above we will
construct for every exit-proof network h1 ∈H an improving path leading to a stable
network.
Step 1: In this step we establish that if h1 is not constitutionally stable, there
exists an improving path to another exit-proof network h2 such that there is
D1 ⊆ N with h2 ≻i h1 andMh1(i) ≠Mh2(i) for all i ∈D1. Note that this implies
h1 ≠ h2.
Therefore, suppose h1 is not constitutionally stable. Then there exists c1 ∈
M with Ac1h1 ≠ ∅. Let D1 ∈ Ac1h1 be of minimal size, i.e., D˜ ∉ Ach1 for all
D˜ ⊊ D1. Moreover, let S ∈ Sch1(D1) be the corresponding coalition which
supports the deviation of D1. We will show first that ∣D1∣ = 1. Note that
D1 ⊈ h1(c1) because h1 is exit-proof by assumption. Moreover, for all i ∈ D1
there is at least one j ∈ S with h1 + (c1,{i}) ≻j h1. If this would not be
satisfied, analogously to Case 2 in the proof of Proposition 3.6 we would have
D1 ∖ {i} ∈ Ac1h1 since the constitutions are decomposable and the preferences
are separable and lexicographic. But this would contradict minimality of D1.
Therefore, given that each i ∈ D is supported by at least one player in S,
from uniformity it follows that this also goes for all other members of h1(c1)
and, thus, D1 = {i} by minimality of D1. Moreover, by applying uniformity
all members in h1(c1) are strictly better off if i enters the connection. Next
we show that c1 is also exit-proof in h¯ ∶= h1 + (c1,{i}). Assume this is not
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true, that is, assume there exists D′ ∈ Ac1
h¯
with D′ ⊆ h¯(c1). Analogously to
Case 2 in the proof of Proposition 3.6 we must have i ∈D′ because the players’
preferences are lexicographic and separable. Let S′ ∈ Sc1
h¯
(D′) be a coalition
which supports the deviation of D′. Moreover, let S′′ ∈ Sc1h1(D′) with S′′ ⊆ S′
be defined as in Case 2 in the proof of Proposition 3.6. Then, by advancing
analog arguments as above we get
h1 − (c1, h1(c1) ∩D′) = h¯ − (c1,D′) ≻j h¯ ≻j h1 ⪰j h1 − (c1, h1(c1) ∩D′)
which obviously is a contradiction. Thus, the assumption D′ ⊆ h¯(c1) must be
false and c1 is also exit-proof in h¯.
Now, suppose there exists c′ ≠ c1 with D¯ ∈ Ac′h¯ for some D¯ ⊆ h¯(c′) = h1(c′) and
let S¯ ∈ Sc1
h¯
(D¯) be the corresponding supporting coalition. Note that D¯∩ S¯ ≠ ∅
due to separability. Moreover, let i ∈ D¯∖S¯. By decomposability and regularity
also {i} ∈ Dc′
h¯
= Dc′h1 and S¯ ∈ Sc′h¯ ({i}). Since h1 is exit-proof, there exists j ∈ S¯
with h1 ⪰j h1 − (c′,{i}) and, thus, also h¯ ⪰j h¯ − (c′,{i}). Therefore, since the
players’ preferences satisfy uniformity, h¯ ⪰j¯ h¯ − (c′,{i}) for all j¯ ∈ h¯(c′) ∖ {i}.
By exploiting separability this yields
h¯ − (c′, D¯ ∖ {i}) ⪰j¯ (h¯ − (c′, D¯ ∖ {i})) − (c′,{i}) = h¯ − (c′, D¯) ≻j¯ h¯
for all j¯ ∈ S¯. Iterating this argument implies D¯ ∩ S¯ ∈ Ac′
h¯
, too, and D¯ ∖ S¯ ∉ Ac′
h¯
.
Therefore, all players in D¯ ∩ S¯ ∈ Ac′
h¯
strictly benefit from this deviation. Note
that it might be the case that there exists j ∈ h¯(c′) ∩ D who is worse off
after this change of the connection. However, because the preferences are
lexicographic, this player still strictly prefers h¯− (c, D¯∩ S¯) to h1. By iterating
these arguments all subsets of members where all players agree to deviating
can be deleted from all connections. Let h2 be the network which is finally
reached by means of this procedure. In particular, because of separability and
uniformity, h2 is eviction-proof, too. Moreover, since no player has to leave a
connection against her will and preferences are lexicographic, all players who
deviated strictly prefer h2 to h1.
Step 2: In this step we show that if h2 is not stable, there exists
(i) a sequence of non-empty subsets D1,D2, . . . ,Dk−1, and
(ii) a sequence of exit-proof networks h1, h2, h3, . . . , hk such that there is an
improving path from hl−1 to hl for all 2 ≤ l ≤ k and the following two
conditions are satisfied:
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(a) hl ≻i hl′ for all 2 ≤ l ≤ k, 1 ≤ l′ ≤ l − 1, and i ∈Dl−1.
(b) if hl ⊁i hl−1, then Mhl(i) =Mhl−1(i).
In particular, (a) implies hk ≠ hl′ for all 1 ≤ l′ < k. Therefore, since there are
only finitely many exit-proof networks, this sequence will stop after finitely
many steps and, thus, the last one has to be stable.
We will show the existence of the sequence by means of induction. For k = 2
see Step 2. Consequently, let k ≥ 3 and assume there exist h3, . . . , hk and
D2, . . . ,Dk−1 as defined above. Moreover, suppose hk is not stable. Since this
network is exit-proof by assumption, there exists ck ∈ M with Ackhk ≠ ∅ and
D ⊈ hk(ck) for all D ∈ Ackhk . Let Dk ∈ Ackhk be of minimal size and construct
hk+1 analogously to h2 in Step 2. Similar to above, players deviate only if
they have a strict incentive and hk+1 ≻i hk for all i ∈ Dk. First, this implies
Mhk(i) = Mhk+1(i) for all i ∈ N with hk+1 ⊁i hk. Second, if i ∈ Dk ∩ Dk−i,
then clearly hk+1 ≻i hl′ for all 1 ≤ l′ ≤ k due to transitivity. Therefore, let
i ∈Dk+1 ∖Dk. If Mhk(i) =Mhl′(i) for all 1 ≤ l′ ≤ k, we have hk+1 ≻i hl′ for each
of these networks because i’s preferences are lexicographic. On the other hand,
if Mhk(i) ≠ Mh1(i), let l1 ∶= min{2 ≤ l ≤ k ∣Mhl−1(i) ≠Mhl(i)}. Note that (ii)
implies hl1 ≻i hl1−1. Thus, from lexicography it follows that hl1 ≻i hl′ for all
1 ≤ l′ ≤ l1 − 1. Next consider l2 ∶= min{l1 + 1 ≤ l ≤ k ∣Mhl−1(i) ≠Mhl(i)}. By
advancing analog arguments as before we get hl2 ≻i hl′ for all 1 ≤ l′ ≤ l2−1 and,
thus, iterating the procedure yields hk+1 ≻i hl′ for all 1 ≤ l′ ≤ k.
Proof of Proposition 3.8
This proof proceeds similarly as the proofs of the two previous propositions. Again,
we construct for every network in H = {h ∈ H ∣ O ∩ h(c) = {oc} ∀ c ∈ M} an
improving path leading from this network to a stable network. Because H is closed,
this stable network has to be in H, too. Therefore, let h1 ∈ H be an arbitrary
network. Because of Lemma 3.2 we may assume that h1 is exit-proof. Moreover,
let c1 ∈ M be an arbitrary connection with Ac1h1 ≠ ∅. The construction of the path
proceeds in three steps:
Step 1: We establish that there exists B1 ∈ Ac1h1 with Ac1h1+(c1,B1) = ∅.
The main idea of this step is to exploit separability of the owner’s preferences.
Define B1 ⊆ N via
B1 ∶= {i ∈ E ∖ h1(c1) ∣ h1 + (c1,{i}) ≻i h1 and h1 + (c1,{i}) ≻oc1 h1} .
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That is, B1 contains exactly those players who want to join c1 and would be
accepted by oc1 . Let i, j ∈ B1. Then, h1 + (c1,{i, j}) ≻oc1 h1 + (c1,{i}) ≻oc1
h1 by separability of oc1 ’s preferences. Iterating this argument implies h1 +(c1,B1) ≻oc1 h1. Moreover, since the workers’ preferences are lexicographic,
also h1+(c1,B1) ≻i h1 for all i ∈ B1. Indeed, this yields B1 ∈ Ac1h1 . Now suppose
there exists a deviation D ∈ Ac1
h1+(c1,B1)
. If D ⊆ h1(c1)∪B1, the definition of B1
and exit-proofness of h1 imply h1 + (c1,B1) ⪰oc1 (h1 + (c1,B1)) − (c1, i) for all
i ∈ h1(c1)∪B1. Advancing the same arguments as before yields h1+(c1,B1) ⪰oc1(h1 + (c1,B1))−(c1,D), which implies that oc1 would not support the deviation.
Moreover, the workers in h1(c1) ∪B1 obviously do not want to leave the firm
and, thus, D ⊆ h1(c1) ∪B1 cannot be true. However, if D ⊈ h1(c1) ∪B1 and
there exists i ∈D∖h1(c1) with (h1 + (c1,B1))+(c1,{i}) ≻oc1 h1+(c1,B1), then
by construction of B1 and because i’s preferences are lexicographic, this worker
would not agree to joining c1. Therefore, Ac1h1+(c1,B1) must be empty.
Step 2: We construct an improving path leading from h′1 ∶= h1+(c1,B1) to another
exit-proof network h2 with h2 ≻i h1 for all i ∈ B1 and h2 ⪰i h1 for all i ∈ E ∖B1.
Let c′ ∈ M such that there exists B′ ⊆ h′1(c′) with B′ ∈ Ac′h′
1
and choose B′
maximal with respect to “⊆”, i.e., there exists no B¯ ⊆ h′1(c′) with B¯ ∈ Ac′h′
1
and B′ ⊊ B¯. Note that c′ ≠ c1 as Ac1h′
1
= ∅. By assumption oc′ ’s preferences
are separable and, thus, h′1 ⪰oc′ h′1 − (c′,B′) by exit-proofness of h1. Therefore,
h′1−(c′,B′) ≻j h′1 for all j ∈ B′. Now suppose there exists i ∈ B′∖B1. Note that
i ∈ h1(c) if and only if i ∈ h′1(c) for all c ∈M . If i has a strict incentive for leaving
c′ in h′1, she would also have a strict incentive for leaving the connection in h1
because her preferences are lexicographic. But this contradicts exit-proofness
of h1 and, thus, B′ ⊆ B1. Moreover, by construction of B′ and separability of
oc′ ’s preferences, there exists no further set of workers B′′ ⊆ h′1(c′) ∖B′ with
B′′ ∈ Ac′
h′
1
−(c′,B′). By iterating the previous procedure, it is possible to reach an
exit-proof network h2 by deleting all workers from all connections they want
to leave without impairing the other workers in E ∖B1. In particular, for all
i ∈ E ∖B1 nothing changes and, therefore, they are indifferent between h2 and
h1. On the other hand, all i ∈ B1 strictly benefit from the deviations and, thus,
they strictly prefer h2 to h1.
Step 3: Iterating the procedure.
Given h2, if Ach2 = ∅ for all c ∈M , there remains nothing to show. Therefore,
assume there exists c2 ∈M with Ac2h2 ≠ ∅. By repeating Steps 2 and 3 it is pos-
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sible to find B2 ⊆ E∖h2(c2) with Ac2h2+(c2,B2) = ∅ and to construct an improving
path leading from h2 + (c2,B2) to an exit-proof network h3. Analogously, h2
will be Pareto dominated by h3 from the workers’ perspective. As H is finite,
there exist only finitely many exit-proof networks. Hence, this procedure will
end after finitely many steps.
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Chapter 4
Robust Equilibria in Location
Games
4.1 Introduction
In his classic example, Harold Hotelling illustrates competition in a heterogeneous
market by two firms that consider where to place their shop on a main street
(Hotelling, 1929). Ever since, this model of spatial competition has inspired a
tremendous amount of research in various disciplines. Starting with Downs (1957),
it is used to analyze the positioning of political candidates competing for voters
(e.g., Mueller, 2003; Roemer, 2001) and to analyze the positioning of products in
order to attract consumers (e.g., Carpenter, 1989; Salop, 1979). In the year 2013
alone, Hotelling has been cited more than 450 and Downs even more than 1100
times.1 Moreover, the model implication of minimal differentiation is known far
beyond scholarly circles. In this paper we want to challenge a fundamental aspect
of the Hotelling-Downs approach.
Throughout the literature (of spatial competition), it has been virtually always as-
sumed that consumers or voters who prefer the same position fully agree upon the
ranking of the other alternatives, i.e., they have identical preferences or utility func-
tions. This very strong homogeneity requirement can be considered as driven by the
assumption that all consumers/voters use the same distance measure since in the
standard Hotelling-Downs set-up (dis)utility is represented by the distance between
positions. In particular, if two people prefer the same option, in any spatial represen-
1Google Scholar, February 10, 2014.
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tation with homogeneous distances they necessarily rank all the other alternatives
in the same order. This is hard to justify when we think of voters of the same polit-
ical party who disagree about the second-best party, or of consumers with the same
favorite brand but disagreement about the ordering of two other brands. Even in
the case of geographic location choices the requirement appears to be challengeable
if distances represent travel time, for instance.2 As a matter of fact, these simple
cases already exceed the scope of almost any model of locational competition.
Consider, for example, a poll on a group of voters about their favorite tax rate. The
answers can be displayed as locations on a line. Location games that capture this
application consider classically two political candidates who strategically choose a
tax rate which they propose to the voters. Thereby it is standardly assumed that
(a) each voter casts his vote for the candidate that is closest to him and (b) all
voters asses the distances between the candidates homogeneously. In combination
these two assumptions are not at all innocuous. As indicated above, they hide the
homogeneity requirement that all voters who consider a tax rate of 10 percent, for
instance, as their favorite alternative, are supposed to rank any two tax rates, like 2
percent and 20 percent, for example, in exactly the same order. Since this require-
ment is unnaturally strong, the classical result that two vote maximizing candidates
choose the median location (Hotelling, 1929) stands apparently on highly question-
able grounds. A way to avoid this issue would be to ask the participants in the poll
not only about their favorite tax rate, but about a full ranking of the alternative
tax rates. Apart from practical problems, the downside of such an approach is the
informational requirement that political candidates know the full assessment of ev-
ery voter. That is, we have replaced a questionable requirement by another one. A
solution to this issue relates back to the seminal contribution of Black (1948). He ex-
amined single-peaked preferences on a line, which has the same effect as voters who
are allowed to asses the “distances” between different tax rates individually. Black’s
result that under single-peaked preferences the median voter wins in majority vot-
ing against any other alternative has the following implication for the situation of
spatial competition outlined above: In any location game that is consistent with
the poll, both candidates choose the median tax rate in equilibrium. In that sense
the classical result is robust.
2Indeed, it is possible that two individuals differ in their speed of walking uphill such that they
would not choose the same path although both easily agree that there is one short and steep path
and one longer and flatter path.
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The example on tax rates illustrates that in two-player location games on a line the
questionable requirement of homogeneous distance perceptions is not driving the fi-
nal outcome. However, for all other cases – in particular, for more than two players
and for multidimensional spaces – robustness of the results is an open problem. If
one can show that the model assumption is not driving the results, then the model
is put on a solid foundation. This issue, although fundamental, seems to have been
overlooked in the – rich and exciting – history of location games.
In this paper we want to scrutinize for given outcomes of spatial competition whether
they rely on homogeneous distance perceptions or not. To this end, we formalize
individual distance perceptions as individual edge lengths of a graph.3 A formal de-
scription of consumers/voters of this type leads to a non-cooperative game between
p players, which are interpreted as firms or political candidates. In this game, play-
ers simultaneously choose a location in order to maximize the number of agents (i.e.,
consumers/voters) they can attract. An equilibrium is then called robust if it is an
equilibrium for all possible distance perceptions that are based on the same under-
lying structure (a line, for example). In other words, our modeling approach boils
down to defining a stronger notion of equilibrium which we call robust equilibrium. It
is defined directly on the situation of spatial competition, i.e., the underlying space
and the distribution of agents (such as the poll on tax rates). Formally, several
of location games correspond to the same situation of spatial competition, one for
each setting of individual distance perceptions; and a robust equilibrium is a Nash
equilibrium in any of these games. In particular, it is also a Nash equilibrium in the
standard case of homogeneous distances.
A key result for our analysis is the characterization of robust equilibria by four con-
ditions which are jointly necessary and sufficient. It is based on partitioning the
underlying space into “hinterlands” and “competitive zones”. Applying this result
allows us first of all to judge which of the standard results are robust. In fact, we find
that several outcomes do not depend on the assumption of homogeneous distances,
but others do.
In the second part of the paper we examine general properties of robust equilibria.
3This can be shown to be equivalent to the assumption of single-peaked preferences on certain
domains. For example, if the underlying structure is a line graph, then this assumption is equiv-
alent to the standard notion of single-peakedness. An alternative model variation would keep
the assumption of homogenous distances but add a set of nodes (which we call “dummy nodes”)
to make the graph more flexible. However this model variation can be shown to undermine the
model’s explanatory power.
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Among them is the central issue of minimal differentiation (e.g., d’Aspremont et al.,
1979; de Palma et al., 1985, 1990; Eaton and Lipsey, 1975; Economides, 1986; Kro´l,
2012; Meagher and Zauner, 2004). It turns out that robust equilibria satisfy a local
variant of minimal differentiation, i.e., they induce reduced games in which the cor-
responding players are minimally differentiated. This result provides strong support
for the “principle of minimal clustering” which has been proposed in the seminal
contribution of Eaton and Lipsey (1975). Indeed, for any number of players, any
underlying structure, and any distribution of agents, robust equilibria are charac-
terized by clusters of players. That is, the players are jointly located on what we
show to be the appropriately defined medians of local areas. Based on this result,
we discuss the welfare implications for consumers and observe that almost all ro-
bust equilibria are not Pareto efficient. Consumers would unambiguously improve if
some firm would be relocated appropriately. We finally, elaborate on the conditions
for the existence of robust equilibria. We analyze how the spatial structure and
the distribution of consumers/voters guarantee, admit, or preclude the existence of
robust equilibria. Interestingly, two very common assumptions in the literature –
(a) uniform distribution of consumers/voters and (b) one-dimensional space such as
cycle or line structures – are mutually exclusive in the sense that for higher numbers
of players robust equilibria require that one of them is not satisfied.
Related Literature
There is an immense body of literature on spatial competition. While the original
Hotelling-Downs framework is restricted to a one-dimensional space, a uniform dis-
tribution of agents, and only two players, many authors have attempted to relax
these restrictions. To do so, one branch of the literature has followed a continuous
modeling approach within the Euclidean space Rk (e.g., d’Aspremont et al., 1979;
Economides, 1986), while a second branch replaces the Euclidean space by a graph
(e.g., Labbe´ and Hakimi, 1991). Because the history of both branches is rich and
long, providing a summary which covers all of it would exceed the scope of our
paper. We restrict ourselves here to list several surveys on the topic and to discuss
the most closely related works.
A broad overview and taxonomy of literature on spatial competition can be found
in Eiselt et al. (1993). Based on five components (the underlying space, the number
of players, the pricing policy, the rules of the game, and the behavior of the agents)
the authors provide a bibliography for competitive location models. While this sum-
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mary is not limited to certain subbranches, more specific surveys have been written
on spatial models of consumer product spaces (Lancaster, 1990), on spatial com-
petition in continuous space (Gabszewicz and Thisse, 1992), on spatial models of
political competition (Mueller, 2003; Osborne, 1995), on competition in discrete
location models (Plastria, 2001), on sequential competition (Eiselt and Laporte,
1997; Kress and Pesch, 2012), and on one-stage competition in location models
(Eiselt and Marianov, 2011; ReVelle and Eiselt, 2005).
Although there are many variations and relaxations of spatial competition, virtually
all of the models rely on the assumption of homogeneous distance perceptions. For
instance, asymmetric transportation costs (e.g., Nilssen, 1997) do not alter the as-
sumption. In order to examine to which extent this standard simplification is driving
the results we will focus on the first stage of Hotelling’s game, i.e., we will investi-
gate the location choices of the players but we will not include additional variables
such as prices. Similar approaches have been used, for example, by Eaton and Lipsey
(1975), Denzau et al. (1985), and Braid (2005) who also concentrate on spatial com-
petition by assuming fixed (and equal) prices. Nevertheless, extending our approach
to a two-stage game would be a potential next step for further research. Integrat-
ing heterogeneous consumer behavior into a model of spatial competition has been
attempted by a few studies only. Among them are de Palma et al. (1985, 1990)
and Rhee (1996) who find that ambiguity about consumers’ (or voters’) behavior
may lead to minimal differentiation. More specifically, they show that if the con-
sumers’ preferences do not only depend on prices and distances but also on inherent
product characteristics and, furthermore, the firms have incomplete information
about consumers’ tastes, then Hotelling’s main result can be restored under cer-
tain conditions. This conclusion is not confirmed in closely related models where
the authors assume that the exact position of demand is unknown (e.g. Kro´l, 2012;
Meagher and Zauner, 2004, 2005). Thus, the validity of minimal differentiation un-
der heterogeneous agents is still an open problem and the same holds true for the
main implications, like that spatial competition generically does not lead to socially
efficient outcomes, for example. However, the previously cited publications differ
from our work in at least two important aspects. First, in these works, players are
assumed to have a probability distribution for the behavior of agents. In our work,
uncertainty is not explicitly modeled but only enters implicitly as robust equilib-
ria do not depend on specification details about the agents’ behavior. Second, the
way we model and interpret heterogeneity differs from the approaches of the other
authors. In our setting, the agents apply individual distances to compare specific
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product variations but the preferences do not depend on inherent product charac-
teristics. To model this in a convenient way we use a graph-based approach. We
believe that our definitions are more intuitive in discrete spaces than in the plane
and that this approach helps to highlight the difference between homogeneous and
heterogeneous agents. However, the main questions of our work are not restricted to
graphs and thus our contribution should also be interesting in a more general con-
text. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper that assesses robustness
of equilibria in location games with respect to different distance perceptions.
From a technical point of view, the model from Eiselt and Laporte (1991, 1993) is
heavily related to ours. In these publications the authors show for homogeneous
agents that the two-player and three-player cases on trees always result in some
kind of minimal differentiation. We will check whether this is also true in our more
general context of more than two players and arbitrary graphs. More recently,
Shiode and Drezner (2003) studied the two-player case on trees under sequential
location choices and stochastic demand. Further recent contributions, to name but
a few, deal with terrorism (e.g., Berman and Gavious, 2007) or stem from computer
science (e.g., Godinho and Dias, 2010; Jiang et al., 2011; Mavronicolas et al., 2008).
Still, the issue of heterogeneous distances has not been addressed in any of these
publications.
Related Literature
There is an immense body of literature on spatial competition. While the original
Hotelling-Downs framework is restricted to a one-dimensional space, a uniform dis-
tribution of agents, and only two players, many authors have attempted to relax
these restrictions. To do so, one branch of the literature has followed a continuous
modeling approach within the Euclidean space Rk (e.g., d’Aspremont et al., 1979;
Economides, 1986), while a second branch replaces the Euclidean space by a graph
(e.g., Labbe´ and Hakimi, 1991). Because the history of both branches is rich and
long, providing a summary which covers all of it would exceed the scope of our
paper. We restrict ourselves here to list several surveys on the topic and to discuss
the most closely related works.
A broad overview and taxonomy of literature on spatial competition can be found
in Eiselt et al. (1993). Based on five components (the underlying space, the number
of players, the pricing policy, the rules of the game, and the behavior of the agents)
the authors provide a bibliography for competitive location models. While this sum-
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mary is not limited to certain subbranches, more specific surveys have been written
on spatial models of consumer product spaces (Lancaster, 1990), on spatial com-
petition in continuous space (Gabszewicz and Thisse, 1992), on spatial models of
political competition (Mueller, 2003; Osborne, 1995), on competition in discrete
location models (Plastria, 2001), on sequential competition (Eiselt and Laporte,
1997; Kress and Pesch, 2012), and on one-stage competition in location models
(Eiselt and Marianov, 2011; ReVelle and Eiselt, 2005).
Although there are many variations and relaxations of spatial competition, virtually
all of the models rely on the assumption of homogeneous distance perceptions. For
instance, asymmetric transportation costs (e.g., Nilssen, 1997) do not alter the as-
sumption. In order to examine to which extent this standard simplification is driving
the results we will focus on the first stage of Hotelling’s game, i.e., we will investi-
gate the location choices of the players but we will not include additional variables
such as prices. Similar approaches have been used, for example, by Eaton and Lipsey
(1975), Denzau et al. (1985), and Braid (2005) who also concentrate on spatial com-
petition by assuming fixed (and equal) prices. Nevertheless, extending our approach
to a two-stage game would be a potential next step for further research. Integrat-
ing heterogeneous consumer behavior into a model of spatial competition has been
attempted by a few studies only. Among them are de Palma et al. (1985, 1990) and
Rhee (1996) who find that ambiguity about consumers’ (or voters’) behavior may
lead to minimal differentiation. More specifically, they show that if the consumers’
preferences do not only depend on prices and distances but also on inherent prod-
uct characteristics and, furthermore, the firms have incomplete information about
consumers’ tastes, then Hotelling’s main result can be restored under certain con-
ditions. However, this conclusion is not confirmed in closely related models where
the authors assume that the exact position of demand is unknown (e.g. Kro´l, 2012;
Meagher and Zauner, 2004, 2005). Thus, the validity of minimal differentiation un-
der heterogeneous agents is still an open problem and the same holds true for the
main implications, like that spatial competition generically does not lead to socially
efficient outcomes, for example. The previously cited publications differ from our
work in at least two important aspects. First, in these works, players are assumed
to have a probability distribution for the behavior of agents. In our work, uncer-
tainty is not explicitly modeled but only enters implicitly as robust equilibria do
not depend on specification details about the agents’ behavior. Second, the way we
model and interpret heterogeneity differs from the approaches of the other authors.
In our setting, the agents apply individual distances to compare specific product
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variations but the preferences do not depend on inherent product characteristics.
To model this in a convenient way we use a graph-based approach. We believe that
our definitions are more intuitive in discrete spaces than in the plane and that this
approach helps highlight the difference between homogeneous and heterogeneous
agents. However, the main questions of our work are not restricted to graphs and
thus our contribution should also be interesting in a more general context. To the
best of our knowledge, this is the first paper that assesses robustness of location
games with respect to different distance perceptions.
From a technical point of view, the model from Eiselt and Laporte (1991, 1993) is
heavily related to ours. In these publications the authors show for homogeneous
agents that the two-player and three-player cases on trees always result in some
kind of minimal differentiation. We will check whether this is also true in our more
general context of more than two players and arbitrary graphs. More recently,
Shiode and Drezner (2003) studied the two-player case on trees under sequential
location choices and stochastic demand. Further recent contributions also deal with
terrorism (e.g., Berman and Gavious, 2007) or stem from computer science (e.g.,
Godinho and Dias, 2010; Jiang et al., 2011; Mavronicolas et al., 2008). Still, the
issue of heterogeneous distances is not addressed in these publications.
4.2 The Model
Our modeling approach proceeds in two steps. First we consider, as usual, a non-
cooperative game between players (the firms/candidates) who are able to occupy a
position or object, respectively. The agents (consumers/voters) are still attracted
by the player(s) located closest to them but now their distance perceptions may be
assessed on an individual basis. More specifically, the agents agree on the underlying
space which is modeled by means of a graph (Subsection 4.2.1), but in our setting
they may individually measure the similarity between the objects (Subsection 4.2.2).
Then, in the second step, we study whether equilibria of the game are robust with
respect to perturbations of the distance perceptions. To this end, roughly speaking,
we fully abandon the distances. This means formally that an outcome is called robust
if it is an equilibrium for all possible edge lengths of the same underlying graph
(Subsection 4.2.3). If this is satisfied, the outcome is completely independent of
individual distance perceptions and then the standard case of homogeneous distances
is a well-justified simplification.
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4.2.1 Definitions of Graphs
An undirected graph (X,E) consists of a set of vertices or nodes X and a set of
edges E where each edge is a subset of the vertices of size two. Let X be a finite set
of size ξ ≥ 2. For brevity we write xy or yx for an edge {x, y} ∈ E. Given a graph
(X,E), we denote by Nx ∶= {y ∈ X ∣ xy ∈ E} the set of neighbors of a node x. The
number of edges/neighbors is its degree degx ∶= ∣Nx∣. Furthermore, Y ⊆ X ∖ {x} is
neighboring to x ∈X if there exists some y ∈ Y with xy ∈ E.
A path from x ∈ X to x′ ∈ X in (X,E) is a sequence of distinct nodes (x1, . . . , xT )
such that x1 = x, xT = x′, and xtxt+1 ∈ E for all t ∈ {1, . . . , T − 1}. A set of nodes
Y ⊆ X is said to be connected if for any pair y, y′ ∈ Y there exists a path between
the two nodes. A set of connected nodes is called a component if there is no path
to nodes outside of this set, i.e., C ⊆ X is a component of (X,E) if it is connected
and for all x, x′ such that x ∈ C and x′ ∈ X ∖ C there does not exist any path. A
graph that consists of only one component is called connected because then there is
a path between any two nodes. Throughout the paper, we will restrict attention to
connected graphs. An important class of such graphs is the class of trees. Trees are
connected with ξ−1 edges or, equivalently, in a tree each pair of vertices is connected
by a unique path.
A node-weighted graph is a triple (X,E,w), where w ∶= (wx)x∈X ∈ Rξ+ is a vector
of weights. We write wx for the weight of node x ∈ X and w(Y ) = ∑y∈Y wy for the
weight of a set of nodes Y ⊆ X. The weight w will be determined later on by the
distribution of agents.
Now let (X,E,w) be given. An important operation in graphs is to delete a set
of nodes Y ⊆ X and all involved edges: (X,E) − Y ∶= (X ∖ Y,E∣X∖Y ) with E∣X∖Y ={xy ∈ E ∣ x, y ∈X ∖ Y }. This is illustrated in Figure 4.1.
The operation (X,E)−Y leads to a graph with potentially several components and
we denote them by CY1 , C
Y
2 , . . . , C
Y
lY
such that w(CY1 ) ≥ w(CY2 ) ≥ . . . ≥ w (CYlY ). If
lY > 1 and ∣Y ∣ = 1, say Y = {x}, the node is called a cut vertex (cf., e.g., Diestel,
2005) and we write Cxk instead of C
{x}
k . In this case, for the number of components it
holds that it is not greater than the degree of x. A connected set of nodes B ⊆X is
called a block if there is no cut vertex in (X,E)−X∖B = (B,E∣B) and B is maximal
with respect to inclusion, i.e., B ⊊ B′ ⊆ X implies that there exists a cut vertex in
(B′,E∣B′). That is, a set of nodes is a block if the induced subgraph cannot be
decomposed into multiple components by deleting single nodes and it is not possible
to find a larger subgraph with this feature. Note that x ∈ X is contained in several
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Figure 4.1: Deletion of nodes.
blocks if and only if it is a cut vertex. The set of blocks of a given graph is denoted
by B and b ∶= ∣B∣ is the number of blocks.
4.2.2 Perceived Distances and Players’ Payoffs
In the following, the elements of X are called objects and are interpreted, according
to the three applications, as geographical locations, political platforms or product
specifications. Let N = {i1, . . . , in} be a finite set of agents who have a favorite object
xˆi ∈ X. As usual, the graph (X,E) is used to represent the relations between the
objects as they are perceived by the agents. 4 In order to be as general as possible we
impose no further requirements on the structure of the graph, but typical examples
from literature are lines, cycles or lattices, to name but a few. In contrast to previous
works, we assume that perceptions are subjective to some extent. Formally, for each
i ∈ N there are edge lengths (δie)e∈E > 0 that represent his individual estimation of
distances between the nodes, such that, for example, δie need not coincide with δ
j
e.5
Given δ ∶= (δie)i∈Ne∈E, agent i’s perceived distance di(x) to an object x ∈X is the length
of the shortest path(s) from the favorite object xˆi to x, where the length of a path
4Note that we do not allow for “dummy nodes,” that is, we do not consider the possibility of
adding further nodes to the graph which are not objects. This is due to the fact that dummy
nodes can be shown to undermine the explanatory power of the model.
5The interpretation for geographic locations is as follows: The agents agree on the underlying graph
(a road map, for example) but they are heterogeneous in terms of assessing or evaluating the edge
lengths (the travel time, for example). If the graph does not represent geographic distances, but
policy spaces or the perception of brands, it seems to be an even more unrealistic assumption
that all agents use the same distance measure, as motivated in the introduction.
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is the sum of its edge lengths:
di(x) ∶=min{T−1∑
t=1
δixtxt+1 ∣ (x1, . . . , xT ) is a path from xˆi to x} .
We set di(xˆi) = 0 for all i ∈ N . Note that two agents with the same favorite object,
i.e., xˆi = xˆj, might have different perceptions about the distances to the other objects.
As usual, we will assume a “distance-based behavior”of the agents, i.e., agent i ∈ N
weakly prefers an object x ∈ X over y ∈ X if and only if di(x) ≤ di(y). In other
words: his utility is decreasing in distances. Thus, the preferences of agent i ∈ N
are completely determined by his favorite object xˆi and his individual edge lengths
(δie)e∈E.6 With the assumption that δie = δje for all i, j ∈ N and any e ∈ E, we obtain
the standard model, where distance perceptions are homogeneous.
In addition to the objects and agents, we consider a set of players P ∶= {c1, . . . , cp}
of finite size p ≥ 2. To ease the distinction between agents and players we will use
the male form for agents, while players are assumed to be female. Each c ∈ P is
supposed to occupy an object x ∈ X. Formally, the strategy set for each player
c ∈ P is Sc = X, such that a strategy is an object sc ∈ X. Let S = Sc1 × . . . × Scp .
Given a strategy profile s ∈ S, let px ∈ N be the number of players whose strategy
is x ∈ X. Furthermore, let Φi(s) be the set of players who are perceived as closest
by agent i ∈ N , i.e., Φi(s) = {c ∈ P ∣ di (sc) ≤ di (sc¯) ∀ c¯ ∈ P }. Note that we loosely
speak about the perceived distance to a player c ∈ P instead of the distance to the
player’s chosen object sc ∈X. We assume that each agent is allocated to the player
which is perceived as closest. If multiple players are perceived as closest by some
agent, then he is assumed to be uniformly distributed among these players. Thus,
given a strategy profile s ∈ S, player c’s payoff Φc(s) is the mass of agents who
perceive object sc as closest to their favorite object, i.e., the payoff of c ∈ P is given
by πc(s) = ∑i∶c∈Φi(s) 1∣Φi(s)∣ . A profile of payoffs is denoted by πδ ∶= (πcδ)c∈P ∶= (πc)c∈P ,
where the subscript δ indicates that the payoffs depend on the individual edge
lengths δ = (δie)i∈Ne∈E.
6There is a justification for this type of preference which neither deals with differing edge lengths
nor with distance-based behavior. Agents can be assumed to have single-peaked preferences on
the graph as they were defined for lines (Black, 1948) or trees (Demange, 1982). Such preferences
find broad acceptance and play a crucial role in the literature on social choice (see, e.g., Moulin,
1980). The alternative formulation with single-peaked preferences is, in fact, equivalent to the
(quite different) formulation here. The proof for this claim can be requested from the authors.
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4.2.3 Equilibrium Notions
Fix a graph (X,E) and a set of agents N such that for each agent i ∈ N we have
a favorite object xˆi ∈ X and individually measured edge lengths (δie)e∈E. Then a
normal form game is given by Γδ = (P,S, πδ). The game is indexed by δ to emphasize
that the payoffs, and therefore the game depends on the individual edge lengths. The
main goal of our work is to examine to which extent this restriction determines the
outcome of the standard setting, which is the special case of homogeneous distances.
A Nash equilibrium of the game Γδ is also called a locational (Nash) equilibrium
(cf. Eiselt and Laporte, 1991, 1993). Thus, s ∈ S is a locational equilibrium if for all
c ∈ P and for all x ∈X we have πc(sc, s−c) ≥ πc(x, s−c).
Example 4.1. Consider a cycle graph (X,E) on six nodes, i.e., X = {x1, x2, . . . , x6}
and E = {x1x2, x2x3, . . . , x6x1}. Let N = {i1, i2, . . . , i12} be a set of twelve agents
with favorite objects (xˆ1, xˆ2, . . . , xˆ12) = (x1, x1, x2, x2, . . . , x6, x6). We first assume
homogeneous edge lengths, i.e., for all i ∈ N we have δie = 1 for any e ∈ E. Together
with a set of three players P = {c1, c2, c3} this constitutes a game Γδ.
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Figure 4.2: Three players on a cycle graph.
The graph (X,E) is illustrated in Figure 4.2. The number within a node indicates
the number of agents who have this node as the favorite object. The edge lengths are
not represented. Finally, the three squares represent the strategy profile (s1, s2, s3) =
(x1, x3, x5). We will keep these conventions in the following figures.
For this game, results of Mavronicolas et al. (2008) imply that the depicted strategy
profile s is a locational equilibrium. A player cannot improve by relocating, because
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her payoff either remains 4 (when deviating to a neighbor) or decreases. This result,
however, depends on the specific edge lengths. Consider the situation where one of
the twelve agents with favorite object on x2 assigns a different length to an edge
next to him, such as δ˜3x1x2 = 1 − ǫ for some ǫ > 0 and δ˜3e = 1 for all other edges.
The perceived distances of the other agents are assumed to stay the same. Then the
depicted strategy profile s is not a locational equilibrium. The player c3 ∈ P with
strategy x3 now has an incentive to deviate to x2 or x4 because in both cases she
would attract four agents instead of only 3.5. Thus, the strategy profile s ∈ S is a
locational equilibrium in the game Γδ but not in the perturbed game Γδ˜. In some
sense the profile is not “robust”.
The previous example motivates the following definition:
Definition 4.1 (Robust equilibrium). A strategy profile s∗ ∈ S is a robust equilib-
rium if it is a locational equilibrium for any collection of individual edge lengths. In
other words: s∗ ∈ S is a locational equilibrium in Γδ for any δ = (δie)i∈Ne∈E.
Certainly, robustness is a strong requirement. But it is a desirable property for at
least two reasons. First, a robust equilibrium is independent of the assumption of
homogeneous edge lengths but includes this as a special case. Indeed, a robust equi-
librium is also a locational equilibrium in the homogeneous case Γδ, where (δie)e∈E
is the same for all agents i ∈ N . Second, to determine the locational equilibrium
one has to specify for each agent her favorite object xˆi ∈ X as well as her list of
edge lengths (δie)e∈E together with a graph (X,E). On the other hand, to determine
robust equilibria it is sufficient to know the graph (X,E) and the distribution of
favorite objects (xˆi)i∈N . In fact, it is sufficient to have only information about the
node-weighted graph that is induced by (xˆi)i∈N , i.e., it is enough to know (X,E,w)
where wx ∶= ∣{i ∈ N ∣ xˆi = x}∣ is the number of agents having x as their favorite ob-
ject. We will interpret an exogenously given node-weighted graph (X,E,w) as a
situation of spatial competition.
4.3 Robustness
We will first give a characterization of robustness which applies to test whether
locational equilibria are robust. Then, we will turn to properties of robust equilibria,
in particular minimal differentiation and efficiency. Finally, we will reconsider the
existence of robust equilibria.
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4.3.1 Characterization
In this subsection we provide the necessary and sufficient conditions for a strategy
profile to be a robust equilibrium. For this purpose we need additional definitions.
Definition 4.2. Let (X,E) be a graph and fix a strategy profile s ∈ S. Furthermore,
let X¯ = ⋃pc=1{sc} ⊆X be the set of occupied nodes in s.
• The hinterland Hx ⊆X of node x ∈ X¯ is the set of nodes that have x on every
path to any x′ ∈ X¯. In the special case where all players choose the same
strategy (i.e., ∣X¯ ∣ = 1), say X¯ = {x}, we define Hx ∶=X.
• An unoccupied zone Z ⊆ X is a component of (X,E) − X¯. The set of all
unoccupied zones is denoted by Z.
• An unoccupied zone Y ⊆ X is called a competitive zone if it is not contained
in any hinterland, i.e., Y ⊈ Hx for all x ∈ X¯. The set of all competitive zones
is Y .
• Two distinct objects x, x′ ∈ X¯ are indirectly neighboring if there exists a com-
petitive zone to which both nodes are neighboring.
• The neighboring area Ax ⊆ X of x ∈ X¯ is the unoccupied zone which would
be obtained when removing all players located on x. Formally, that is Ax =(⋃Z∈Zx Z ∪ {x}), where Zx ∶= {Z ∈ Z ∣ Z neighboring to x}.
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Figure 4.3: Example for definitions: decomposition into competitive zones and hin-
terlands.
The notions of hinterland and competitive zone go back to Eiselt (1992) who has
defined them for the given positions of two players. The hinterland Hx ⊆X consists
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of the node itself and possibly several unoccupied zones that are adjacent to x ∈ X¯
but not to any other occupied node in X¯. Agents who have their favorite object
in Hx must be closer to player(s) on node x than to all other players, since any
path, and therefore also the shortest one(s), contain this object. This is different
for competitive zones. Players surrounding a competitive zone Y ∈ Y compete with
indirectly neighboring competitors over the agents who have their most favorite
object in Y . The definitions are illustrated in Figure 4.3, where there are two
occupied nodes x, x′ ∈ X¯, several unoccupied zones, where one of them (Y ) is a
competitive zone, and another one (Z) belongs to a hinterland. Furthermore, the
neighboring area Ax ⊆ X consists of the hinterland Hx and the competitive zone
Y , while the neighboring area Ax′ consists of the other hinterland Hx′ and the
competitive zone Y . Generally, each node either belongs to one hinterland or to one
competitive zone. This can be considered as a partition of X into l hinterlands (i.e.,
∣X¯ ∣ = l) and k competitive zones
Π(s) = {Hx1 , . . . ,Hxl , Y1, . . . , Yk}. (4.1)
In fact, because every agent with favorite object in Hx ⊆ X is always closer to a
player on the corresponding node x than to any other occupied node, w(Hx)
px
is the
“worst-case payoff” that a player who chooses x receives. Conversely, the maximal
payoff of a player who chooses x is restricted by the neighboring area Ax ⊆ X, i.e.,
by w(Ax)
px
. These simple considerations lead to the following key proposition.
Proposition 4.1. Let s∗ ∈ S be a strategy profile on a node-weighted graph
(X,E,w) and let Π(s) be the corresponding partition as in (4.1). Furthermore,
let Zˆ ∈ argmaxZ∈Z w(Z) be a heaviest unoccupied zone. Then s∗ is a robust equi-
librium if and only if the following four conditions are satisfied for all x ∈ X¯:
(1.) w (Hx)
px
≥ w (Zˆ)
(2.) w (Hx)
px
≥ w(Ax′)
px′ + 1
∀ x′ ∈ X¯ ∖ {x}
Furthermore, if px = 1:
(3.) w(Y ) = 0 ∀ Y ∈ Y , Y ⊆ Ax
(4.) w (Hx) ≥ w(Ax′)
px′
∀ x′ ind. neighb. to x.
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The proof is relegated to the appendix. Proposition 4.1 formalizes the requirements
for a strategy profile to be a robust equilibrium. It consists of four straightforward
conditions. The first one formalizes that deviations into unoccupied zones are never
beneficial. Even if the players only receive their worst case payoff, i.e., the weight
of their hinterland, they never gain from relocating into any Z ∈ Z.7 Similarly,
Condition (2.) captures that deviations to already occupied nodes x′ ∈ X¯ are not
beneficial. The highest possible payoff a deviating player could get is w(Ax′)
px′+1
.8 These
two previous considerations must be strengthened when considering certain devia-
tions of an isolated player because her node becomes unoccupied then. Again, we
distinguish between deviations into a neighboring zone and deviations on occupied
nodes, which is reflected by Conditions (3.) and (4.). The main intuition is that for
some distance perceptions an isolated player would attract only her hinterland, but
by deviating she could receive her former hinterland and, in addition, the weight
of some competitive zone (Condition (3.)). By deviating on a neighboring occupied
node she can not only share the payoffs of the players on this node, but would also
regain some share of her former hinterland (Condition (4.)). For competitive zones
neighboring a singly occupied node this means that their weight must be zero. We
have already seen an example where this condition is violated. In Example 4.1 there
are several singly occupied nodes which are neighboring a non-trivial competitive
zone (cf. Figure 4.2).9 Thus, we can immediately conclude that the given strategy
profile is not a robust equilibrium.
The main importance of Proposition 4.1 is that it provides an efficient tool for veri-
fying whether a strategy profile s ∈ S (which might be a Nash equilibrium for specific
edge length, for example) constitutes a robust equilibrium or not. A straightforward
algorithm is simply to (i) determine the partition Π(s), (ii) compute the weights of
the hinterlands and competitive zones, and (iii) check if the four conditions charac-
terizing a robust equilibrium are satisfied. In particular, since the algorithm proceeds
in quadratic time, finding a robust equilibrium is as complex as finding a Nash equi-
librium for specific edge length. In the remainder of this subsection we will exemplify
this for some prominent results from the literature.
7This requirement also implies that the weight of unoccupied zones can never be higher than the
average payoff of the players, i.e., w(Z) ≤ n
p
for all Z ∈ Z.
8A simple implication of this requirement is that in robust equilibria the number of players on
occupied nodes is roughly proportional to the weights of the hinterlands: px
p
x
′+1
≤
w(Hx)
w(H
x
′)
≤
px+1
px
for all x,x′ ∈ X¯.
9We say that a competitive zone Y is trivial if no agent has his favorite object there, i.e., w(Y ) = 0.
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Hotelling’s main result for two players on a continuous line is that both cluster on
the so-called median. This finding is driven by the fact that both players tend to the
center of the line to steal agents from the other player. This is illustrated for a dis-
crete line in Figure 4.4 where we can observe the incentive to increase the hinterland
by moving to the discrete analogue of the median.
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Figure 4.4: A node-weighted line graph with two players.
Definition 4.3 (Median). A median of a node-weighted graph (X,E,w) is a node
q ∈ X that balances the node weights, i.e., w(Cq1) ≤ w(X)2 = n2 , where Cq1 ∈ Z is the
heaviest component of (X,E) − {q}.
In general, a median need not exist. For example, if we consider the complete graph
where all weights are equal to one, we have w(Cq1) = n − 1 > n2 . Nevertheless, one
can show that if (X,E) is a tree, a median always exists.10
The most direct way to extend Hotelling’s model to graphs is to consider trees. Al-
though this is only a special case of our set-up, much attention has been devoted to
this particular class in literature. Among others, Eiselt and Laporte (1991) exam-
ined this setting and they have shown that in the two-player case for homogeneous
distances both players will locate on the median of the tree. Thus, they came to the
same conclusion as Hotelling did. In fact, this result had already been established
by Wendell and McKelvey (1981) in slightly different terms. In their publication
the authors show that for homogeneous distances on a tree the median is always a
Condorcet winner.11 Since a Condorcet winner cannot be beaten in majority voting
(by definition), choosing the Condorcet winner constitutes a locational equilibrium
in the two-player game.
Now, let us apply Proposition 4.1 to test whether the two-player results men-
tioned in the previous paragraph are robust. If both players locate on the same
object, say q ∈ X, there is only one hinterland consisting of all the nodes, i.e.,
10Moreover, for trees a node q is a median if and only if q ∈ argmin{∑y∈X d(x, y)wy ∣ x ∈X} for
all δ (see Goldman, 1971), i.e., a median q is a minimizer of the weighted sum of graph distances
for all δ. On general graphs there are multiple conventions for the notion ‘median’: sometimes it
is defined (rather than characterized) as the minimizer of the weighted sum of graph distances.
11Later Hansen et al. (1986) extended this work.
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Π(s) = {X}. Therefore, only Condition (1.) of Proposition 4.1 applies and it sim-
plifies to n
2
≥ w(Zˆ) = w(Cq1), which is exactly the definition of the median.12 Now
consider the setting where the players choose different positions, say x and x′ ∈ X.
Eiselt and Laporte (1991) show that this is a locational equilibrium only if the po-
sitions are either neighboring or the competitive zone between them has weight 0
and, furthermore, n
2
= w(Cx1 ) = w(Cx′1 ) holds. Applying conditions (3.) and (4.) of
Proposition 4.1 yields that this is robust, too.
In Eiselt and Laporte (1993) the authors examine the case of three players on a tree.
In their main result they distinguish four different cases: (i) type A equilibria (all
players cluster on the median q ∈ X), (ii) type B equilibria (two players locate on
the median q and one in the heaviest component Cq1 ∈ Z on the node that is neigh-
boring to q), (iii) type C equilibria (all three players on different nodes), and (iv)
non-existence of equilibria. With the conditions given in Eiselt and Laporte (1993)
it is easy to check that type A and type B equilibria are indeed robust. However,
type C equilibria generically are not. They are robust only if the hinterland of all
players has the same weight because otherwise Condition (4.) of Proposition 4.1
would be violated.
Note that in the previous examples the equilibria are robust only if some kind of
minimal differentiation is satisfied and at least some players choose the median q.
Therefore these results raise some questions regarding the general form of robust
equilibria.
4.3.2 Minimal Differentiation
Minimal differentiation is one of the most controversial results and much atten-
tion has been devoted to its implications.13 In the framework of graphs, we define
minimal differentiation as follows.
12In fact, this has already been shown for the continuous line, although in very different terms, by
the seminal contribution of Black (1948). He proved that for single-peaked preferences on a line
the median is always a Condorcet winner. As already mentioned in Section 4.2, single-peaked
preferences on a line are is equivalent to our assumption of heterogeneous edge lengths on the
line graph.
13Some works show that generically it is not satisfied (see, e.g., d’Aspremont et al., 1979;
Eaton and Lipsey, 1975; Economides, 1986) but others support it for special cases (see, e.g.,
de Palma et al., 1985, 1990; Hehenkamp and Wambach, 2010). Similar considerations also ap-
ply to minimal differentiation on graphs.
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Definition 4.4. A strategy profile s ∈ S satisfies minimal differentiation if all players
locate on the same node, i.e., s = (x, x, . . . , x) for some x ∈X.
In the previous section there were already examples for robust equilibria satisfying
minimal differentiation for two or three players.14 These cases can be extended
to arbitrary numbers of players in a straightforward way. Consider the strategy
profile s ∶= (x, x, . . . , x) where all players locate on a node x ∈ X. We then have
only one hinterland consisting of all the nodes, i.e., Π(s) = {X}. By using the
same arguments as in the two-player case one can see that Conditions (2.), (3.), and
(4.) of Proposition 4.1 do not apply and, furthermore, Condition (1.) simplifies to
n
p
≥ w(Zˆ), where Zˆ is the heaviest unoccupied zone. Thus, we get the following
corollary.
Corollary 4.1. Let (X,E,w) be a node-weighted graph and q ∈ X. Furthermore,
let Cq1 ∈ Z be a heaviest component of (X,E)−{q}. The strategy profile s = (q, . . . , q)
is a robust equilibrium if and only if the weight of any component of (X,E) − {q}
is not higher than the average payoff, i.e.,
w (Cq1) ≤ np .
Corollary 4.1 shows that it is easy to construct a robust equilibrium for any num-
ber of players. The result is also easy to prove without Proposition 4.1 since for
s = (q, . . . , q) every player earns the average payoff n
p
, while the most beneficial devi-
ation leads to the heaviest unoccupied zone Cq1 . Phrased differently, if the heaviest
component of the graph without q ∈X is relatively light, then there exists a robust
equilibrium where all players locate on the same node. In particular, this also im-
plies that q has to be a median of the graph.
Note that in the robust equilibria discussed so far all players are located on or next
to the median. Therefore one might suspect that in any robust equilibrium the
median must be occupied (if it exists) and that the players cluster on or around it.
The following example is a counter-example to this conjecture.
Example 4.2. Let (X,E,w) be the weighted line graph depicted in Figure 4.5.
Furthermore assume that two players locate on each of the nodes with weight 33. As
it is easy to check, this strategy profile is a robust equilibrium. The median, however,
14Definition 4.4 captures minimal differentiation in a strong sense. A weaker version of minimal
differentiation would be the requirement that there is no unoccupied node between any pair of
occupied nodes or, equivalently, that there is no competitive zone.
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Figure 4.5: A robust equilibrium with no player on the median and without minimal
differentiation.
is the node with a weight of four and it belongs to a competitive zone. Thus, neither
minimal differentiation is satisfied, nor are players located on the median.
However, consider a reduced game where we remove the two nodes to the right and
we remove the two players in this area. In this reduced game, the unique robust equi-
librium is that the remaining two players both locate on the node with 33 agents such
as in the current strategy profile. Moreover, this node is the median of the reduced
graph. A similar observation can be made when reducing the game by removing “the
left part”.
Example 4.2 shows that in a robust equilibrium it need not be the case that players
minimally differentiate on the median. However, it seems that locally, in a kind of
reduced game, this is still true. To investigate this issue, let us formally define a
reduced game. Given a strategy profile s ∈ S, we define a reduced game for every
occupied node x ∈ X¯ by considering the objects and players in the neighboring area
Ax ⊆ X. Thus, the number of players in the reduced game is px and the graph
is restricted to (Ax,E∣Ax). For the payoffs only those agents are considered whose
favorite object belongs to the neighboring area Ax such that the node weights of the
graph in the reduced game coincide to the node weights of the original game.
Corollary 4.2 (Reduced Games). Suppose s∗ ∈ S is a robust equilibrium for some
(X,E,w) and let x ∈ X¯ be an occupied position such that px ≥ 2. Then, x is the
median of the subgraph (Ax,E∣Ax) and (x, x, . . . , x) is a robust equilibrium satisfying
minimal differentiation in the corresponding reduced game.
Proof. Let x ∈ X¯ be an occupied position in s∗ ∈ S with px ≥ 2. Applying Propo-
sition 4.1, Condition (1.) implies w(Ax)
px
≥ w(Hx)
px
≥ w(Z) for every unoccupied zone
surrounding x. But this is equivalent to the condition of Corollary 4.1, w(Cx1 ) ≥ w(A)px ,
which shows that the strategy profile (x, . . . , x) is a robust equilibrium in the reduced
game. Moreover, this condition implies that the weight of the heaviest component
of (Ax,E∣Ax) − {x} is smaller than w(Ax)2 which shows that x ∈ X¯ is the median of
the subgraph (Ax,E∣Ax).
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Corollary 4.2 shows that in any robust equilibrium a local variant of minimal differ-
entiation is satisfied. This finding is fully in line with the “principle of local cluster-
ing” conjectured in the seminal work of Eaton and Lipsey (1975). Their principle,
however, also contains the aspect that players pair, i.e., do not locate away from
other firms. This aspect is also true in robust equilibria since it follows from Con-
dition (3.) of Proposition 4.1 that isolated players do not neighbor a non-trivial
competitive zone. This implies that singly occupied nodes must neighbor another
occupied node if node weights are strictly positive. Thus, any robust equilibrium
can be characterized as a few multiply occupied nodes which are possibly neighbored
by some singly occupied nodes. The final question on the extent of differentiation
is whether these local clusters can be at a large distance from each other.
In Example 4.2 only a small share of agents favor the object between the occupied
positions. In fact, it holds generally that the weight of competitive zones in robust
equilibria must be relatively light.
Proposition 4.2 (Competitive zones). Let (X,E,w) be a node-weighted graph.
Suppose s∗ ∈ S is a robust equilibrium and let Y be the set of competitive zones.
Then, ∑Y ∈Y w(Y ) ≤ n5 .
The proof can be found in the appendix. By definition, a strategy profile satisfies
minimal differentiation only if there is no competitive zone. In this context, Propo-
sition 4.2 can be interpreted as a weaker form of a global minimal differentiation
result: competitive zones might exist in equilibrium, but their weight in sum is
bounded by n
5
, i.e., at most 20% of the agents can have their favorite object in some
competitive zone.
The requirement of robustness is crucial for each of the results on minimal differ-
entiation. Indeed, it is possible to find (non-robust) locational equilibria which do
not satisfy the properties specified by Corollary 4.1, Corollary 4.2, and Proposi-
tion 4.2. Whether robustness also leads to stronger results with respect to efficiency
is addressed next.
4.3.3 (In-)Efficiency
Traditionally, welfare is measured by aggregating the players’ and the agents’ sur-
plus. However, from the players’ perspective, in our setting (i.e., without consider-
ing price competition) any strategy profile yields the same aggregated surplus as we
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study a constant-sum game. Therefore, efficiency will be discussed from the view-
point of the agents which are interpreted as consumers in this subsection.15 The
standard result of two firms choosing the median of a line is known to be inefficient
since minimal differentiation leads to unnecessarily high distances for the consumers.
In his paper, Hotelling complains about this inefficiency:
“Buyers are confronted everywhere with an excessive sameness [. . . ]”
and “[. . . ] competing sellers tend to become too much alike.”
(Hotelling, 1929, p. 54)
This result, however, does not simply generalize. Reconsider Example 4.1 where
some agents are uniformly distributed along a cycle graph with equal edge lengths.
The (non-robust) locational equilibrium depicted in Figure 4.2 is efficient with re-
spect to different criteria. For instance, it minimizes the sum of distances (of each
consumer to a closest player) as well as the sum of squared distances, which are the
most common cardinal criteria.16 However, the cardinal approach does not seem to
be fully justified in our context as we have individual distance perceptions which
need not be comparable across consumers. A well-known ordinal criterion is Pareto
efficiency. The locational equilibrium in Example 4.1 satisfies this criterion as well,
i.e., there does not exist another strategy profile such that any consumer is at least as
well off and at least one consumer is strictly better off (where better off here means
that the perceived distance to the closest player becomes shorter). Note that this is
a weak requirement which is satisfied by plenty of strategy profiles. The existence of
locational equilibria that are efficient therefore raises the question of whether robust
equilibria can be efficient as well. Under generic conditions, the answer is no.
Proposition 4.3 (Pareto efficiency). Let (X,E,w) be a node-weighted graph. Sup-
pose that the number of agents n is not divisible by the number of players p and that
there are at least p nodes with positive weight wx > 0. Then any robust equilibrium
is Pareto dominated (for the consumers).
Proposition 4.3 shows that under mild conditions robust equilibria are not Pareto
efficient. This statement of inefficiency with respect to an ordinal criterion precludes
15These might be inhabitants that visit a facility or consumers who buy a product. Because we
have not specified a second stage like government formation in our model, the discussion of
efficiency does not apply to the context of voting.
16The sum of squared distances as an efficiency criterion has been used, for example, by
Meagher and Zauner (2004) and Kro´l (2012) who find different effects of uncertainty on effi-
ciency.
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inefficiency with respect to cardinal criteria as well since no Pareto dominated strat-
egy profile can minimize the sum of (squared) distances. The proof of Proposition 4.3
is relegated to the appendix. Its intuition is simple. Generically, in every robust
equilibrium there are two firms that choose the same location, while the consumers
would benefit if one of them located at a different position. In fact, as we have a
constant-sum game between the players, a social planner could relocate them and
provide transfer payments to keep their payoffs constant. Thus, a socially optimal
outcome from the consumers’ point of view would be possible without changing the
payoffs of the players.17 This shows that, in a much more general form, Hotelling’s
inefficiency persists when robustness is required.
4.3.4 (Non-)Existence of Robust Equilibria
So far we analyzed properties of robust equilibria without explicitly examining under
which conditions they exist. In Subsection 4.3.1 we have shown for small numbers
of players on tree graphs that most of the sufficient conditions from the literature
indeed induce robust equilibria. Moreover, Corollary 4.1 provides a condition which
is sufficient for existence. Intuitively, it is satisfied either if the weight is concen-
trated on the median or if we have a star-like structure under a more equal weight
distribution. Although this condition is necessary and sufficient only for robust
equilibria with minimal differentiation, similar considerations also apply in general.
Corollary 4.1 is based on Proposition 4.1 which characterizes the underlying strat-
egy profiles of robust equilibria.18 In particular, Condition (1.) states that the
hinterland Hx ⊆X of every occupied node x ∈ X¯ must be heavy enough to carry px
players. If this weight is not directly on the node x, then it must be on other nodes
in its hinterland. Considering the “arms” in the hinterland, i.e., the components in
the graph (Hx,E∣Hx)−{x}, each of them is an unoccupied zone. However, for unoc-
cupied zones the weight is bounded, again by Proposition 4.1 Condition (1.). Thus,
in order to be heavy enough, an occupied node x ∈ X¯ must either have sufficiently
17However, this result also depends on the abstraction from price competition. If firms do not
cluster, i.e., if they have a local monopoly, they might have an incentive to raise prices.
18Proposition 4.1 provides the necessary and sufficient conditions for existence in the sense that a
robust equilibrium exists if and only if there is a strategy profile that satisfies these conditions.
Thus, this result transforms the problem of finding a strategy profile that is a robust equilibrium
into finding a strategy profile that satisfies the conditions of Proposition 4.1, but it is not a
result on the exogenously given situation of spatial competition, i.e., on the node-weighted graph
(X,E,w).
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many arms in its hinterland (which are heavy in sum) or it must have a relatively
high weight itself. This intuition is formalized in Corollary 4.3.
Corollary 4.3. For some node-weighted graph (X,E,w), let s∗ ∈ S be a robust
equilibrium with heaviest unoccupied zone Zˆ ∈ Z (and w(Zˆ) > 0). Let x ∈ X¯ be
occupied by 0 < px < p players. Denote by ax ∈ N the number of arms (i.e., the
number of components in the hinterland for (Hx,E∣Hx) − {x}) of x. Then
wx
w(Zˆ) + ax ≥ px.
Proof. Let Zˆx ∈ Z be the heaviest unoccupied zone in the hinterland of x ∈ X¯. The
result then follows from Proposition 4.1 Condition (1.):
w(Hx) ≥ pxw(Zˆ) ⇒ wx + axw(Zˆx) ≥ pxw(Zˆ)
⇒ wx
w(Zˆ) + ax ⋅
w(Zˆx)
w(Zˆ) ≥ px ⇒
wx
w(Zˆ) + ax ≥ px
Corollary 4.3 shows that in a robust equilibrium the relative weight of an occupied
node plus its number of arms must exceed the number of players on it. This result
is illustrated in Figure 4.6 with two occupied nodes x and x′ ∈ X¯.
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Figure 4.6: Four players on two nodes. If this is a robust equilibrium, then node
x must have high weight. This is not necessarily true for x′ because it has a high
degree (which leads to several arms in its hinterland).
While x has only one arm in its hinterland, x′ has four of them. Therefore, for node
x we have wx
w(Zˆ)
+1 ≥ 2, which is equivalent to wx ≥ w(Zˆ), i.e., the weight of the node
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must exceed the weight of the heaviest unoccupied zone. Note that this implies an
inequality of weights if there are unoccupied zones with many nodes. In contrast to
this, x′ needs not be as heavy as x, but in order to have four arms it must be a cut
vertex and have a degree larger than five. Thus, one interpretation for Corollary 4.3
is that the weight of occupied nodes and their degree can be interpreted as some
kind of substitutes: at least one of them has to be high enough in order to carry px
players in equilibrium.
This gives a requirement for robust equilibria on the level of single nodes. On
the graph level this requirement will translate into (a) structural features of the
graph and in (b) conditions on the distribution of weights. To assess the weight
distribution, we consider the inequality of weights measured by the variance. In
our case it is given by Var(w) = ∑x∈X (wx − nξ )2 = 1ξ ∑x∈X w2x − n2ξ2 . The variance is
the quadratic distance from the uniform distribution. In particular, Var(w) = 0 if
and only if wx = nξ for all x ∈ X, i.e., if and only if w is uniformly distributed (a
special case that is predominantly discussed in the literature). To assess structural
requirements of a graph we consider its connectedness which is measured by the
number of blocks b (cf. Diestel, 2005). If this number is smaller than the number of
players p, then it is still impossible to have Corollary 4.3 trivially satisfied (such as
for node x′ in Figure 4.6). For these graphs Corollary 4.3 has implications on the
weight distribution because there must be an occupied node that is similar to node
x in Figure 4.6. As a consequence we have that graphs with a high connectivity
(i.e., a relatively small number of blocks) only admit robust equilibria if the weight
distribution is far from uniform.
Proposition 4.4. Let (X,E,w) be a node-weighted graph with ξ > 3p. Suppose
that the number of blocks is smaller than the number of players, i.e., b < p. Then
there exists some ν > 0 such that Var(w) < ν implies that a robust equilibrium does
not exist.
The interpretation of this result is as follows: Suppose the graph is not too small
(ξ > 3p) and the distribution of agents is sufficiently close to the uniform distri-
bution. Then the existence of robust equilibria requires a low connectivity of the
underlying graph in terms of that there must be more blocks than players.
Proposition 4.4 obviously applies to all graphs with just one block (i.e., b = 1) like
grids, for instance. Those graphs are known as two-connected and they are charac-
terized by not containing any cut vertex (see, e.g., Diestel, 2005). Indeed, in this
case we have ax = 0 for any occupied node x ∈ X¯ (and for any s ∈ S). Thus, if
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a two-connected graph is sufficiently large, it always satisfies the requirements of
Proposition 4.4 and therefore it does not admit robust equilibria if the weight dis-
tribution is too close to uniformity.19 A particular example of this class of graphs
are cycle graphs (as illustrated in Figure 4.2) which have been studied extensively
by Mavronicolas et al. (2008). Given a uniform distribution of agents (and edge
lengths), the authors have shown that there always exists a Nash equilibrium for
ξ > 3p. However, Proposition 4.4 immediately implies that these equilibria are not
robust.
For tree graphs Proposition 4.4 does not apply since trees consist of many blocks.
However, for this special class the number of arms is also restricted by some struc-
tural property. Since there are no cycles in a tree, each arm in any hinterland leads
to a node of degree 1, a so-called loose end. Therefore, completely analogous to
Proposition 4.4 we can show the following.
Proposition 4.5. Let (X,E) be a node-weighted tree with ξ > 3p. Suppose that
e < p, where e is the number of loose ends. Then there exists some ν > 0 such that
Var(w) < ν implies that no robust equilibrium exists.
The number of loose ends is a structural feature that is related with the equality
of the degree distribution of the graph. The lowest number of loose ends in a tree
is attained in the line graph (which has a highly equal degree distribution), while
the highest number is attained in the star graph (which has a highly unequal degree
distribution). In that sense, Proposition 4.5 shows that the existence of a robust
equilibrium on a tree requires either an unequal distribution of weight or an unequal
distribution of degree.
To sum it up, robust equilibria certainly exist for structures that are similar to a
star graph (Corollary 4.1) or have a highly concentrated distribution of weights.
However, for graphs with few cut vertices (i.e., graphs with a low number of blocks)
and for tree graphs, robust equilibria can exist only if the weight distribution is not
close to uniform. To consider a numerical example for the required inequality: for
trees that satisfy the condition e < p of Proposition 4.5 and for cycle graphs (which
always satisfy the condition b < p of Proposition 4.4) we can show that there only
19The result that two-connected graphs require a sufficient inequality of node weights can also be
derived from Proposition 4.2. Since in two-connected graphs any unoccupied node belongs to a
competitive zone, Proposition 4.2 implies that we have w(X¯) ≥ 4
5
n in robust equilibria. Thus,
there must be at least one node x with wx ≥
4
5
n
p
. That is, to reach an average payoff n
p
it is
almost enough to attract all agents with favorite object x.
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exists a robust equilibrium of three or more players if there is a node x ∈ X that is
at least ξ
p
− 1 times heavier than some other node x′ ∈ X. Thus, if the number of
nodes strongly exceeds the number of players in the game (i.e., ξ ≫ p), those one-
dimensional structures do not admit robust equilibria if the weights are uniformly
distributed.
4.4 Discussion
Models of spatial competition predominantly deal with three specific applications:
(i) firms that strategically locate facilities (e.g., Eiselt and Laporte, 1993), (ii) polit-
ical candidates who strategically choose a political platform (e.g., de Palma et al.,
1990), and (iii) firms that strategically choose a product specification (e.g., Eaton
and Lipsey, 1975). In any of the model variations it has been standardly as-
sumed that agents are heterogeneous with respect to their ideal point (i.e., loca-
tion/policy/product), but homogeneous with respect to the perception of distances.
In particular, it must hold that two agents with the same ideal point agree on the
ranking of all the other alternatives. In this paper we have introduced a way to
relax this strong homogeneity requirement by considering individual distance per-
ceptions. We assess whether model predictions are robust in the sense that they
are independent of the perceived distances. Thereby, we confirm robustness of the
equilibria found for two and three players on a tree graph by Eiselt and Laporte
(1991, 1993). And we find strong support for a conjecture of the “principle of local
clustering” articulated by Eaton and Lipsey (1975, p. 46) who further explain that
“[t]he principle of minimum differentiation is a special case of the principle of local
clustering when the number of firms in the market is restricted to two.” In fact, we
have shown that all robust equilibria satisfy local clustering in the sense that we have
minimal differentiation in each reduced game. An implication of this result is that
robust locational choices are not Pareto efficient, which is in line with Hotelling’s
conjecture. On the other hand, not all results from models of spatial competition
are robust with respect to heterogeneous distance perceptions. Especially in graphs
without cut vertices the existence of robust equilibria is highly restricted. We il-
lustrate this in an example of uniform distribution of agents along a cycle graph
(analyzed by Mavronicolas et al., 2008). Indeed, by discussing general structural
conditions for the existence of robust equilibria, we have shown that the existence
generically requires a highly unequal distribution of agents. This also raises the ques-
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tion whether there are robust outcomes in the three main applications mentioned
at the beginning of this section. For example, Proposition 4.2 implies that at most
20% of the agents may have their favorite object “between” the players. Interest-
ingly, some empirical data on the geographical distribution of inhabitants suggests
that the necessary inequality requirements might just be satisfied. According to the
United Nations report from 2012 the rate of urbanization in more developed regions
was about 78% in 2011 and it is still increasing.20 In the US it was even higher
than 82%, for example. Thus, the popoulation in more developed regions is quite
unequally distributed and this suggests that if firms serve only the major cities this
might well be a robust equilibrium, despite the inefficiency for consumers who live
outside these cities. In the case of product or policy spaces, the exact distribution
of consumers is still an open question. But if it should not meet the requirements of
robust equilibria, this would lead again to our main motivation that the assumption
of homogeneous distances can have a strong impact on the results. In this case, the
use of models of spatial competition in these applications has to be reconsidered
carefully.
Although we have focused in this paper on just one – yet crucial – aspect of robust-
ness, several other model specifications can be challenged as well. Some of them
do not substantially influence our results. For instance, if the assumption that the
players do not locate on the edges of the graph was relaxed, then for any robust
equilibrium in this more general set-up there exists another one where the players
only locate on the vertices and each of them attracts the same set of agents. More-
over, these additional equilibria exist only under very restrictive conditions. Another
aspect that could be relaxed is the assumption that ties are broken equally in the
case of equal distances. Although it would then be necessary to adapt the formu-
lations of the results, their substance would not change. The reason is that robust
equilibria are independent of the perceived distances and, thus, the tie-breaking rule
is relevant only if two players locate at the same position.
On the other hand, however, there are also further assumptions which might well
play an important role. In particular, we study a simultaneous move game, while
models of sequential moves lead to quite different predictions about minimal differ-
entiation (e.g., Loertscher and Muehlheusser, 2011; Prescott and Visscher, 1977),
when more than two players are involved.21 A further major modeling decision is
20United Nations, DESA (2012). World urbanization prospects: The 2011 revision.
21Also in the literature on sequential location choices the questionable homogeneity assumption is
standard. When relaxing this assumption one can find simple three-player examples where the
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whether continuous or discrete space is considered. We have contributed to bridging
the two corresponding literatures, but it is left for future research to clarify the role
of this modeling assumption; for instance, by approximating a continuous space by
a discrete space of shrinking steps.
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4.5 Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 4.1
Necessity: Assume s∗ ∈ S is a robust equilibrium and let X¯ = {x1, . . . , xl} be the
set of occupied nodes.
First consider the case px = 1 where x ∈ X¯. Let c ∈ P be the player with
sc = x. We will establish that x is not neighboring a non-trivial competitive
zone, i.e., w(Y ) = 0 for all Y ∈ Y neighboring to x. To see this suppose
the opposite is true. Fix some arbitrary object y ∈ Y . Because Ax ⊆ X is
connected, it is possible to find edge lengths (δ¯ie)e∈E for all i ∈ N with xˆi ∈ Ax∖Y
such that di (y) < di (x′) for any occupied position x′ ∈ X¯ neighboring to Ax.
This implies di (x) < di (y) because every path in Ax from xˆi to y passes
through x. Furthermore, for all j ∈ N with favorite object in Y one can choose
edge lengths (δ¯i)
e∈E
such that dj (y) < dj (x′′) < dj (x), where x ≠ x′′ ∈ X¯ is
some occupied position also neighboring to Y . Then the payoff of player c is
πc
δ¯
(s∗) = w(Ax) −w(Y ) < w(Ax) = πcδ¯ (y, s∗−c). Since she can now beneficially
equilibria are not robust.
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deviate, s∗ is not a robust equilibrium.
Furthermore, if s∗ ∈ S is robust, an isolated player c ∈ P may never have an
incentive to deviate to an indirectly neighboring position x′ ∈ X¯. Because the
weight of all competitive zones surrounding x equals 0, πc(s∗) = w (Hx(s∗)) =
w(Ax) for all perceptions of distances. Suppose c relocates to x′. Similar as
before, it is possible to construct individual distances (δ¯ie)e∈E for all i ∈ N such
that every agent with favorite object in Ax′ or Ax strictly prefers x′ to any
other occupied position, i.e., πc
δ¯
(x′, s∗−c) = w(Ax′)+w(Ax)
px′+1
. But this implies
πc(s∗) = w (Hx) ≥ w(Ax′) +w(Hx)
px′ + 1
∀ x′ indirectly neighboring to x.
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highest possible payoff at occupied and indirectly neighboring nodes
⇔ w(Hx) ≥ w(Ax′)
px′
∀ x′ indirectly neighboring to x.
(4.2)
Now let px ≥ 1. Because s∗ ∈ S is supposed to be a robust equilibrium, it is
not possible to perturb distances in such a way that a player can increase her
payoff. This implies that the payoff she can attain at least has to be greater
than the highest possible gain she can reach if she deviates. With similar
arguments as in the case px = 1 this yields
w (Hx)
px´udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¸udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¶
worst case payoff at x
≥ w(Zˆ)dcurly
best case payoff at unoccupied nodes
,
where Zˆ ∈ Z is the heaviest unoccupied zone, and
w (Hx)
px
≥ w(Ax′)
px′ + 1
∀ x′ ∈ X¯ ∖ {x}.
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best case payoff at already occupied nodes
(4.3)
If px = 1, (4.2) already implies (4.3) for indirectly neighboring objects.
Sufficiency: Now assume the requirements from the proposition are satisfied. We
have to show that the strategies where px players locate at x ∈ X¯ constitute
robust equilibria. First consider the case px = 1, i.e., a singly occupied node.
Conditions (3.) and (4.)make sure that the player cannot improve by deviating
to a neighboring competitive zone or by deviating to a directly or indirectly
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neighboring occupied node. Condition (1.) assures that she cannot improve
by deviating to any other unoccupied zone and by Condition (2.) she cannot
improve by deviating to any other occupied node. Now, let px > 1. For a
player located on x ∈ X¯, Condition (1.) assures that he cannot improve by
deviating to any other unoccupied zone and Condition (2.) assures that he
cannot improve by deviating to any other occupied node.
Proof of Proposition 4.2
Let s∗ ∈ S be a robust equilibrium and x ∈ X¯ be the position with lowest worst-case
payoff, i.e.,
w(Hx)
px
≤
w(Hx)
px
for all x ∈ X¯. Then Proposition 4.1 Condition (2.) implies
w(Hx) ≥ px
px + 1
w(Ax) = px
px + 1
(w(Hx) + ∑
Y ∈Y, Y ⊆Ax
w(Y ))
≥ px
px + 1
w(Hx) + px
px + 1
∑
Y ∈Y, Y ⊆Ax
w(Y ).
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=∶w(Yx)
and, consequently, w(Hx) ≥ pxw(Yx) for all x ∈ X¯ ∖ {x}, where w(Yx) is the aggre-
gated weight of competitive zones surrounding x ∈ X¯.
Case 1: px = 1
Here, Proposition 4.1 Condition (3.) implies w(Y ) = 0 for all Y ⊆ Ax and,
thus, w(Hx) ≥ pxw(Yx) = 0. Then:
n = ∑
x∈X¯
w(Hx) + ∑
Y ∈Y
w(Y ) ≥ ∑
x∈X¯
px ⋅
w(Hx)
px
+ ∑
Y ∈Y
w(Y )
≥ ∑
x∈X¯
px w(Yx)´udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¸udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¶
=0, if px=1
+ ∑
Y ∈Y
w(Y )
≥ 2 ∑
x∈X¯
w(Yx) + ∑
Y ∈Y
w(Y )
≥ 2(2 ∑
Y ∈Y
w(Y )) + ∑
Y ∈Y
w(Y ) = 5 ∑
Y ∈Y
w(Y ),
where the last inequality is due to the fact that by definition of competitive
zones each Y ∈ Y is neighboring to at least two occupied positions.
Case 2: px ≥ 2
If px = 1 for all x ∈ X¯ ∖ {x}, again Condition (3.) from Proposition 4.1 implies
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w(Yx) = 0 for all x ∈ X¯ ∖ {x} and there remains nothing to show. Therefore
assume that there exists at least one x′ ∈ X¯ ∖ {x} with px′ ≥ 2. Again one can
exploit Proposition 4.1 Condition (2.):
w(Hx) ≥ px
px′ + 1
w(Ax′) ⇔ w(Hx) ≥ pxw(Ax′) − px′w(Hx)
⇔ w(Hx) ≥ pxw(Hx′) − px′w(Hx) + pxw(Yx′)
and, analogously,
w(Hx′) ≥ px′
px + 1
w(Ax) ⇔ w(Hx′) ≥ px′w(Hx) − pxw(Hx′) + px′w(Yx).
Now the rest of the proof proceeds similarly to Case 1. According to (4.1) we
can again decompose the graph in hinterlands and competitive zones and by
using w(Hx) ≥ pxw(Yx) for all x ∈ X¯ ∖ {x} one gets
n = w(Hx) +w(Hx′) + ∑
x∈X¯∖{x,x′}
w(Hx) + ∑
Y ∈Y
w(Y )
≥ pxw(Hx′) − px′w(Hx) + pxw(Yx′) + px′w(Hx) − pxw(Hx′) + px′w(Yx)
+ ∑
x∈X¯∖{x,x′}
px ⋅
w(Hx)
px
+ ∑
Y ∈Y
w(Y )
≥ pxw(Yx′) + px′w(Yx) + ∑
x∈X¯∖{x,x′}
px w(Yx)´udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¸udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¶
=0, if px=1
+ ∑
Y ∈Y
w(Y )
≥ 2 ∑
x∈X¯
w(Yx) + ∑
Y ∈Y
w(Y )
≥ 2(2 ∑
Y ∈Y
w(Y )) + ∑
Y ∈Y
w(Y ) = 5 ∑
Y ∈Y
w(Y )
Again, the last inequality holds because each Y ∈ Y is neighboring to at least
two occupied positions.
Proof of Proposition 4.3
Let (X,E,w) be a node-weighted graph and suppose n
p
∉ N. We first show that in
any robust equilibrium s∗ ∈ S there is at least one node multiply occupied.
Suppose the opposite is true: There is a robust equilibrium s ∈ S with only singly
occupied nodes, i.e., px = 1 for all x ∈ X¯. Consider two occupied nodes x, x′ ∈ X¯
which are directly or indirectly neighboring. Condition (4.) of Proposition 4.1 then
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reads w (Hx) ≥ w(Ax′)1 ≥ w(Hx′)1 and w (Hx′) ≥ w(Ax)1 ≥ w(Hx)1 which implies that
w (Hx) = w(Hx′). Since the graph (X,E) is connected, any occupied node x ∈ X¯
is a direct or indirect neighbor of at least one other occupied node and the relation
of being a (direct or indirect) neighbor connects all occupied nodes. Therefore, we
have w (Hx) = w(Hx′) for all x, x′ ∈ X¯. Moreover, Condition (3.) of Proposition 4.1
implies that all competitive zones must have a weight of zero (because they have
a singly occupied node as a neighbor) such that ∑x∈X¯ w(Hx) = n. Taken together,
this yields w (Hx) = np for any x ∈ X¯. However, since the weight of each hinterland
is determined by a number of agents, we must have w (Hx) ∈ N, which contradicts
our assumption that n
p
∉ N.
Thus, in every robust equilibrium there needs to be a multiply occupied node, say
x ∈ X¯. Since at least p nodes have a positive weight, there exists an unoccupied
node, say x˜ ∈X ∖X¯, with wx˜ > 0. Changing the strategy of one player with sc = x to
s˜c = x˜ is a Pareto improvement because all consumers with xˆi = x˜ are better off.
Proof of Proposition 4.4
To show the proposition, assume the opposite is true: that is, assume there exists
a robust equilibrium s∗ ∈ S. Let Zˆ ∈ Z be the heaviest unoccupied zone with
respect to s∗. Given the requirements of the proposition, we will show that in each
robust equilibrium there exists an occupied node which is heavier than Zˆ. But if
the variance becomes small this leads to a contradiction. The proof proceeds in five
steps:
Step 1: The ǫ-νǫ-criterion.
Consider the mapping ∥ ⋅ ∥1 ∶ Rξ Ð→ R with ∥w∥1 = ∑x∈X ∣wx∣, also known as
the Manhattan norm. It is well-know that ∥ ⋅ ∥1 is continuous. Thus, for all
ǫ > 0 there exists some νǫ > 0 such that ∥w −w′∥2 < νǫ implies ∥w −w′∥1 < ǫ for
all w,w′ ∈ Rξ, where ∥w −w′∥2 = √∑x∈X(wx −w′x)2 is, as usual, the Euclidean
norm. Let ǫ ∶= 2p
5(p+1) ⋅
n
ξ
. Furthermore, in the following let w′ be the uniform
distribution w′x ∶= nξ for all x ∈ X.22 Having specified these variables, the ǫ-
νǫ-criterion from above implies that there exists some ν ∶= ν2ǫ > 0 such that
from
√
Var(w) = ∥w − w′∥2 < √ν always ∑x∈X ∣wx − nξ ∣ < ǫ = 2p5(p+1) ⋅ nξ follows.
Correspondingly, for the rest of the proof it is assumed that there is given a
tupel of node weights (wx)x∈X (i.e., w ≥ 0 and ∑x∈X wx = n) with Var(w) < ν.
22Because the fraction n
ξ
need not be an integer, the uniform distribution cannot always be induced
by allocating n agents to nodes. Still, it is possible to study the node-weighted graph (X,E,w′).
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Step 2: We establish that ∣w(Xˆ) − ∣Xˆ ∣n
ξ
∣ < ǫ for all Xˆ ⊆X.
If Var(w) < ν, Step 1 implies for all subsets Xˆ ⊆X,
∣w(Xˆ) − ∣Xˆ ∣n
ξ
∣ = RRRRRRRRRRR∑x∈Xˆ (wx −
n
ξ
)RRRRRRRRRRR ≤ ∑x∈Xˆ ∣wx −
n
ξ
∣ ≤ ∑
x∈X
∣wx − n
ξ
∣ < ǫ.
Step 3: We establish that ∑x∈X¯ ax ≤ b.
The main intuition of this step is that all unoccupied zones can be covered by
blocks of the graph and we will show that minimal covers of different zones have
to be disjoint. Let Zx ≠ Z ′x′ be two unoccupied zones in the hinterland of x and
x′, respectively, where x, x′ ∈ X¯. Note that x = x′ is allowed but, nevertheless,
the two zones may not be equal. If it is not possible to find such two zones,
∑x∈X¯ ax ≤ 1 and there remains nothing to show. According to Section 4.2
let B be the set of blocks. Obviously X = ⋃B∈BB holds. Therefore there
exist BZx ,BZx′ ⊆ B with Zx ⊆ ⋃B∈BZx B and Zx′ ⊆ ⋃B∈BZx′ B such that both
sets are minimal with respect to inclusion, i.e., Bˆ ⊊ BZx implies Zx ⊈ ⋃B∈BˆB
(analogously for Bˆ ⊊ BZx′ ). Given the construction of blocks, the two sets BZx
and BZx′ must be disjoint because otherwise there would be a path from Zx to
Z ′x′ not passing through x and x
′, which is not possible due to the definition
of hinterlands. Thus:
∑
x∈X¯
ax = ∑
x∈X¯
∑
Zx∈Z, Zx⊆Hx
1 ≤ ∑
x∈X¯
∑
Zx∈Z, Zx⊆Hx
∣BZx ∣ ≤ ∣B∣ = b
Step 4: We establish that wx′ ≥ w(Zˆ) for some x′ ∈ X¯.
As already has been shown in Step 3, the number of hinterlands is bounded by
b and, thus, ∑x∈X¯ ax ≤ b < p = ∑x∈X¯ px. Therefore there exists some x′ ∈ X¯ with
ax′ ≤ px′ − 1 and by applying Corollary 4.3 this yields wx ≥ w(Zˆ). In words:
there necessarily exists an occupied node which is heavier than the heaviest
unoccupied zone.
Step 5: The final contradiction.
Since the number of hinterlands is smaller than the number of players and be-
cause of Proposition 4.2, the average weight of unoccupied zones in hinterlands
needs to be relatively high:
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average weight of unoccupied zones in hinterlands
>
4
5
n −w(X¯)
p
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Moreover, according to Step 4 this implies that x′ must be relatively heavy as
well, wx′ >
4
5
n−w(X¯)
p
. But then from Step 2 it follows that
n
ξ
+ ǫ >
4
5
ξ n
ξ
− (∣X¯ ∣n
ξ
+ ǫ)
p
≥ 125 pnξ − pnξ − ǫ
p
= 7n
5ξ
−
ǫ
p
which contradicts ǫ = 2p
5(p+1) ⋅
n
ξ
. Therefore, s∗ cannot be a robust equilibrium.
References
Berman, O. and Gavious, A. (2007). Location of terror response facilities: A
game between state and terrorist. European Journal of Operational Research,
177 (2), 1113–1133.
Black, D. (1948). On the rationale of group decision-making. Journal of Political
Economy, 56 (1), 23–34.
Braid, R. M. (2005). The equilibrium locations of three stores with different se-
lections of differentiated products. Economics Letters, 93, 31–36.
Carpenter, G. S. (1989). Perceptual position and competitive brand strategy in
a two-dimensional two-brand market. Management Science, 35 (9), 1029–1044.
d’Aspremont, C., Gabszewicz, J. J. and Thisse, J.-F. (1979). On hotelling’s
”stability in competition”. Econometrica, 47 (5), 1145–50.
de Palma, A., Ginsburgh, V., Papageorgiou, V. V. and Thisse, J.-F.
(1985). The principle of minimum differentiation holds under sufficient hetero-
geneity. Econometrica, 53 (4), 767–781.
—, Hong, G.-S. and Thisse, J.-F. (1990). Equilibria in multi-party competition
under uncertainty. Social Choice and Welfare, 7 (3), 247–259.
Demange, G. (1982). Single-peaked orders on a tree.Mathematical Social Sciences,
3 (4), 389–396.
Denzau, A., Kats, A. and Slutsky, S. (1985). Multi-agent equilibria with mar-
ket share and ranking objectives. Social Choice and Welfare, 2 (2), 95–117.
138
Diestel, R. (2005). Graph Theory (Graduate Texts in Mathematics). Springer.
Downs, A. (1957). An economic theory of political action in a democracy. Journal
of Political Economy, 65 (2), 135–150.
Eaton, B. C. and Lipsey, R. G. (1975). The principle of minimum differentiation
reconsidered: Some new developments in the theory of spatial competition. The
Review of Economic Studies, 42 (1), 27–49.
Economides, N. (1986). Minimal and maximal product differentiation in
hotelling’s duopoly. Economics Letters, 21 (1), 67–71.
Eiselt, H. A. (1992). Hotelling’s duopoly on a tree. Annals of Operations Research,
40 (1), 195–207.
— and Laporte, G. (1991). Locational equilibrium of two facilities on a tree.
RAIRO, 25 (1), 5–18.
— and — (1993). The existence of equilibria in the 3-facility hotelling model in a
tree. Transportation Science, 27 (1), 39–43.
— and — (1997). Sequential location problems. European Journal of Operational
Research, 96 (2), 217–231.
—, — and Thisse, J.-F. (1993). Competitive location models: A framework and
bibliography. Transportation, 27 (21), 44–54.
— and Marianov, V. (eds.) (2011). Foundations of Location Analysis, New York:
Springer.
Gabszewicz, J. J. and Thisse, J.-F. (1992). Location. In R. Aumann and S. Hart
(eds.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, Handbook of Game
Theory with Economic Applications, vol. 1, 9, Elsevier, pp. 281–304.
Godinho, P. andDias, J. (2010). A two-player competitive discrete location model
with simultaneous decisions. European Journal of Operational Research, 207 (3),
1419–1432.
Goldman, A. J. (1971). Optimal center location in simple networks. Transporta-
tion Science, 5 (2), 212–221.
139
Hansen, P., Thisse, J. F. andWendell, R. E. (1986). Equivalence of solutions
to network location problems. Mathematics of Opeations Research, 11, 672–678.
Hehenkamp, B. andWambach, A. (2010). Survival at the center–the stability of
minimum differentiation. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 76 (3),
853–858.
Hotelling, H. (1929). Stability in competition. The Economic Journal, 39 (153),
41–57.
Jiang, A. X., Leyton-Brown, K. andBhat, N. A. (2011). Action-graph games.
Games and Economic Behavior, 71 (1), 141–173.
Kress, D. and Pesch, E. (2012). Sequential competitive location on networks.
European Journal of Operational Research, 217 (3), 483–499.
Kro´l, M. (2012). Product differentiation decisions under ambiguous consumer de-
mand and pessimistic expectations. International Journal of Industrial Organiza-
tion, to appear.
Labbe´, M. and Hakimi, S. L. (1991). Market and locational equilibrium for two
competitors. Operations Research, 39 (5), 749–756.
Lancaster, K. (1990). The economics of product variety: A survey. Marketing
Science, 9 (3), 189–206.
Loertscher, S. and Muehlheusser, G. (2011). Sequential location games.
RAND Journal of Economics, 42 (4), 639–663.
Mavronicolas, M., Monien, B., Papadopoulou, V. G. and Schoppmann,
F. (2008). Voronoi games on cycle graphs. In E. Ochman´ski and J. Tyszkiewicz
(eds.), Proceedings of the 33rd International Symposium on Mathematical Foun-
dations of Computer Science (MFCS’08), LNCS, vol. 5162.
Meagher, K. J. and Zauner, K. G. (2004). Product differentiation and location
decisions under demand uncertainty. Journal of Economic Theory, 117 (2), 201–
216.
— and— (2005). Location-then-price competition with uncertain consumer tastes.
Economic Theory, 25 (4), 799–818.
140
Moulin, H. (1980). On strategy-proofness and single peakedness. Public Choice,
35 (4), 437–455.
Mueller, D. C. (2003). Public Choice III. Cambridge University Press.
Nilssen, T. (1997). Sequential location when transportation costs are asymmetric.
Economics Letters, 54 (2), 191–201.
Osborne, M. J. (1995). Spatial models of political competition under plurality
rule: A survey of some explanations of the number of candidates and the positions
they take. Canadian Journal of Economics, 28 (2), 261–301.
Plastria, F. (2001). Static competitivefacility location: An overview of optimisa-
tion approaches. European Journal of Operational Research, 129 (3), 461–470.
Prescott, E. C. and Visscher, M. (1977). Sequential location among firms with
foresight. Bell Journal of Economics, 8 (2), 378–393.
ReVelle, C. S. and Eiselt, H. A. (2005). Location analysis: A synthesis and
survey. European Journal of Operational Research, 165 (1), 1–19.
Rhee, B.-D. (1996). Consumer heterogeneity and strategic quality decisions. Man-
agement Science, 42 (2), 157–172.
Roemer, J. E. (2001). Political Competition: Theory and Applications. Harvard
University Press.
Salop, S. C. (1979). Monopolistic competition with outside goods. The Bell Jour-
nal of Economics, 10 (1), 141–156.
Shiode, S. and Drezner, Z. (2003). A competitive facility location problem on a
tree network with stochastic weights. European Journal of Operational Research,
149 (1), 47–52.
Wendell, R. E. andMcKelvey, R. D. (1981). New perspectives in competitive
location theory. European Journal of Operational Research, 6 (2), 174–182.
141
